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ABSTRACT 
 
In the state of Michigan, people infected with HIV are required by law to disclose their HIV-
status to their partners before engaging in sexual contact. Failure to do so is a felony, punishable 
by up to four years in prison. Like statutes in 32 states that specifically criminalize 
nondisclosure, Michigan’s law does not require that the sexual contact pose a risk of HIV 
transmission – a fact illustrated vividly during the 2009 proceedings against a dancer convicted 
for not disclosing her status before her client’s nose penetrated her vagina. Indeed, despite 
scientific advances in treating and managing HIV disease, prosecutions for nondisclosure have 
continued unabated and appear to be on the rise. My dissertation explains this paradoxical trend 
by arguing that Michigan’s HIV disclosure law does not serve to control HIV as a virus but 
rather to identify it as a moral infection requiring interdiction and punishment. 
To make this case, my dissertation tackles three interrelated issues. In Chapter 2, I 
analyze how local health officials enforce the larger “health threat to others” statute, which 
includes the felony nondisclosure law but also confers upon public health authorities additional 
powers for controlling individuals they declare to be deviant. Based on interviews with officials 
in 14 of Michigan’s 17 jurisdictions for HIV, I argue that the techniques (such as STI testing and 
contact tracing) employed by some officials in order to identify potential “health threat” cases 
cannot actually reveal whether or not an individual disclosed his or her HIV-positive status. Yet, 
health officials’ conflation of nondisclosure with other, perfectly legal deviant 
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practices (e.g. condomless sex) suggests that their intent is not simply to control the spread of 
disease but also to regulate a population they perceive to be deviant.   
In Chapter 3, I draw on archival data associated with 95% of all convictions under the 
felony statute between 1992 and 2010 to analyze how legal actors transform HIV into a criminal 
matter in a court of law. Drawing on more than 4,000 pages of trial court transcripts, I 
demonstrate that legal actors frame nondisclosure as murderous and HIV-positive defendants as 
reckless killers – even in cases where the sexual contact alleged posed no risk of transmission. 
On that basis, I argue that the enforcement of Michigan’s HIV disclosure law is not driven by 
insights from medical science; rather, it serves to control and punish HIV-positive populations 
deemed deviant. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine disparities in conviction outcomes to identify whether 
certain groups are bearing the brunt of the disclosure law’s application. By comparing conviction 
outcomes with data documenting HIV-positive diagnoses during the same period, I argue that 
disparities under the disclosure law are better explained by variations in complainant 
characteristics (e.g. gender) than by characteristics of the defendant. For male defendants, having 
sex with women was associated with a higher rate of conviction as compared to men who have 
sex with men. Indeed, although critics have charged that HIV disclosure laws are homophobic, 
heterosexuals bear the brunt of the law’s application – particularly black men and white women.  
While many proponents of HIV legal reform have argued that HIV-specific criminal laws are 
bad for public health, the way state actors respond to these cases does not suggest that they are 
primarily interested in promoting public health. Of course, it is impossible to know what 
unspoken factors may have guided the decisions of prosecutors and attorneys in these cases. 
However, their patterned reliance on punitive and moral discourses – as well as their ignorance 
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and dismissal of scientific evidence – suggests that their understanding of these cases is tainted 
by stigma and morality. These ethical dimensions bear only a tenuous relationship to public 
health and medical evidence: their logic does not depend on science.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
During a general panic about the potential for AIDS to spread from “high risk” minority groups 
to the “general population” in the late 1980s, Michigan legislators enacted a set of laws 
collectively referred to as “health threat to others” laws that require HIV-positive individuals to 
disclose their status to their partners before engaging in a wide range of sexual practices. Like 
many of the 32 states that have enacted such statutes, Michigan does not require proof of 
malicious intent, nor does it require evidence that the sexual practices alleged pose any risk of 
transmitting the virus (Wolf & Vezina 2004; Galletly & Pinkerton 2006; Center for HIV Law & 
Policy 2011). Violators are legally termed “health threats” and sanctions can include forced 
testing and counseling, quarantine, and/or incarceration under the felony criminal provision. 
 While conceptual approaches to theorizing social control have varied over time (Meier 
1982), sociologists have a longstanding interest in understanding how categories of sickness are 
produced, regulated, and applied. Indeed, medical sociologists coined one of their signature 
concepts, “medicalization,” in order to describe the process through which social phenomena 
come to be regulated by medical authorities. Yet, while sociologists have acknowledged that 
medicalization could be “bidirectional and partial” (Conrad 2005:3), most research has centered 
on what was viewed as the usual direction of change: from badness to sickness (Conrad & 
Schneider [1980]1992). Much less is known about how phenomena historically controlled by 
medical authorities come to be governed by the criminal law.
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Recent reports suggest that over a thousand HIV-positive Americans have been 
criminally prosecuted for not disclosing their seropositivity to their partners (Bernard & Nyambe 
2012). Health scholars have criticized criminal disclosure laws, arguing that they may discourage 
HIV testing by inadvertently turning an HIV-positive test result into a potential legal liability – 
those who haven’t been tested and thus diagnosed as HIV-positive cannot be prosecuted under 
these statutes, so there is a legal advantage to not knowing whether or not one has been infected 
with HIV (Galletly & Pinkerton 2006). Yet, beyond limited studies in public health and a 
handful of sociological case studies (Shevory 2004), we know little about how these laws are 
enforced or the sociological implications of their application. 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine how Michigan’s “health threat” laws are 
enforced. The first paper (Chapter 2) draws on interview data with local health officials tasked 
with monitoring HIV-positive clients. It seeks to understand how they go about identifying and 
controlling clients they suspect of posing a “health threat to others.” Drawing on trial court data 
associated with 95% of all convictions under the felony statute between 1992 and 2010, the 
second paper (Chapter 3) shows how legal actors transform HIV into a criminal matter in a court 
of law. In other words, how do legal actors frame HIV as a legitimate site for legal intervention? 
The third paper (Chapter 4) analyzes conviction outcomes under the felony HIV disclosure law 
to ask whether certain groups are disproportionately punished under the law.  
 
Background 
The Social Context: A Brief Overview 
The “health threat to others” laws that are the subject of this dissertation did not emerge in an 
historical vacuum. While a history of the AIDS pandemic in the U.S. is beyond the scope of this 
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dissertation (for examples, see Inrig, 2011; Brandt 1987), three developments that began in the 
1980’s deserve mention:  the emergence and resurgence of infectious diseases, the birth and 
growth of AIDS activism, and the ascendance of the New Right during the Reagan years. 
The emergence and resurgence of infectious diseases.  Throughout most of the 20th 
century, public health and medicine took pride in what appeared to be a conquest of infectious 
disease. This triumphant victory was challenged in the last decades of the century, however, by 
several developments: the resurgence of tuberculosis; the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the 1980’s;  
the discovery of new diseases such as Lyme disease, Legionnaire’s disease, and hantavirus; and 
the emergence of antibiotic-resistance strains of old microbes such as Staphylococcus aureus 
(commonly known as “MRSA”) and multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis.  The rise of these 
infectious agents has been linked to a myriad of causes, from overcrowding in prisons and 
homeless shelters to globalization, increasing poverty, malnutrition, homelessness, and the over-
prescription of antibiotic drugs by physicians and patient noncompliance (for a discussion of 
these issues, see Gostin et al 1999).  In this new epidemiological context, public health officials 
in some cities returned to the coercive measures that had historically been used  to control the 
spread of infectious disease, such as compulsory isolation or quarantine. 
The Reagan years, the New Right, and the moral panic over AIDS.   In the U.S., this 
change in the epidemiological environment coincided with a change in the political environment. 
The CDC (1981) reported the first cases of a strange new form of Pneumocystis pneumonia 
among gay men in June of 1981, coinciding with the election of Ronald Reagan. With the 
Reagan presidency came the ascendance of the New Right, a coalition of conservative politicians 
and the Christian conservatives who would become a formidable force in American politics. For 
the American right, AIDS became a symbol of America’s moral decline. Members of the New 
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Right viewed the new “Gay Plague” as divine retribution for sexual sin, or in the words of Jerry 
Falwell, “the wrath of God against homosexuals.” A notable exception was Surgeon General C. 
Everett Koop, himself a pro-life advocate, who argued against the invasive social control of 
HIV-positive individuals advocated by the right wing, such as mandatory testing, arguing that 
such measures would cause HIV-positive people to “go underground” and make them 
unreachable by public health officials (Koop 1987:30; for a discussion, see Waller 2014). 
Combining racism, homophobia, and xenophobia, commentators began to speak of the 
“4-H risk groups”—homosexuals, heroin addicts, hemophiliacs, and Haitians. However, the New 
Right continued to focus most of its ire on the perceived transgressions of gay men. This climate 
of fear and social hostility exhibited some of the features of a moral panic: widespread belief in 
the group’s negative impact on society; hostility toward the groups in question (gay men, 
injection drug users accused of spreading the disease); and actions taken that are disproportionate 
to the actual threat the group poses (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994).  Political pundits fed the 
homophobia of a terrified public with doomsday proclamations about the plague imposed on 
“general public” by the hedonistic lifestyles of drug addicts and gay men. A 1987 Gallup Poll 
showed that, like conservative religious leaders, 43% of Americans said that AIDS was a 
punishment for moral decline (Kaiser Family Foundation 2011). In communities across the 
country, tensions were high. When a Florida couple successfully sued the De Soto County 
School District to allow their three hemophiliac, HIV-positive sons to attend school, they found 
their house had burned down, forcing them to leave town. (Thomas 1987).  
By the mid-1980s conservative politicians and religious leaders, such as Jesse Helms and 
Pat Robertson, argued for draconian, coercive measures:  mandatory testing of all those “at risk” 
of spreading the disease, branding people with AIDS with a visible tattoo, and quarantine and 
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criminal incarceration of “recalcitrant” AIDS carriers. (Waller 2014; Gostin 1989). In their call 
for coercion, conservatives were joined by members of a public increasingly frightened by the 
spread of an incurable disease.  Public opinion polls conducted in 1985 and 1986 showed that 
between 28 and 51% of respondents agreed that “people with AIDS should be put into 
quarantine to keep them away from the general public” (Singer, Rogers, & Corcoran 1987:580).   
Political activism among persons living with HIV.  AIDS was the first epidemic to 
emerge during a period when the many “new” social movements that followed the civil rights 
movement had become a powerful force in American politics (Gostin 2004). Like the 
movements that had influenced it, the women’s health movement and the gay liberation 
movement, AIDS activism combined identity politics with concrete objectives and astute 
strategy. AIDS activists—many of them professionals, artists, and intellectuals—had a greater 
degree of social capital than is commonly found among oppressed groups. This was one factor in 
the unique accomplishment of the AIDS movement: their collective transformation from 
“disease victims” into “activist experts” (Epstein 1996).  
Treatment activism began in the late 1980’s when the AIDS community, desperate for 
rapid approval of experimental drugs that offered a chance of survival, grew increasingly 
frustrated with regulatory bureaucracies, such as the FDA and National Institute of Allergies and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID), that prolonged the approval process and  restricted access to 
clinical trials. The most visible treatment activist group was ACT UP, a direct-action group 
known for staging well-attended, well-orchestrated protests at the NIH, FDA, CDC, and 
pharmaceutical companies. ACT UP members were instructed to do “homework before hell 
raising,” studying the intricacies of the drug approval process and mastering the vocabulary and 
culture of science while simultaneously establishing themselves as spokespersons for the AIDS 
6 
 
community. Their growing scientific sophistication established their credibility as “lay experts” 
and gave them access to officials in the highest reaches of the medical research establishment 
that had previously been closed to the public (Epstein 1996). AIDS activists influenced every 
aspect of clinical research, from funding priorities (e.g., treatment of opportunistic infections) to 
the design of clinical trials (inclusion in clinical trials of the full array of persons living with HIV 
and those who had been denied access because they had tried other treatments) to accelerated 
approval of treatments for HIV/AIDS and other life-threatening diseases to lowering the price of 
AZT (Killen, Harrington and Fauci, 2012; Epstein 2007).      
 AIDS activists also challenged the 100-year-old public health practices of surveillance: 
name-based reporting, contact tracing, and mandatory screening. At the beginning of the 
epidemic, states instituted mandatory reporting of the names of those diagnosed with AIDS to 
public health registries—a practice that was uncontroversial. However, activists strenuously 
resisted the move to implement named reporting of HIV-positive serostatus, arguing that it is an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy, one that carried a great risk of fomenting discrimination in 
housing and employments should the information become public. In the absence of effective 
treatment, early AIDS activists argued that compulsory programs using invasive surveillance 
strategies offered few benefits; voluntary programs, they argued, were more effective.  Many 
public health officials agreed with them. Although all 50 states would eventually adopt name-
based case reporting, states adopted programs based on voluntary counseling, anonymous 
testing, and pre-and-post-test counseling with strict confidentiality protections (Lazzarini 2001).  
In the 1990’s, however, the tide began to turn against the activists. Several politicians and 
some commentators argued against what they called “AIDS exceptionalism” and called for the 
revival of “time-honored” surveillance practices (Bayer 2007; Lazzarini 2001). CDC officials 
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also began to argue for the epidemiological benefits of a national system of serostatus reporting – 
namely, that it would greatly enhance the ability of public health authorities to track individuals 
diagnosed as HIV-positive and would produce much more accurate statistical data about the 
national HIV/AIDS caseload. Despite objections, the CDC ultimately succeeded in persuading 
all 50 states to adopt name-based systems by 2008 (for a discussion, see Gostin 2004). Despite 
occasional breaches of privacy (see, for example, Landry 1996), in 2006 the CDC also 
recommended screening for HIV for all persons aged 13 to 64 who receive healthcare and who 
do not explicitly “opt out” or object, threatening to do away with informed consent (for a 
discussion, see Fisher, Hanssens and Schulman 2006). Of all the renewed surveillance measures, 
partner notification programs have drawn the most fire from activists as well as from many 
public health officials because they can lead to emotional or physical abuse; because those who 
have not disclosed can be reported to law enforcement; and because they have not been found to 
be effective (Gostin 2004). Despite these concerns, most states have instituted partner services 
programs. In short, while AIDS activists were extremely successful in reshaping treatment 
research, they have been far less effective in dissuading public health officials from re-instating 
“time honored” surveillance practices. 
 
Controlling Disease, Controlling People: Public Health as a Site of Social Control 
When confronted with the AIDS epidemic, legislators and public health officials drew upon a 
legacy of public health practices used to control the spread of disease. When I refer to “public 
health,” I am using the term broadly to refer to a set of practices used to promote the health of 
and prevent disease in populations, whether by governmental officials or professionals. Many of 
these practices emerged long before the professional schools of public health were established 
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early in the 20th century. For centuries, public health officials have waged a battle—sometimes 
against overwhelming odds—to prevent the spread of disease, and one of their weapons has been 
social control.     
A brief survey of these disease control strategies illustrates how central social control is 
to the practice of public health. Most commentators classify public health measures as either 
voluntary or coercive.  Rather than using this dichotomy, however, it is more useful to view 
social control strategies as arrayed along the following continuum ranging from the least to the 
most coercive:                                                               
1. Persuasion. In the second half of the 20th century, public health focused on STI’s, 
HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, and the chronic illnesses that had become leading causes of death: heart 
disease, cerebrovascular disease, and diabetes. Increasingly, public health educators turned to ad 
campaigns designed to persuade individuals to adopt healthy lifestyles and modify the risky 
health behaviors now viewed as the new health threats: overeating, lack of exercise, careless 
driving, and unprotected sex (Colgrove and Bayer 2005; Bayer 2007). Despite its ostensibly 
voluntary nature, persuasion is a more subtle form of social control that shapes people’s behavior 
by motivating them to manage their health risks (Petersen and Lupton 1997; Lupton 2013). 
Advertising campaigns have been criticized for exaggerating risks, for example instilling fear 
though grisly images of dying smokers (see Lupton 2013).            
 2. Regulation. When public health campaigns failed to persuade, organizations, cities and 
states have adopted rules and ordinances targeting risky health behaviors more directly.  These 
include, for example, laws requiring drivers to wear seatbelts and motorcyclists to wear helmets; 
“sin taxes” that raise the price of cigarettes and alcohol; regulations prohibiting smoking in 
public establishments or restricting smoking to designated areas; and most recently, laws 
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forbidding restaurants to sell large, sugary drinks (Colgrove and Bayer 2005; Bayer 2007). Most 
of these measures work by creating disincentives or obstacles that make it more difficult to 
engage in risky behavior. The primary goal of these regulations, however, is not to improve the 
health of those who take risks. Rather, the courts have justified these regulations because of the 
threat risky behaviors pose to others or to the general public: the deleterious effect of passive 
smoke on others; the effect of seriously injured motorists on emergency personnel or other 
patients; the cost to taxpayers of caring for disabled accident victims (for a discussion, see Bayer 
2007). 
3. Compulsion. Public health surveillance practices, developed in the late nineteenth 
century, have included mandatory reporting of patients’ names to public health registries, contact 
tracing, in which those diagnosed with an STI are asked to reveal the names of their sexual 
partners who can be examined and treated; and mandatory screening for some infectious 
diseases.  All of these measures entail invasions of privacy and the risk of reputational damage 
should the information become public.  As has been noted, most states have moved away from 
strictly voluntary counseling and testing and have returned to mandatory surveillance practices. 
Compulsory vaccination programs have provoked intense controversy since the 19th century and 
continue to do so today (Colgrove and Bayer 2005; Bayer 2007). With the resurgence of 
tuberculosis and the appearance of resistant strains, health departments have imposed mandatory 
treatment and directly observed therapy on patients seen as noncompliant (Bayer and Dupuis 
1995; Bayer 2007). Compulsory screening, vaccination, and treatment programs involve 
coercion and violate the principle of informed consent and the right of patients to refuse 
treatment (for a discussion, see Fisher et al. 2006).          
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4. Confinement.  Among the oldest measures of infectious disease control are quarantine 
(mandatory separation of well persons believed to be exposed to a disease from the rest of the 
population) and isolation (involuntary confinement of infected persons in their homes or 
institutions to prevent them from spreading the disease). Quarantine emerged as a formal system 
of social control in medieval Europe during the 14th century Black Death or bubonic plague, 
when officials in the Italian city states forced ships from plague-infested countries to remain 
anchored for 40 days, confined infected sailors to hospitals known as lazarettos, erected “sanitary 
cordons,” policed by soldiers, to prevent strangers from entering the city, and isolated infected 
persons in their homes.  The practice of confining ships and infected persons became widespread 
in Europe, and colonists brought these practices to the New World (Parmet 2007; Tognotti 
2013).   
In the 19th century, quarantine and isolation were used to prevent the spread of smallpox, 
tuberculosis, and cholera; in the 20th century, they have been used during epidemics of scarlet 
fever, typhus, polio, and tuberculosis (Sullivan and Field 1988; Gostin, Burris, and Lazzarini 
1999; Parmet 2007; Tognotti 2013). In the midst of the moral panic surrounding the AIDS 
epidemic, several states passed laws authorizing the isolation of “recalcitrant” seropositive 
persons who health officials believed were engaging in behaviors that posed a threat to public 
health (Gostin, Burris, and Lazzarini 1999), sometimes after receiving “cease and desist” orders 
from public health authorities. Isolation can be an effective method of disease control for 
airborne diseases that are highly contagious and spread by casual contact. However, it is 
ineffective in the case of HIV/AIDS, which is spread through actions such as needle sharing and 
sexual intercourse rather than through spatial proximity (Sullivan and Field 1988). People who 
are isolated for most infectious diseases are released once they recover or are no longer 
11 
 
contagious. By contrast, because no effective treatment for HIV/AIDS existed at the time, those 
isolated could face confinement for the duration of their lives.  
Quarantine and isolation are highly coercive forms of social control—they represent the 
greatest extent to which people who have not committed a crime can be deprived of their 
freedom (Gostin 1989; Parmet 2007). In a 1905 decision, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Court nevertheless upheld these measures as a legitimate exercise of the state’s “police 
power” to limit individual freedom to protect the public’s health (Gostin, Burris, and Lazzarini 
1999; Colgrove and Bayer 2005; Gostin 2005). The sweeping power of public health officials to 
quarantine and isolate falls under the civil law but rivals the power of the criminal justice system 
to deprive people of their freedom. Moreover, “until relatively recently, “the protections 
accorded to defendants in criminal prosecutions have not been extended to those viewed as a 
threat to the public health” (Bayer 2003:141). This was to change when, amid the “due process 
revolution” of the 1970’s, the courts ruled that mental patients facing civil commitment to mental 
institutions were entitled to the due process protections of the 14th Amendment and were given 
the right to be treated in the least restrictive setting that met their needs. These rights came to be 
extended to patients with physical illness (Bayer 2003; Bayer and Dupuis 1995). 
5. Criminalization. During the 1980’s, state legislators responded to the demands of 
conservative politicians, the religious right, and frightened constituents to use the criminal law to 
incarcerate those blamed for spreading HIV/AIDS: drug users and particularly gay men.  States 
have used two principal types of laws to criminalize exposing others to HIV. First, states have 
used general criminal laws against assault and battery, reckless endangerment, or attempted 
murder, to prosecute HIV-positive persons who have allegedly exposed others to the virus. A 
wide variety of cases have been tried using general criminal law, ranging from biting to the case 
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of a Virginia man who was accused of “infected sexual battery” when he infected his wife 
through sexual intercourse (Gostin 2004). Criminal law is based on intent—often notoriously 
difficult to prove in the courtroom—and, partly for this reason, states began to pass laws 
criminalizing actions that exposed others to HIV irrespective of their intent to harm. Many of 
these statutes were modeled on “venereal disease” laws enacted earlier in the century. Between 
1986 and 2011, 33 states enacted HIV-specific criminal exposure statutes that made it a crime 
(usually a felony) for persons who are aware they have HIV to engage in a variety of behaviors 
and sexual practices without first disclosing their HIV-positive status (Lehman et al. 2014). Most 
of these statutes were enacted in the 1980’s, when little was known about the virus or how it was 
transmitted. However, seven states enacted statutes between 1999 and 2000, after the Ryan 
White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act required states to certify that their 
criminal laws were adequate to prosecute those who knowingly exposed others to HIV in order 
to receive federal funding for HIV/AIDS programs (see, for example, Lehman et al. 2014). 
State statutes vary widely in terms of the specific acts that are criminalized and the 
penalties that are imposed on those who are convicted. 24 states require disclosure of serostatus 
to sexual partners and/or needle-sharing partners (Lehman et al. 2014). 25 states criminalize one 
or more behaviors that pose a “low or negligible risk for HIV transmission,” such as oral sex, 
biting, spitting, or throwing blood. (Lehman et al. 2014).  Some states prohibit other practices 
known to be safe, such as manual stimulation or using sex toys or other objects without prior 
disclosure (Galletly and Pinkerton 2006). Only four states designate condom use as a defense 
(Lehman et al. 2014). Several statutes do not specify the specific behaviors that are criminalized: 
it is a crime simply to expose another person to HIV—a wording which one observer calls 
“unconstitutionally vague” (Gostin 2004).  In 16 states, failure to disclose seropositive status is 
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part of the crime, and the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove failure to disclose. Other 
than relying on complainant testimony, it is virtually impossible to prove whether a defendant 
did or not disclose their status (Lehman et al. 2014).  
Critics have argued that HIV disclosure statutes undermine the HIV prevention ethic of 
“safer sex,” which encourages using condoms as a way to circumvent the need for serostatus 
disclosure (Gostin 2004). Further, statutes in a few states are so vaguely worded as to criminalize 
exposure to HIV/AIDS regardless of whether one’s serostatus is disclosed, thereby criminalizing 
sex itself among HIV-positive persons (Gostin 1989).  In the vast majority of states, HIV-
specific criminal statutes do not require proof of the intent to expose another person to HIV or 
evidence that defendants actually transmitted HIV to their partners (Gostin 2004). In these states, 
simply engaging in behavior believed to expose another person to HIV without first disclosing 
one’s HIV-positive status is in itself a crime. 
Penalties for failing to disclose HIV-positive status can be harsh. Most HIV disclosure 
and exposure laws impose felony penalties; in only two states is it a misdemeanor to expose 
another person to HIV without prior disclosure (Lehman et al. 2014). The average minimum 
sentence in states with felony penalties is 11 years (Wolf and Vezina 2004), and maximum 
sentences range from 10 years (18 states) to 20 or more years (12 states) (Lehman et al. 2014).  
Critics argue that such sentences are far more severe than penalties for violent crimes such as 
assault (1-5 years in the model penal code) and rape (1-10 years in the model penal code) 
(Galletly and Pinkerton 2006). 
Many of these statutes reflect the climate of the period in which they were enacted:  an 
exaggerated perception of the risk of transmission of HIV and punitive attitudes toward persons 
living with HIV. In 2010, however, the Obama White House released its National HIV/AIDS 
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strategy, stating that “in some cases, it may be appropriate for legislators to reconsider whether 
existing laws continue to further the public interest and public health” (cited in Lehman et al. 
2014). A 2014 report bearing the authoritative imprimatur of the Department of Justice and the 
CDC noted that many state laws “criminalize behaviors that pose low or negligible risk for HIV 
transmission” and, in addition, most laws do not consider measures known to reduce the risk of 
transmission, such as condom use, HAART, or pre-exposure prophylaxis. The report encouraged 
states to “assess the laws’ alignment with current evidence regarding HIV transmission risk, and 
consider whether the laws…achieve their intended purposes.” For the many critics of these laws, 
these recommendations may come as welcome news. However, given that many of these points 
had been made as early as the late 1980s and, moreover, that antiretroviral drugs have been in 
use since 1996, others may also wonder why these recommendations came so late (see Center for 
HIV Law & Policy 2014). In any case, these recommendations do not yet have the force of law 
and many states legislatures will not be moved by suggestions from President Obama’s 
administration.  
A persistent, pervasive pattern. Historians of public health have documented a persistent 
pattern: from their inception in the Middle Ages, campaigns to control the spread of infectious 
disease through coercion have consistently targeted those considered deviant, disfavored, or 
disenfranchised. In the United States, enforcement of these public health measures was often 
deeply discriminatory, reserving the harshest, coercive measures for the groups most unfavorably 
situated in the social structure. To give a few notable examples: In 1900, a San Francisco 
ordinance required that all Chinese residents of the city receive a dangerous experimental 
vaccine for plague. Following reports of nine deaths from plague, city officials roped off the 
Chinese quarter, quarantining 25,000 residents, closing Chinese businesses, while explicitly 
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exempting non-Asians from quarantine (Tyson 2004; Parmet 2007). Although smallpox is 
viewed as a “democratic epidemic” that targets rich and poor alike, the public health response 
has been notably undemocratic.  In 1894, for example, Milwaukee officials forced immigrants 
and poor residents into a quarantine hospital. After cases were identified in Boston in 1902, 
public health officials, with police in tow, forcibly inoculated African Americans and immigrants 
(Annas, Mariner, and Parmet 2008). During the 1916 polio epidemic in New York City, health 
workers conducted door-to-door searches, forcibly removing sick children from their homes, but 
allowing the children of wealthy families to remain in a separate room in their homes (Risse 
1988). In each case, coercive measures were aimed at marginalized groups, often viewed as a 
threat to the moral order. During epidemics, fear and the stigma of contagion served to heighten 
the social exclusion of already stigmatized groups.  In this context, sanitary cordons, pesthouses, 
and jail cells express the need of elites to protect themselves from the “dangerous” classes. As 
this dissertation will demonstrate, the HIV/AIDS epidemic was no exception to this pattern. 
 
Contributions 
Toward a Critical Sociology of Public Health 
As the previous section shows, public health is, at its core, an institution of social control. 
Indeed, medical historians and anthropologists have recognized that efforts by public health 
authorities to control and regulate disease can be considered a form of social control. Building on 
this insight, I show how public health serves as an institution of social control by examining the 
various strategies local health officials use to identify and regulate potential “health threats” 
cases. In so doing, I hope to contribute to a critical sociology of public health. 
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Social control has been one of sociology’s enduring concepts. Parsons (1951) introduced 
this concept into medical sociology by noting that illness is a form of legitimate deviance and, 
conversely, that medicine is an institution of social control.  In their role as “gatekeepers,” 
physicians regulate access to the sick role and ensure that individuals return to their normal role 
obligations.  Two decades later, “post-Parsonian” medical sociologists developed a more critical 
perspective on medicine’s social control function by linking it to the use (and abuse) of 
professional power.  In an influential essay, Zola (1972) argued that medicine had supplanted the 
law and religion as the predominant institution of social control by, for example, exercising 
authority over how people should live their lives to remain healthy and retaining access to 
“taboo” areas, such as sex and reproduction.  In the course of treating disease, therefore, 
medicine defines and controls normative standards of conduct. Developing this perspective 
further, Conrad (1979; 1992) argued that medical social control should be understood as having 
four components: medical ideology (the imposition of a medical model as a result of the 
influence of physicians); collaboration (the role of doctors as “gatekeepers” of knowledge); 
technology (the use of medical technological innovations such as genetic screening); and, based 
on the work of Foucault (1973; 1977), surveillance (internalization of the “medical gaze”).   
An extensive body of empirical research has also documented the role of mental 
institutions (see, for example, Goffman 1961) and health professions in the control and 
surveillance of deviant behavior (for a review, see Conrad 1992). This research shows that 
control and surveillance often ironically exacerbate the very problems they purport to ameliorate. 
The findings of these studies parallel a body of sociological research that has analyzed how 
social work institutions, such as homeless shelters (Pitts 1996), battered women’s shelters 
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(Murray 1988), and social welfare programs (Piven & Cloward 1971), despite their ostensibly 
benign purposes, operate as sites of social control. 
Despite its importance, there is a significant imbalance in this literature: although an 
extensive body of theory and research has focused on medicine and related occupations as sites 
of social control, with few exceptions (Peterson and Lupton 1997; Lupton 2013), sociological 
studies have rarely examined social control in public health—a striking and surprising omission 
since social control is at heart of public health’s mandate. Like medicine, public health exercises 
authority over people’s lifestyles—including the intimate and “taboo” aspects of their lives. 
Public health officials, however, engage in strategies of social control that differ in two important 
ways from the more traditional forms of medical authority. First, the field of public health, in 
contrast to “clinical professionals” in medicine, focuses on prevention rather than treatment:  
Public health professionals try to prevent problems from happening or re-occurring 
through implementing educational programs, developing policies, administering 
services, regulating health systems and some health professions, and conducting 
research, in contrast to clinical professionals, such as doctors and nurses, who focus 
primarily on treating individuals after they become sick or injured (Association of 
Schools of Public Health N.d.). 
  
Second, while physicians focus on the individual patient, public health professionals focus on the 
health of populations: 
Overall, public health is concerned with protecting the health of entire populations, as 
small as a local neighborhood, or as big as an entire country or region of the world (CDC 
Foundation 2014). 
 
This mandate to focus on the health of populations rather than individuals poses ethical 
challenges that rarely arise in medicine. In contrast to medicine, Bayer and Fairchild (2004: 488) 
argue, “the core of public health practice is the charge to protect the common good,” which may 
“necessitate limits on the choices of individuals.” For this reason, public health ethics cannot be 
justified by the principles of biomedical ethics, which are grounded in the autonomy of the 
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individual patient (Bayer & Fairchild 2004). Moreover, in contemporary societies, populations 
are rarely homogeneous, consensual communities, but rather contain individuals and minority 
groups with divergent beliefs, norms, values, and interests (for a discussion, see Faden and 
Shebaya 2010). A public health policy can become contentious when the perspectives of 
majorities and minorities collide and public health officials impose their views on those with less 
power. Such cases are not unusual and some scholars in public health ethics argue that public 
health measures typically involve some degree of coercion (Bayer & Fairchild 2004; Faden & 
Shebaya 2010). Whether they focus on seatbelt or helmet laws, mandatory vaccinations, or 
controlling the spread of sexually-transmitted infections, public health campaigns involve efforts 
to compel groups to subordinate their beliefs or change their behavior to protect the health of 
larger collectivities. 
In this dissertation, I analyze several strategies local health officials employ in order to 
identify and control potential “health threats” cases. Their primary objective is not to treat or 
diagnose individuals with HIV, but rather to prevent those individuals from putting the health of 
others at risk. I argue that these efforts to control HIV do not resemble those of medical 
authorities aimed at diagnosing, treating, and managing HIV disease. This difference is in part 
due to the fact that public health aims to prevent illness in populations.  Thus, because it 
explicitly aims at the social control of populations, public health, no less than medicine, is 
uniquely deserving of critical sociological inquiry.  
While the difference between social control in medicine and public health can become 
blurred in actual practice, each field requires a different set of strategies for social control and 
thus a different set of sociological tools for analysis. What analytical tools can we use to develop 
a critical sociology of public health?  In the absence of an extensive body of sociological work, 
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we can look to the work of scholars in other fields. Social control in public health, whether in the 
form of mandatory screening, compulsory treatment, civil confinement, or criminal incarceration 
has been the subject of commentary and debate among scholars in history, public health law and 
policy, and the nascent field of public health ethics. 
According to most commentators, at the heart of public health is an ineluctable tension 
between promoting the public’s health and preventing disease on the one hand and civil liberties 
on the other (for a discussion, see Bayer 2007). Each level of social control reviewed above 
infringes on individual rights: Public health surveillance infringes on the right to privacy; 
mandatory treatment infringes on bodily integrity, autonomy, and the right to refuse treatment; 
and civil confinement and criminal incarceration infringe on personal liberty and freedom of 
movement (Gostin 1988; Bayer 2007). Writers agree that the challenge for policy makers is to 
strike a balance between public health and individual freedom but differ in the particular 
interventions they believe are justified. How they evaluate a particular measure depends on their 
assessments of the gravity of the health threat, the extent of infringement on liberty, and the 
relative weight attached to each consideration. Bayer (2007), for example, suggests that some 
compulsory measures, such as mandatory surveillance, may be necessary in the face of serious 
threats to public health. By contrast, Annas (2007: 1093) gives greater weight to civil liberties: 
“Sacrificing human rights…is almost always unnecessary and counterproductive in a free 
society.”  
Gostin has developed several criteria, based largely on constitutional and other legal 
principles, for assessing health interventions in the case of HIV/AIDS. The use of coercive 
public health powers that infringe on civil rights is justified only if it meets the following criteria: 
1) There is a significant risk of transmission of the virus to others; 2) the intervention is effective 
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in preventing transmission of HIV—that is, it is reasonably likely to achieve the stated goal (i.e., 
the means chosen fits the ends); 3) the intervention is the least restrictive option that can achieve 
that goal; 4) the human rights burdens are reasonable compared to the projected benefits; and 5) 
the benefits and burdens are fairly distributed—that is, the burdens are imposed only where a 
public health risk exists (Gostin 1989; Gostin 2000; Gable, Gostin, & Hodge 2008). 
By now, numerous reviews and commentaries focus on HIV exposure and disclosure 
laws. Using Gostin’s criteria as a framework helps explain why most observers conclude that 
these laws are unjustified: 1) Most laws can be applied to behavior that do not pose a significant 
risk of transmitting HIV to others, such as biting, spitting, manual stimulation, or using sex toys 
(Gostin 1988, 2004; Sullivan and Field 1988; Lazzarini, Bray and Burris 2002; Wolf and Vezina 
2004; Gallety and Pinkerton 2006; Lehman et al. 2014). Only four states take into consideration 
measures known to lower the risk of transmitting the virus, such as condom use, anti-retroviral 
therapy, or pre-exposure prophylaxis (Lehman et al. 2014). 2) There is no empirical evidence 
that criminalization is effective in preventing or deterring the most common modes of 
transmission:  unprotected, consensual sex and needle sharing (Burris and Cameron 2008). In 
fact, one study suggests that high-risk individuals in a state with criminal HIV exposure laws 
were no less likely to engage in high-risk sexual behaviors than those in a state without such 
laws (Burris et al. 2007). Moreover, the criminal law “discourages exactly those behaviors 
necessary for the collective good—testing, disclosure, and participation in clinical and public 
health programs” (Gostin 2004: 492). 3) With two exceptions, states have not implemented 
policies that offer persons believed to engage in high-risk behavior less restrictive options, such 
as counseling and education before they are prosecuted for criminal exposure. 4) Most laws 
impose excessive human rights burdens. In 28 states, exposing others to HIV without prior 
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disclosure of serostatus is a felony. Many HIV-specific criminal laws authorize excessively harsh 
prison sentences (Gostin 2004) that are more severe than penalties for comparable crimes, such 
as assault; penalties are comparable to or, in some cases, more severe than those applied to more 
serious crimes such as rape (Galletly and Pinkerton 2006). In addition, all of the statutes 
legitimize the state’s intrusion into the most private aspects of its citizen’s lives (Gostin 2004) 
and add the stigma of criminality to disfavored groups who already experience the stigma of a 
stigmatizing disease (Lazzarini et al. 2002; Wolf and Vezina 2004; Galletly and Pinkerton 2006). 
5) The human rights burdens are unfairly distributed. HIV-specific statutes criminalize 
consensual sexual activities that are common and widespread, inviting selective, discriminatory 
enforcement against members of the most vulnerable or disfavored groups: sex workers, IV drug 
users, gay men, the poor, and members of racial minorities (for a discussion, see Sullivan & 
Field 1988; Wolf & Vezina 2004; Gostin 1988, 2004).  
In short, these considerations lead almost all commentators to conclude that these 
criminal laws violate civil rights and are “unlikely to be an effective tool for public health” 
(Gostin 2004: 492).  Some authors also conclude that criminal HIV exposure statutes do not fare 
well when assessed against the stated goals of the criminal law. While they do provide an outlet 
for collective outrage and retribution, prisons are unlikely to incapacitate or rehabilitate 
offenders, and the law is unlikely to deter behaviors that transmit HIV (see, for example, Burris 
and Cameron 2008). 
Weighing the costs to human rights against public health benefits provides a clear set of 
standards for evaluating social control in public health.  This framework, however, has its critics. 
First, to ask about the extent to which the state can abridge civil liberties in the name of public 
health arguably prejudges the issue at the outset by assuming that some restriction on freedom 
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will always be necessary. Moreover, as Jonathan Mann argued, the conflict between human 
rights and public health is a false dichotomy: voluntary measures, such as counseling, 
community outreach, needle exchange, and voluntary testing not only protect human rights but 
have also been shown to improve public health (see Fee and Parry 2008). Conversely, coercion 
and criminalization of HIV exposure is ineffective in encouraging people to alter their health 
behavior and drives them away from public health programs and therefore has a negative impact 
on both human rights and public health (see also Gostin 2004, Burris and Cameron (2008). For 
these reasons, the tension between human rights and public health is illusory. 
An alternative view of public health—and one that human rights activists would 
endorse—-places social justice and remediation of health disparities at the center of public 
health’s mandate (Faden and Shebaya 2010). Given that social inequality is a fundamental cause 
of health disparities (Link & Phelan 1995), it is not surprising that HIV/AIDS has increasingly 
affected the poor, immigrants, and Latinos and African Americans (Gostin 2004). Viewed from 
this vantage point, criminalizing HIV exposure not only leads to selective, discriminatory 
enforcement of the law, but, in addition, places the onus of responsibility on the individual 
(particularly the infected individual) to change his or her behavior rather than addressing the root 
causes of the epidemic. For example, rather than arresting sex workers for exposing others to 
HIV, a social justice-human rights paradigm would address the problems that led many to turn to 
prostitution in the first place and provide them with housing, food stamps, and welfare benefits 
(Sullivan and Field 1988). It would endorse needle exchange and methadone substitution 
programs rather than arresting more people who use drugs. Finally, a social justice-oriented 
program would also remove the barriers that prevent people from accessing anti-retroviral 
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therapy by providing housing, transportation, and economic support (see, for example, Open 
Society Institute 2008). 
The body of literature I have reviewed suggests legal and ethical frameworks that can be 
used to create a critical sociology of public health. But such a sociology needs to be built on a 
solid foundation of empirical knowledge about how public health social control measures work 
in actual practice. On this point, as some writers acknowledge, the literature raises as many 
questions as it answers (see Lazzarini et al. 2002). While this literature analyzes the theoretical 
tensions between civil liberties and the public’s health, there is much we still do not know about 
whether and how these tensions play out on the ground today. Many of the arguments against 
coercive social control are consequentialist and are based on the presumed and predicted 
consequences of criminalization: that it will drive people away from public health programs, be 
enforced selectively against disfavored groups, or exacerbate the stigma of HIV/AIDS. Yet we 
still know little about the actual consequences of these laws. While writers predict that the 
criminal law will further stigmatize people living with AIDS, much remains to be learned about 
how public health officials and court officers reproduce that stigma through their work.  
Most commentators use as “data” the content of criminal statutes—the law on the 
books—from which they extrapolate its predicted consequences. The few multi-state surveys of 
criminal laws that discuss enforcement (e.g., Lazzarini et al. 2002) focus on the outcome of 
statutes—decisions—rather than the processes of decision-making in the court room. Thus, as 
Lazzarini and her colleagues observe, much remains to be learned about how the criminal law is 
applied and enforced: 
There is a real difference between criminal law on the books and criminal law in practice. Some 
laws are heavily enforced, others rarely. The prohibitions can be broadly or narrowly interpreted. 
…the people who really “make” criminal law are police and prosecutors. …This “prosecutorial 
discretion” extends not just to the question of whether to arrest and charge a person, but also with 
which crimes to charge, and whether to accept a plea bargain….Police decide how intensively to 
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look for violations of the law or to investigate those brought to their attention. Exercise of 
prosecutorial and law enforcement discretion raises particular concerns where it is exercised 
arbitrarily or prejudicially (Lazzarini et al. 2002:240). 
 
There are other questions as well: How do public health officials talk to and about their 
clients? Do they protect their clients from the criminal law or, as activists have predicted, 
collaborate with law enforcement? Do defendants understand that they are exposing others to 
HIV and recklessly ignore the consequences of their actions? Or do they believe they have taken 
precautions to protect their partners against infection?  How do prosecutors and judges depict 
HIV and the actions of the criminal defendants? 
In short, the literature underscores the need for empirical research. To build a critical 
sociology of public health we need to know how social control works at the “street level” in the 
transactions between health officials and clients, court officers and defendants. While 
sociologists have analyzed how mental hospitals, homeless shelters, battered women’s shelters 
operate as sites of social control, there is not a similarly rich empirical research that analyzes the 
negative repercussions that flow from public health efforts to control disease.  The papers in this 
dissertation take a first step toward filling that gap in our knowledge. 
 
From Sickness to Badness: Interrogating the Concept of Medicalization 
Over the past four decades, medical sociologists have elaborated on the concept of medical 
social control. Freidson (1970) was the first to recognize that illness was a socially constructed 
phenomenon by analyzing how medical professionals came to define categories of deviance as 
illness in order to diagnose increasing numbers of individuals as sick. Conrad (1979, 1992) and 
Conrad and Schneider ([1980] 1992) later articulated these efforts through the concept of 
medical social control, which is conceptualized as the process whereby medicine and its 
practitioners come to govern types of non-conformity once viewed as crime or sin. Conrad’s 
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theory of medical social control became encapsulated within the well-known concept, 
“medicalization,” in his analysis of the development of the medical category “hyperkinesis” (see 
Conrad 1975). 
With the rise of science and the increasing power of the medical profession, the process 
of medicalization followed an inexorable trajectory as an ever-widening variety of forms of 
deviant behavior or “badness” came to be defined as “sickness.” Conrad and Schneider first 
described the medicalization of child abuse, hyperkinesis, alcoholism, and mental illness, but in 
later decades, scholars applied the concept to such phenomena as female sexual dysfunction 
(Bancroft 2002) and fetal alcohol syndrome (Armstrong 2003)—and even processes that more 
readily seem “natural,” such as death and dying (Riley 1983). Those who wrote about 
medicalization also theorized the consequences of medicalization. Although the medicalization 
of deviant behavior purports to remove blame from the person who is labeled as sick, in fact 
there were other, more insidious consequences, such as the de-politicization of deviance and the 
disempowerment of patients.  At the same time, medicalization resulted in the increasing 
authority of experts, such as physicians and members of related occupations (school 
psychologists), whose power increased as their jurisdiction expanded. 
Conrad (2005) noted that with such developments as direct-to-consumer marketing, no 
longer were professionals the exclusive agents of medicalization; rather, the “engines’ were often 
pharmaceutical companies, health insurers, and consumer groups. However, few questioned the 
belief that the process of medicalization was largely unidirectional, resulting in increasing 
numbers of conditions that had come to be defined and treated medically. With the exception of 
Fox’s (1977) observations on de-medicalization, only recently have observers come to question 
this picture of a one-way historical progression of events. While Conrad and Schneider ([1980] 
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1992) originally conceptualized medicalization as the process through which “categories of 
deviant behavior become defined as medical rather than moral problems” (p. 17), Conrad (2005) 
later argued that medicalization can be “bidirectional and partial” (p. 5). Anspach (2011:xxii) 
expands on this to suggest that “ideas about bad behavior… continue to exist in popular culture 
alongside the medical model.” Bosk (2013) argues that, while children with behavioral disorder 
diagnoses undergo partial medicalization, this does not protect them from criminalization.  
Thus, one contribution of this dissertation is to interrogate the concept of medicalization 
by examining what happens when “sickness” (HIV in this case) comes to be defined as 
“badness.” In order to understand better this relationship between medical and legal governance, 
this dissertation examines what Timmermans and Gabe (2002) describe as the “medico-legal 
borderland” – that is, sites of overlapping jurisdiction between medicine and the law. By 
examining the criminal regulation of a disease, this dissertation puts the literature on medical 
social control in conversation with the criminological literature on the process of 
“criminalization”—or, how deviance becomes labeled as crime and controlled by criminal justice 
authorities (for a review, see Jenness 2004). Describing this transition as a “moral passage,” 
Gusfield (1967:187) argues that “What is attacked as criminal today may be seen as sick next 
year and fought over as possibly legitimate by the next generation.”  
 
Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System 
Explaining discrimination in the criminal justice system is a longstanding goal of socio-
legal scholars. While the scholarship on the subject is too vast to review comprehensively here, 
there are important conceptual distinctions to note. In particular, legal approaches to 
conceptualizing discrimination have often formally distinguished between disparate treatment 
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and disparate impact (see Lucas, 2008). Disparate treatment studies on race, for example, 
examine racist practices that explicitly treat groups differently—such as racial bias in criminal 
sentencing (see, for example, Doerner and Demuth, 2010; Kautt, 2009; Crawford et al., 2006). 
Disparate impact studies, by contrast, examine practices that are not explicitly related to race, 
gender, or some other legally protected identity but nonetheless result in disparate outcomes, 
such as the well-documented disparate impact of the “war on drugs” on racial minorities (for a 
review, see Provine, 2011). Documenting the causal mechanisms underlying these outcomes has 
been more problematic; socio-legal scholars have noted that interpreting such trends as racist 
often conflicts with conventional notions of racial prejudice that implicitly understand it to be 
intentional (Murakawa and Beckett, 2010).  
While racial discrimination is perhaps the most widely studied form of discrimination, a 
wide range of social factors have come under the scrutiny of socio-legal scholars interested in 
discrimination. These include various demographic characteristics of the defendant, such as their 
age (Steffernsmeier et al.,1995) and gender (Koons-Witt, 2002) and the interaction of these 
variables for black men in particular (Doerner and Demuth 2010; Steffernsmeier et al., 1998).  
While far less numerous, studies have also examined whether the characteristics of crime 
victims—rather than just defendants—are also associated with criminal justice outcomes. In 
particular, numerous studies have examined how the gender and race of violent crime victims 
impact the imposition of the death penalty, finding that black defendants accused of killing white 
victims receive the death penalty at higher rates than others (see, for example, Holcomb et al., 
2006; Radelet and Pierce, 1985). Similar studies of victim characteristics in non-capital crimes 
and their adjudication are less numerous. In this dissertation, I extend the insights of these 
scholarly efforts by evaluating whether defendant characteristics and partner gender (that is, the 
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gender of the sexual partner in cases of non-disclosure of HIV-positive status) are associated 
with disparate rates of conviction under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law.  
 
The Social Control of Sickness through Three Empirical Lenses 
Despite scientific advances in treating and managing HIV disease, prosecutions for 
nondisclosure have continued unabated and appear to be on the rise. My dissertation explains 
this paradoxical trend by arguing that Michigan’s HIV disclosure law functions to control HIV 
not as a virus but rather as a moral infection requiring interdiction and punishment. To make this 
case, my dissertation tackles three interrelated questions.  
Chapter 2, “Controlling Sex in the Name of Public Health: Social Control and Michigan 
HIV Law,” analyzes how local health officials enforce the larger “health threat to others” statute, 
which includes the felony nondisclosure law but also confers upon public health authorities 
additional powers for controlling individuals they declare to be deviant. Based on interviews 
with officials in 14 of Michigan’s 17 jurisdictions for HIV, this chapter reveals the techniques 
(such as STI testing and contact tracing) employed by some officials in order to identify potential 
“health threat” cases and argues that these strategies cannot actually reveal whether or not an 
individual disclosed his or her HIV-positive status to his or her partner. Despite this, health 
officials’ conflation of nondisclosure with other, perfectly legal deviant practices (e.g. 
condomless sex) suggests that their intent is not simply to control the spread of disease but also 
to regulate a population they perceive as deviant.   
Chapter 3, “From Sickness to Badness: The Criminalization of HIV in Michigan,” draws 
on archival data associated with 95% of all convictions under the felony statute between 1992 
and 2010 to analyze how legal actors transform HIV into a criminal matter in a court of law. 
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Drawing on more than 4,000 pages of trial court transcripts, the analysis demonstrates that legal 
actors frame nondisclosure as murderous and HIV-positive defendants as reckless killers—even 
in cases where the sexual contact alleged posed no risk of transmission. These findings show that 
Michigan’s HIV disclosure law is not driven by insights from medical science; rather, it serves to 
control and punish HIV-positive populations deemed deviant. 
Chapter 4, “Disparate Risks of Conviction under Michigan’s Felony HIV Disclosure 
Law: An Observational Analysis of Convictions and HIV Diagnoses, 1992-2010,” examines 
disparities in conviction outcomes to determine whether certain groups are bearing the brunt of 
the disclosure law’s application. By comparing conviction outcomes with data documenting 
HIV-positive diagnoses during the same period, this analysis shows that disparities under the 
disclosure law are better explained by variations in complainant characteristics (e.g. their gender) 
rather than those of the defendant. For male defendants, having sex with women was associated 
with a higher rate of conviction as compared to men who have sex with men. Indeed, although 
critics have charged that HIV disclosure laws are homophobic, heterosexuals bear the brunt of 
the law’s application—particularly black men and white women.   
Chapter 5 serves as the conclusion to the dissertation. It reflects on the broader 
implications of these findings, taken together, and considers their import. While many 
proponents of HIV legal reform have argued that HIV-specific criminal laws are bad for public 
health, the way state actors respond to these cases does not suggest that they are primarily 
interested in promoting public health. Of course, it is impossible to know what unspoken factors 
may have guided the decisions of prosecutors and attorneys in these cases. However, their 
patterned reliance on punitive and moral discourses—as well as their ignorance and dismissal of 
scientific evidence—suggests that their understanding of these cases is tainted by stigma and 
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morality. These ethical dimensions bear only a tenuous relationship to public health and medical 
evidence: their logic does not depend on science.
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CHAPTER 2 
Controlling Sex in the Name of “Public Health”: 
Social Control and Michigan HIV Law 
 
Introduction 
During a general panic about the potential for AIDS to spread from “high risk” minority groups 
to the “general population” in the late 1980s, Michigan legislators enacted a set of laws 
collectively referred to as “health threat to others” law that requires HIV-positive individuals to 
disclose their status to their partners before engaging in any form of sexual contact. Like many of 
the 32 states that have enacted such statutes, Michigan law does not require proof of malicious 
intent, nor do they require evidence that the sexual practices alleged pose any risk of transmitting 
the virus (Wolf & Vezina 2004; Galletly & Pinkerton 2006; Center for HIV Law & Policy 2011). 
Violators are legally termed “health threats” and sanctions can include forced testing and 
counseling, quarantine, and/or incarceration under the felony criminal provision. 
Recent reports suggest that over a thousand HIV-positive Americans have been 
criminally prosecuted for not disclosing to their partners (Bernard & Nyambe 2012). Health 
scholars have criticized criminal disclosure laws, arguing that they may disincentivize HIV 
testing by inadvertently turning an HIV-positive test result into a potential legal liability – those 
who haven’t been tested and thus diagnosed as HIV-positive cannot be prosecuted under these 
statutes (Galletly & Pinkerton 2006). Yet, beyond limited studies in public health and a handful 
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of sociological case studies (Shevory 2004), we know little about how these laws are enforced or 
the sociological implications of their application. 
 In this paper, I report findings from a study involving 25 local health officials who are 
responsible for managing “health threat” cases from 14 health jurisdictions in Michigan. 
Qualitative, in-depth interviews with these officials reveal two primary techniques of identifying 
“health threat” cases that I argue can be usefully conceptualized as informal and formal forms of 
social control. In what follows, I first provide an overview of the literature on the social control 
of public health. While sociological approaches to medical social control have typically 
examined the practices, forms of authority, and discourses of conventional medicine, I instead 
bring the insights of the literature on social control to bear on the field of public health. Although 
medicine and public health have similar aims, I argue that their contrasting orientations towards 
prevention (public health) and treatment (medicine) have important implications for their 
strategies of social control. In the second section, I survey the literature on the legal regulation of 
HIV disclosure. This paper builds on its insights by analyzing how public health enforces a 
broader set of “health threat” legal statutes by means that go beyond criminal sanctions. In the 
third section, I provide background on the history of sexual contact tracing and HIV testing in 
the United States. 
In the fourth and fifth sections, I report findings from my research.  I analyze the formal 
and informal strategies of social control that were described by participants. The first, “formal” 
strategy for social control is evidenced by reports from health officials in five jurisdictions who 
described harnessing epidemiological surveillance technologies, such as Partner Services and 
HIV testing, for legal surveillance. This strategy typically involved asking a client newly 
diagnosed with a reportable sexually transmitted infection (including HIV but also other 
33 
 
infections such as chlamydia) to report the names of their previous sexual partners as well as 
whether any of those named partners had disclosed that they were HIV-positive before sex. 
Officials would then check the list of named partners against the state’s database that includes 
anyone ever diagnosed as HIV-positive in Michigan in order to identify potential “health threat” 
cases. As I show, the formal techniques for controlling “health threat” cases described by health 
officials often rely on misguided assumptions about sexual practices and HIV risk. Moreover, the 
application of those techniques reveals vast differences in how officials interpret the law, with 
some officials conflating not disclosing with engaging in unprotected sex.  
The second, “informal” strategy for social control is evidenced by reports from health 
officials in five jurisdictions who describe receiving a large volume of “third party phone 
reports” in which local residents accuse others in the community of not disclosing their supposed 
HIV-positive status to their sexual partners. I argue that these patterned phone calls are 
suggestive of local gossip cultures fueled by gendered and raced forms of social stigma. 
Moreover, although the kind of disclosure practiced by community members through gossip is 
not encouraged by the state’s HIV disclosure law, I argue that these practices reflect underlying 
assumptions about risk and informed consent similar to those encoded in the law. 
 
Literature Review & Background 
The Social Control of Public Health 
This paper attempts to bridge two sometimes disparate traditions in the sociological literature on 
social control. First, it is framed by the work of medical sociologists who have analyzed how 
medical knowledge, authority, and technologies come to be an important site of social control. 
This literature can be traced back to Parsons’ (1951) novel work on the “sick role” in which he 
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conceptualized illness as form of deviance and medicine as the appropriate resulting form of 
social control. With a more critical eye towards medicine, Conrad (1979; 1992) argued that 
medical social control should be understood as having four critical components: medical 
ideology (the imposition of a medical model as a result of increased influence by medical 
authorities); collaboration (the role of doctors as information providers or “gatekeepers” of 
knowledge); technology (the use of medical technological innovations such as genetic 
screening); and, based on the work of Foucault (1973; 1977), surveillance (including how the 
“medical gaze” becomes internalized).  
Building on these important pioneering insights and the work of other medical 
sociologists who have revealed much about how medical institutions and practice operate as sites 
of social control, this paper attempts to bring these critical insights to bear on the field of public 
health. I argue that public health differs in important ways from more traditional forms of 
medicine and medical authority. For instance, the Association of Schools of Public Health 
distinguishes the field of public health from that of “clinical professionals” by its focus on 
prevention rather than treatment:  
Public health professionals try to prevent problems from happening or re-occurring 
through implementing educational programs, developing policies, administering 
services, regulating health systems and some health professions, and conducting 
research, in contrast to clinical professionals, such as doctors and nurses, who focus 
primarily on treating individuals after they become sick or injured (Association of 
Schools of Public Health N.d.). 
 
While this heuristic distinction between treatment and prevention can become blurry in practice1, 
I argue that there are important differences in how public health produces social control as 
                                                          
1 For instance, advocates arguing for the rapid scale-up of antiretrovirals to treat HIV infection in developing nations 
recently framed the need to provide HIV-positive people access to lifesaving treatments as an indirect but effective 
way to prevent future infections. Because these medications dramatically reduce or even eliminate the amount of 
virus in patients’ bodily fluids, patients treated with antiretrovirals are less likely to transmit the virus to others. 
Thus, “treatment as prevention” has become a slogan of many treatment activists – blurring the lines between these 
two conceptual approaches to health. 
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compared to traditional institutions of medicine. This difference is in part due to the fact that 
public health aims to prevent illness, which requires a different set of strategies for social control 
and thus a different set of sociological tools for analysis.  
To say that public health is a site of social control is, admittedly, not altogether novel. 
Indeed, within the social sciences, historians of medicine and medical anthropologists have both 
developed rich, critical traditions analyzing the efforts of public health to control communities. 
For example, historians have shown how venereal disease control campaigns in the early 20th 
century (Davidson 2000; Holloway 1998), as well as psychiatry and mental hospitals (Foucault 
1973; Sadowsky 1999; Jackson 2005) operate as institutions of social control. Anthropologists 
have a similarly rich tradition critical of public health; for example, scholars have criticized the 
way that stigmatizing, American epidemiological concepts such as the “bisexual bridge” have 
been problematically mapped on to HIV epidemics in Latin American and Caribbean countries 
where the word “bisexual” may not even exist (Carrillo 2003; Padilla 2007). However, while 
sociologists such as Peterson and Lupton (1997) have theorized how public health can become 
an important site of moral regulation, there is not yet a rich empirical knowledge base in 
sociology documenting the various forms that social control can take in public health practice. 
 
Informal and Formal Social Control 
In order to bring greater specificity to a concept that has been invoked to refer to very different 
kinds of social processes (for an overview, see Janowitz 1975; Meier 1982), I rely on a 
distinction in the criminology literature between “formal” and “informal” modes of social 
control. For the purposes of this paper, when I speak of formal social control, I refer to the 
regulation, surveillance, and control of individuals and their behaviors by institutions of authority 
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and officials who represent them. I am putting in conversation the concept of “formal” social 
control that comes out of the criminology literature with the previously described concept of 
medical social control outlined by Conrad (1992). In this paper, I draw on Conrad’s (1992) focus 
on technology and surveillance in particular to analyze the use of epidemiological surveillance 
technologies by health officials for formal social control.  
When I speak of informal social control2, I refer to the ways community members 
monitor, police, and control each other. Notably, I am drawing on the concept developed by 
sociologists and policy scholars to mean “what ordinary citizens do to keep where they live free 
from crime and disorder” (Carr 2003: 1249). This literature is often in conversation with “broken 
windows theory,” which postulates that decaying neighborhood conditions lead to social disorder 
and crime (Wilson and Kelling 1982). However, while informal social control is sometimes 
defined positively as a force promoting social order (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; 
Carr 2003), I argue that it does not necessarily yield laudable social outcomes.  
In framing this paper around both formal and informal kinds of social control, I aim to 
highlight the need for a critical sociology of public health. While social work scholars have 
analyzed how institutions such as homeless shelters (Pitts 1996), battered women’s shelters 
(Murray 1988), and welfare programs in general (Piven & Cloward 1971) operate as sites of 
social control, public health scholarship is generally uncritical of the role public health 
institutions play in producing and organizing social control. For instance, while various studies 
have attempted to examine the role that social stigma plays in structuring the HIV epidemic 
(Herek 1999; Sayles, et al. 2009) the literature rarely acknowledges the role public health may 
                                                          
2 Readers may note that my usage is somewhat different from how medical sociologists such as Bosk (1979) have 
used the term to designate the kind of regulation produced through ordinary, everyday social interaction, such as 
physicians scolding medical residents. The literature in public policy also highlights social interaction in its 
approach to informal social control, but highlights instead how lay individuals police each other when authority 
figures are not around. 
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play in producing stigma and the deleterious consequences that flow from it. While this paper is 
not primarily about stigma, I argue that the techniques of social control described and facilitated 
by public health officials are both informed by and reproduce social stigma. 
 HIV Disclosure and “Health Threat” Policies in the United States 
Michigan’s “health threat” legislative package legally codifies the various steps health officials 
must follow in handling cases involving “an individual who is a carrier [and] has demonstrated 
an inability or unwillingness to conduct himself or herself in such a manner as not place others at 
risk of exposure to a serious communicable disease or infection” (Michigan Compiled Law 
Annotated § 333.5201). Once identified as a “health threat,” the offender must be served a “cease 
and desist warning notice.” If health officials later suspect that the individual is not complying 
with the warning notice, they may request that the case be reviewed by a probate court where a 
judge can order a variety of interventions, including mandatory education; counseling and/or 
treatment programs; forced HIV testing; quarantine; and “any other order considered just by the 
circuit court” (Michigan Compiled Law Annotated § 333.5205). Because the state does publicly 
release data on “health threat” cases, it is not known precisely how many cases are pursued 
beyond warning notices.  
The “health threat” statute also includes a felony criminal provision that applies 
specifically and only to persons infected with HIV.  It states: 
A person who knows he or she has HIV, and who engages in sexual penetration with 
another person without informing that person of his or her HIV status, is guilty of a 
felony. "Sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal 
intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of 
any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body; emission of semen 
is not required (Michigan Compiled Law Annotated § 14.15 [5210]). 
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While Michigan State Police records indicate that at least 68 criminal cases3 have been 
initiated under the felony HIV disclosure statute between the first prosecution in 1992 
and October 2010 (Michigan State Police 2011), what role health officials have played (if 
any) in initiating or facilitating these charges has not been described until now. 
Yet, while 68 known cases have been brought against (allegedly) HIV-positive 
defendants for failing to disclose their own status, no evidence exists that suggests anyone has 
ever been charged for unlawfully revealing another person’s HIV-positive status. Under 
Michigan law, it is illegal for an individual to disclose another person’s HIV status without that 
person’s express, written permission. The law requires that “All reports, records, and data… that 
are associated with the serious communicable diseases or infections of HIV infection… are 
confidential” and states that anyone who violates this statute is “guilty of a misdemeanor, 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or 
both, and is liable in a civil action” (Michigan Compiled Law Annotated § 333.5131). Even 
though this statute was enacted at the same time as the felony law requiring HIV-positive 
individuals to disclose to their sexual partners, I have not discovered any evidence to suggest that 
charges have ever been filed under its provisions. 
Very little scholarship exists that examines the impact of non-criminal “health threat” 
statutes and laws like them in other states. However, in a survey of all fifty state health 
departments, Bayer and Fairchild-Carrino (1993) found that 24 states had either no policy in 
place for handling what they termed “recalcitrant” HIV-positive individuals (which the authors 
define as “those who knowingly persisted in exposing others to HIV” [p. 1471]) or took no 
                                                          
3 Michigan State Police data indicates there have been 49 convictions and 19 cases in which a defendant with a prior 
criminal record was either found not guilty or succeeded in having the charge dismissed. Records involving 
defendants who were not convicted and who did not have a prior criminal record are expunged, so the number of 
such cases is unknown. However, local news reports suggest they are few and far between. 
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action if they received reports about such individuals. Additionally, this study found that 
Michigan was one of 16 states where both quarantine and criminal prosecutions had been carried 
out, although the authors noted that quarantine was much less common than prosecution. They 
concluded that “despite [the law’s] procedural protections, [prosecution] has been deemed a 
more effective way of seeking to assert social control over individuals whose behavior was 
considered a threat” (p. 1475).  More common than either approach, however, was the issuance 
of cease and desist orders to “recalcitrant” HIV-positive individuals as provided for under non-
criminal “health threat” statutes. 
Studies focused on criminal disclosure statutes are more abundant. Recent studies 
indicate that at least 24 states presently have a criminal law that makes it a misdemeanor or a 
felony for HIV-positive people to have sex without first disclosing their status. Including states 
with sentence enhancement policies that increase the severity of punishment for certain crimes 
such as prostitution, 32 states have HIV-specific criminal statutes (Wolf & Vezina 2004; Galletly 
& Pinkerton 2006; Center for HIV Law & Policy 2011). Michigan’s statute in particular has been 
criticized for being overly broad, in that it criminalizes sexual acts that carry no risk of HIV 
transmission (Heywood 2008). Like many state disclosure laws, Michigan law neither requires 
actual transmission or even risk of transmission in order to define the sexual behavior of the 
HIV-positive individual as actionable, nor does it require malicious intent. Beyond their 
criminalization of harmless sexual contact, these statutes have also come under attack for making 
knowledge of one’s HIV-positive status a criminal liability, potentially discouraging people at 
risk for HIV infection from seeking to be tested (see, for example, UNAIDS 2002). However, no 
study has yet systematically evaluated these claims. 
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Fourteen of the 24 states with felony or misdemeanor HIV-specific criminal disclosure 
laws were passed in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, before life-saving antiretroviral medications 
were introduced in 1995 (Galletly & Pinkerton 2006). The laws were passed, then, in a context 
of high mortality rates, at a time when most Americans were uninformed about AIDS and feared 
contracting it through highly improbable scenarios, such as kissing or malicious exposure 
(Bateson & Goldsby 1988; Brandt 1988; Burris, Dalton, Miller, & Yale AIDS Law Project 
1993). Public debates over criminal disclosure statues have tended to focus on extremely atypical 
cases that reflect those fears, such as the case of a black New Yorker, Nushawn Williams, who 
was prosecuted in 1999 for allegedly infecting over a dozen white women (Shevory 2004).  
HIV-specific criminal statutes have only recently become a subject of sociological 
inquiry. For instance, Weait (2007) analyzed how notions of risk, harm, and culpability have 
been codified into English case law pertaining to HIV exposure. In a review of Canadian court 
cases regarding HIV transmission, Adam and co-authors (2008a) note that while the 1990s were 
characterized by a rhetoric of “mutual responsibility” – in which “HIV prevention through safer 
sex is the responsibility of both HIV-negative and HIV-positive people” – recent Canadian cases 
indicate that the “onus of responsibility may be shifting back toward HIV-positive people” (p. 8). 
In a qualitative study of HIV-positive people in Michigan, Galletly & Dickson-Gomez (2009) 
found that the majority of participants supported the law but expressed concern that it could be 
maliciously used against them. By contrast, a study of attitudes towards disclosure laws among 
HIV-positive people in the UK found participants were generally critical of criminal 
prosecutions (Dodds and Keogh 2006). However, a survey of both HIV-positive and HIV-
negative gay men in the UK found that men in the study generally supported prosecution and 
expected partners to disclose before sex (Dodds 2008).  
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Building on these insights, this study is the first sociological analysis that examines the 
role that health officials play in enforcing “health threat” statutes. The evidence that it assembles 
is critical for understanding how these statutes are applied, and the problems that accompany 
their application. Further, this paper demonstrates how the strategies adopted by health officials 
for surveillance and enforcement can be understood as forms of social control.  
Sexual Contact Tracing and HIV Testing in Michigan 
The use of sexual contact tracing as a strategy for the prevention and treatment of sexually 
transmitted infections has a long history that stretches back to syphilis outbreaks in American 
urban centers in the early 20th century. Contact tracing was developed then as a novel way to 
help limit new infections (Smith & Brumfield 1933; Turner, Gelperin, & Enright 1939). A public 
health researcher in 1939 described contact tracing as a way to notify partners “in order that they 
may be brought under medical care and rendered non-infectious as promptly as possible” 
(Turner, Gelperin, & Enright 1939: 768). Since then, state health departments have relied on 
partner referrals as a way to identify, test, and, if necessary, treat partners of individuals newly 
diagnosed with a variety of sexually transmitted infections – typically gonorrhea, chlamydia, 
syphilis, and HIV (see, for example, Judson & Vernon 1988).   
Contact tracing was initially developed to “trace” the origins of bacterial infections and to 
treat them before the infected individual unwittingly exposed others. Adapting this method to an 
incurable virus required a shift in priority: partners of infected persons could not be “rendered 
non-infectious” at the time they were identified; they could only be made aware that they might 
have been exposed. Indeed, early HIV prevention scientists noted that: 
Emphasis should be on partners who are unlikely to know they were exposed to HIV e.g., 
female partners of bisexual men and of IV drug users… Lower priority should be given 
to notification of casual male partners of homosexual men and female prostitutes because 
they are difficult to reach and presumably are voluntarily taking a risk (Judson & Vernon 
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1988: 392).  
 
In other words, the need to notify was normatively interpreted as directly related to the likelihood 
that the partner of an infected person was unaware of the exposure (or the “risk” of exposure). 
Partners of “homosexual men” and of “female prostitutes” were presumed to be “voluntarily 
taking a risk” and therefore aware of their possible exposure. They were also presumed to be 
asking for trouble and to be in less need of state intervention. Health scholars’ emphasis on 
awareness reveals how knowledge – a key component of disclosure – became a critically 
important factor when public health practitioners adapted contact tracing to the HIV epidemic.    
In Michigan today, the state conducts contact tracing for all individuals newly diagnosed 
with gonorrhea, chlamydia, syphilis, and/or HIV.  Michigan Department of Community Health 
(MDCH) staff identify the following goals for partner notification: “Counseling HIV/STD-
infected clients on disease state and need to identify their sex and/or needle-sharing partners at-
risk for HIV/STD; Locating partners, and notifying them of exposure and offer testing and 
treatment, prevention, education, and referral to medical and support services” (Peterson-Jones 
2009). Thus, health officials in charge of partner referrals in Michigan conceptualize their 
function largely in terms of “health”: Find partners, inform them, counsel them, test them, and 
when necessary, treat them.   
Just as contact tracing had to be adapted to the context of the HIV epidemic, so too did 
testing. Public health experts and HIV/AIDS advocacy organizations engaged in fierce debates 
over how HIV test results should be collected and stored by the state (see, for example, Gostin, 
Ward, & Baker 1997). Two competing strategies emerged for managing HIV testing data. The 
first, “code-based” method involved assigning each individual a unique, anonymous code that 
could not be traced back to the client. The alternative, “names-based” method, favored by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), involved collecting the names of individuals 
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who are tested and storing them confidentially, so as to correlate individual test results with the 
individual persons being tested. Michigan was an early adopter of names-based reporting in 1988 
(CDC 2007; Nakashima, et al. 1998). Debates raged for years over the vulnerability of names-
based systems to privacy violations, fueled by several widely reported leaks in Florida (Landry 
1996). Despite these privacy concerns, most states adopted names-based systems and the CDC 
eventually pressured the states that did not already convert to names-based reporting to do so 
(CDC 2010b). Despite their widespread application, no studies have examined the role these 
technologies may play in facilitating the enforcement of HIV law. 
 
Methods 
Michigan is divided into 45 local health jurisdictions, 16 of which are classified by the MDCH as 
high-morbidity jurisdictions for HIV infection. Each of these 16 jurisdictions has its own 
program for handling HIV/AIDS, which includes staff responsible for managing and responding 
to “health threat to others” cases. The remaining 29 jurisdictions, classified as low-morbidity 
jurisdictions, share one overarching, centralized HIV/AIDS program.  Thus, there are 17 proper 
cases (defined as local public health agencies charged with investigating HIV “health threat to 
others” cases) suitable for analysis in this project: 16 high-morbidity jurisdictions, and one, 
omnibus low-morbidity jurisdiction. 
With assistance from MDCH staff, I identified two actors whose organizational roles and 
institutional responsibilities are most closely tied to responding to and managing “health threat to 
others” cases: the HIV/AIDS Services Coordinator and the Disease Intervention Specialist (DIS).  
The coordinator is responsible for overseeing the jurisdiction’s programs and services that are 
related to HIV/AIDS, while the DIS is charged with making site visits and organizing and 
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implementing interventions developed to deal with “health threat” cases. Notably, these roles are 
not distributed evenly: in smaller counties, they were sometimes united in the same person, while 
larger counties had multiple DIS positions. In cases where there were multiple DIS positions, I 
only interviewed staff who had direct experience with HIV “health threat” cases.  
In coordination with MDCH, I visited 14 of the 17 local health jurisdictions where I 
interviewed 25 staff members. Two jurisdictions declined to participate because of recent staff 
turnover, and one never responded to requests to participate. Each in-depth, 45- to 90-minute, 
semi-structured interview was audio recorded. I asked each participant to choose a pseudonym, 
which are the names used in this paper. I conducted all of the interviews myself, and coded 
transcripts using NVIVO software. In particular, I coded interviews for general techniques of 
surveillance (e.g. using partner services or testing data); participants’ awareness and opinion of 
the HIV disclosure law; and direct experience with regulating HIV-positive clients. I obtained 
approval to do research with human subjects from both the University of Michigan’s Health 
Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board and the Michigan Department of 
Community Health’s Institutional Review Board. 
 
Results 
Forms of Formal Social Control 
Technologies of Surveillance: How Health Departments Employ Epidemiological Surveillance 
Tools in the Service of Legal Surveillance 
When clients visit one of the many publicly-funded health clinics in Michigan to be tested for 
HIV, they can expect more than just a finger-prick or blood draw.  Counselors sit down with 
clients to review copious details pertaining to their sexual practices and partners: How many 
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times have you engaged in anal sex in the last six months? Did any of your partners ejaculate 
inside you? How many times in the past six months have you used narcotics when having sex? 
Clients’ responses are often catalogued and collectively analyzed.  Considered by health experts 
as an opportunity for clients to reflect on their sexual lives and perhaps commit to taking more 
care to prevent acquiring HIV in the future (if they test negative), pre- or post-test HIV 
counseling has long been one of the cornerstones of HIV prevention.  
If a client tests positive for HIV or any other reportable sexually transmitted infection, the 
testing counselor will not only provide counseling and referrals for treatment but is also legally 
mandated to ask clients to report the names of everyone with whom they have had sex. Health 
officials later attempt to contact those individuals to recommend that they be tested for HIV and  
 
Table 2.1: Techniques used in Public Health Jurisdictions in Michigan to Identify Cases of 
“Health Threats to Others” 
Jurisdiction No. 
Partner Services 
+ Names STI Testing Contracts Phone Calls 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6   1  
7     
8     
9     
10     
11     
12     
13     
14     
1. While their HIV/AIDS Coordinator stated that their health department did not employ such a contract, the local 
policy documents they gave to me included such a form. It is not known if this form is actually in use.  
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other infections. In this section, I argue that we can understand HIV testing and partner referral 
as forms of social control. HIV testing and the array of surveillance technologies built up around 
it are well suited to this concept. HIV counseling sessions are not just an occasion to educate 
people, raise their awareness of the risks they are taking, or collect data on how many people are 
taking what kinds of risks. The findings in this paper reveal that health officials use these 
encounters as opportunities to regulate their clients’ sexual practices and, more specifically, to 
enforce Michigan’s “health threat” law. 
While health officials describe partner services as a tool for epidemiological surveillance 
and HIV and STI prevention (Peterson-Jones 2009), findings in this study suggest that partner 
services is also a tool for legal surveillance. As outlined in Table 2.1, local health officials in 
three jurisdictions report actively employing contact tracing in order to identify potential “health 
threat to others” cases. While these officials described a variety of scenarios in which these 
surveillance techniques were utilized, their descriptions typically featured an individual newly 
diagnosed with a reportable sexually transmitted infection, who named a sexual partner already 
known by the state to be infected with HIV. To be clear, there are several critical steps in this 
process: 
1. Person A tests positive for HIV (and/or chlamydia, gonorrhea, syphilis); 
2. The testing counselor elicits the names of Person A’s prior sexual partners; 
3. The testing counselor asks if any of the partners disclosed to Person A that they were 
HIV-positive; 
4. The health official attempts to ascertain the HIV-status of Person A’s reported partners 
– first against local records, and then against the state’s mandatory, confidential names-
based database – to see if any of the partners reported are known to be HIV-positive; 
5. If anyone named is already known to be HIV-positive and Person A reported that no one 
said he or she was HIV-positive, an investigation is launched against the reported 
partner(s) known to be HIV-positive – who, in some cases, are automatically deemed a 
“health threat to others.” 
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For example, Mitch (HIV/AIDS Coordinator, Jurisdiction #2) described how she would elicit the 
names of partners from a client newly diagnosed with HIV, following up with an additional 
question as to whether any of the reported partners had disclosed that they were HIV-positive:   
We make sure that we say everything very confidentially. So the one question that we 
have that we always ask somebody when they’re giving us names is – going to this other 
person, if that person gave me four names, I would say “Did any of these four people 
ever tell you that they were HIV-positive?” Because if they give me a name and I already 
know that one of them is HIV-positive, because I’ve dealt with that person so much, then 
that’s gonna be a flag to me right there. But I can’t say, “Well so-and-so is HIV-positive, 
did they tell you that?” So we just make it very generic, “Did any of these people ever tell 
you that they were HIV-positive?” I may not know any of those people on that list, but 
the next step that I do is I’m gonna go back to my files and see if I have a file on any of 
these people. I will then go to the state and see if any of these people have already been 
reported as positive. And when that report comes back or when we have a file that one of 
those four people is positive, that becomes a flag (Mitch, HIV/AIDS Coordinator, 
Jurisdiction #2). 
 
Notably, Mitch mentions that they may “already know that one of them is HIV-positive,” 
meaning that they may simply recognize a partner’s name by virtue of having worked with that 
person in the past. This was reported by several officials, such as Charlie – the HIV/AIDS 
coordinator and disease intervention specialist in jurisdiction #9: 
I was actually testing another individual who had just come in for – for everything, I 
think they were testing for everything. I tested, they were positive, and after interviewing, 
I knew the name immediately. After they gave me one of their partner names, I knew the 
name immediately. After they gave me one of their partner names, I thought – I didn’t 
say anything at that time. But I just, you know, I just said, [sighing] “Oh, I know that 
name.” Went back, sure enough, confirmed that this person was already positive (Charlie, 
HIV/AIDS Coordinator & Disease Intervention Specialist, Jurisdiction #9). 
 
Several things are worth noting here. First, Charlie’s account suggests that clients who have 
closer relationships with testing counselors (or whose names are for whatever reason more likely 
to be recognizable to counselors) may be more likely to be identified as a potential “health 
threat.” While health officials in these jurisdictions reported cross-referencing the names 
reported through the state’s confidential names-based database, this is not an automated process. 
Thus, name recognition may increase the likelihood that health officials take the extra step of 
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checking a particular name against the state databank. Moreover, clients are often able to provide 
health officials only with nicknames (e.g. “Shorty”) or partial information (e.g. “Johnny who 
works at McDonald’s on Main Street”). In such instances, health officials may be more readily 
able to make positive identifications of clients with whom they have close working relationships. 
This is sociologically important for several reasons. First, the clientele of public clinics is 
not a random sample of the surrounding population: Women, African-Americans, and men who 
have sex with men are overrepresented among those who seek services at state-run health clinics. 
Because racial and sexual minorities and women are overrepresented at health clinics, they may 
be more likely to be identified as a “health threat.” Second, health officials in jurisdictions with 
relatively large HIV-positive populations may be less likely to recognize a particular name than 
those who work in jurisdictions with smaller numbers of HIV-positive residents. 
While this paper is not primarily about the legal outcomes of cases identified through 
these surveillance technologies, it is worth noting that legal action, while rare, may be a 
consequence of health officials’ cross-referencing the names of sexual partners reported by 
newly-diagnosed clients against the state database. For example, Mitch described how they had 
handled a recent case in which a newly diagnosed client reported a partner that the health 
department later identified as HIV-positive. Because regulations enacted under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) prevent the health department 
from reporting that discovery to their client, they described taking further action as requiring 
“tiptoeing”: 
There’s a lot of tiptoeing. There’s a lot of, “Well, we’d like you to come back into the 
office and talk to you a little bit more about your situation.” And that’s when we’ll try 
and say, “Have you had any other partners? Have any of your other partners ever said 
anything about being HIV-positive?” And at that point, sometimes we might say, “Well, 
we’d like you to report this to the police. We’d like you to contact the police.” Recently 
we had somebody we had called back to come in and do that, and then the person never 
showed. We were going tell them to contact the police, because we have a person who is 
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being a “health threat to others.” But the person never showed up. (Mitch, HIV/AIDS 
Coordinator, Jurisdiction #2). 
  
While reports suggest that individuals who allege that their partners did not disclose must be 
willing to testify in order for a prosecutor to intervene legally, health officials can facilitate their 
contact with law enforcement as Mitch describes here. Thus, the strategies and techniques health 
officials described employing to identify “health threat” cases can lead to serious legal 
consequences for the individuals under surveillance. For example, the only person ever known 
by the author to be quarantined under Michigan’s “health threat” law, in 1992, was a woman 
described in news reports as “mentally deficient”; she was later convicted under the felony 
disclosure statute in 1995 (Walsh 1992; AIDS Policy and Law 1998). As I show in the next 
section, health officials in several jurisdictions have recently begun implementing a record 
intended to prove that newly-diagnosed clients have been informed of their HIV-positive status 
and of their responsibilities under the “health threat” statutes. This suggests that health officials 
are invested in facilitating legal action against their clients. 
 
Can HIV-Positive People Legally Have Sex Without Condoms – Even After Disclosing? 
In addition to using the confidential names-based database to identify “health threat” cases, 
health officials in certain jurisdictions use STI-testing technologies more generally as a means of 
identifying “health threat” cases. In two jurisdictions (see Table 2.1), officials reported 
classifying as a “health threat” HIV-positive clients who later test positive for a secondary 
infection (such as syphilis or chlamydia) as well as HIV-positive women who become pregnant. 
When I asked Fern (Disease Intervention Specialist, Jurisdiction #11) how most “health threat” 
cases came to her attention, she replied: 
Well, usually it’s all the sudden their name appears with another STD… All the STDs 
have to be reported on the [Michigan Disease Surveillance System]. So… if the [syphilis 
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coordinator] has any syphilis cases where they’re also showing that they’re HIV-positive,  
then her and I work together and we – you know, if I’ve got a case report – then it goes to 
a “health threat to others,” more or less. Because if they come up with syphilis, they’re 
having unprotected sex (Fern, Disease Intervention Specialist, Jurisdiction #11).  
 
The conclusion Fern reaches is notable: “they’re having unprotected sex.” While Michigan’s 
state health department maintains that contracting a secondary infection is not sufficient grounds 
for categorizing an individual a health threat (Michigan Department of Health 2011a), health 
officials in two jurisdictions reported using STI testing in order to identify “health threat” cases.  
I followed up with Fern to try to clarify this logic: 
Author: A positive STI test result… y’all see as evidence of non-disclosure – well, I 
guess, how… what’s the… why is that interpreted as a potential “health threat”? 
 
Fern: Well they’re having unprotected sex. But, again too, sometimes what I come up 
against is when I do get there, they’ll say, “Well I did tell them.” You know, “They’re 
positive also.” I say, “Well that doesn’t matter.” You know, “Just because they’re 
positive also, you still need to be using protection” (Fern, Disease Intervention Specialist, 
Jurisdiction #11). 
 
Fern’s concern in this case is not that the client might not be disclosing their HIV-positive status, 
but rather that the client was not using condoms – despite the fact that the client was engaging in 
a harm reduction strategy known as “serosorting,” or intentionally seeking out sex with people of 
the same HIV-status to reduce or eliminate the risk of HIV transmission (Parsons, et al. 2005). 
Thus, it appears that at least some health officials believe that having unprotected sex was 
sufficient grounds to be classified as a “health threat.” 
Moreover, in a 2008 e-mail obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request by 
Todd Heywood, a local reporter, the state health department’s legal director interpreted 
Michigan’s “health threat” statute to mean that HIV-positive people are legally forbidden from 
ever engaging in unprotected sex “even if the partner is HIV-positive”: 
Would an HIV-infected individual who has unprotected sex be a health threat to his/her 
sex partner? Are there any circumstances where unprotected sex not be a health threat? 
… It sounds like the individual would always be a health threat, even if the individual’s 
partner is also HIV-positive. An HIV-infected individual is not relieved of all 
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responsibility to prevent transmission simply because he/she has warned their sex partner 
of the HIV-infection. We (in public health) and the infected person still have 
responsibilities to prevent the spread of serious communicable disease even if the 
infected individual's sexual partner consents to the risky behavior. In fact, under section 
5203, the local health officer shall issue a warning notice against such an individual 
(Chrysler, 2008, emphases mine).  
 
While the state health department maintains that Chrysler’s statement was not an official legal 
opinion (MDCH 2011a), the fact that its own legal director believed that an HIV-positive person 
engaging in unprotected sex “would always be a health threat” suggests that what actually 
constitutes an actionable “health threat to others” is not a precise offense but turns out to be 
subject to a range of interpretations.   
Local health department policies also indicate that many local officials do in fact interpret 
the “health threat” statute as requiring HIV-positive people always to use condoms. Five 
jurisdictions4 (see Table 2.1) have developed so-called “client acknowledgement forms” that 
newly diagnosed HIV-positive clients are asked to sign immediately after learning that they have 
tested HIV-positive. While there are various versions of the form, the most controversial 
language was found in forms that asked clients to place their initials beside the following 
statement (quoted from the form used in Macomb County5:  see Figure 2.1): “You are required 
to inform individual/s of your HIV infected status BEFORE sexual contact. You and your 
sexual partner/s must use a barrier protection such as latex condoms, dental dams, and/or female 
condoms in a correct and consistent manner” (Macomb County Health Department, n.d., original 
emphases). While most forms were more ambiguous in that they simply referred to a 
requirement that clients engage in “safe behaviors” and/or “risk reduction,” the language used in 
                                                          
4 Health officials either directly described using such a form (n=2), and/or they provided me with policy documents 
that included such a form (n=5).   
5 This is a public document and its inclusion should not be read as an indication that Macomb County did or did not 
participate in this study. 
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some of these forms suggests that at least some health officials believe their HIV-positive clients 
must use condoms at all times. 
More than just a way to inform clients about their legal responsibilities, these “client 
acknowledgement forms” are a means of holding clients legally responsible for not disclosing 
their HIV status at a later date. As Mitch reports, these forms were developed after clients 
suspected of not disclosing simply denied knowing they were HIV-positive in the first place:   
Sometimes, they’ll try and say, “Well, nobody ever told me I was positive. I tested but I 
didn’t get my results. They didn’t tell me I was positive.” And that’s why – we do a lot of 
paperwork now about, a lot of the education that we do, we actually have to have the 
people sign, anytime we have a positive, we go through felony law and do all of this 
education – what you need to do and what you don’t need to do. Get them hooked up 
with support services and then we make them sign a paper that basically says, “I’ve been 
educated. I know that I can’t do this without disclosing my status. I’ve been warned of 
that and I could potentially have charges brought against me if I don’t do that.” So we 
make everybody sign that, so that when we have that piece of paper and the name, say 
this person were to come up again all of the sudden, we’ve got that on file and we would 
say, “You can’t tell me that you didn’t know that you were positive, because we’ve got 
this on file” (Mitch, HIV/AIDS Coordinator, Jurisdiction #2).  
 
These forms have already played a role in prosecuting HIV-positive people in Michigan. Indeed, 
a news report on the 2007 sentencing of a man to 5-15 years in prison for failing to disclose his 
HIV-positive status to two sexual partners noted that “Police say [the defendant] knew what he 
did was illegal because he had signed a disclosure form with [a neighboring county’s] 
Department of Public Health” (WWMT News 2007). Other reports suggest these forms have been 
used to help prosecute HIV-positive defendants in three additional counties (Heywood 2011a). 
Thus, at least in some places in Michigan, HIV-positive individuals are asked to sign a 
document that the Center for HIV Law and Policy criticizes for “effectively [asking] the client to 
acknowledge in writing his/her potential liability for failure to disclose under Michigan's HIV-
specific criminal law” (Center for HIV Law & Policy 2007). Curiously, while Mac (HIV/AIDS 
Coordinator, Jurisdiction #6) indicated that their jurisdiction did not employ such a form, the 
policy documents that they provided me actually included one (perhaps the form had been  
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Figure 2.1: Client Acknowledgement Form 
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developed but was not being used). Nonetheless, they criticized the use of such forms because “it 
takes that right away from them”: 
Mac: There are some agencies that actually have them sign that they are aware of that 
law. We don’t have anything at the health department stating that. And I don’t know… I 
kind of feel… I guess I have mixed feelings on that. 
 
Author: In what way? 
Mac: In the way that it was stated in the form that was sent to us, it was basically… I just 
feel like it doesn’t… it takes that right away from them almost. I don’t know how to 
explain it. Some of the wording just didn’t sound – I don’t wanna say “good” to me. I 
don’t know. It was just something about the wording of it. I don’t know. I don’t know 
how to explain it… But basically saying, “You” – and I’m not saying that they don’t have 
to follow it, they do. But it’s more strong and stern and to the point where it’s like, “Oh 
my gosh. You have to do this.” And I know they have to, but it just didn’t sound right to 
me (Mac, HIV/AIDS Coordinator, Jurisdiction #6). 
 
Based on Mac’s comments, it appears that controversy over the use of these “client 
acknowledgement forms” extended to within health departments themselves. As data were being 
collected for this project, however, the controversy exploded publicly when Todd Heywood 
obtained these “contracts” and published a series of articles highlighting their problematic nature 
(Heywood 2011a; Heywood 2011b; Heywood 2011c; Heywood 2011d). Heywood quotes 
Catherine Hanssens, the director of the HIV Center for Law and Policy, as saying: 
The form… treats all types of sex as equally risky, and all persons with HIV as equally 
infectious… This is a level of medical inaccuracy that is unacceptable from a state 
Department of Health. Lawyers who think that banning only unprotected sex is legal 
might want to acquaint themselves with the U.S. Constitution and legal opinions which 
have long since established the decision to conceive children as a Constitutionally-
protected, fundamental right (Heywood, 2011a, n.p.) 
 
After these articles were published, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission expressed interest in 
investigating the use of these forms (Heywood 2011c), prompting state health officials within a 
few hours to “reverse” their position by deciding to advise “local health departments that if they 
are going to use client acknowledgment forms… – and there is nothing saying they must use 
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such forms – they need to quote the law” (Heywood 2011d). However, state health officials did 
not require that local health departments discontinue their use.  
 Moreover, even if local health departments decided to discontinue using these forms, the 
practice of relying on STI and HIV testing technologies to facilitate the identification of “health 
threat” cases may continue. While previously I described jurisdictions in which HIV-positive 
people who present with secondary infections are classified as a “health threat,” it is important to 
point out that partner referrals for other sexually transmitted infections (such as chlamydia or 
syphilis) are also used to identify “health threat cases.” Donna – a disease intervention specialist 
in jurisdiction #13 – describes this process: 
Let’s say, they come in and they have a secondary infection. Let’s say they have 
chlamydia and gonorrhea. Okay, by law – or by our duty, basically – gonorrhea cases are 
reportable to us… So we ask, part of our investigation process is to ask, “Who’s your 
partner?” In this instance, this person mentioned, “So-and-so is my partner.” So when we 
pulled up the file looking for the other person, we realized at that time that the person was 
HIV-infected also… so that tells us, “You’re having unprotected sex” (Donna, Disease 
Intervention Specialist, Jurisdiction #13). 
 
The logic inherent in this process is that sexually transmitted bacterial infections such as 
gonorrhea are necessarily the result of unprotected sex – but this is not necessarily true. While 
latex condoms can reduce the risk of transmission of STIs such as gonorrhea, they do not 
eliminate it (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2006). Recent legal cases suggest that 
this logic is not restricted to Michigan: an HIV-positive man in North Carolina was recently 
found guilty of violating his probationary agreement not to have sex without condoms when he 
tested positive for an undisclosed sexually transmitted infection at a local health clinic (Thorpe 
2008).   
The evidence presented in this section suggests that health officials are using information 
about sexual partners gathered from clients in ways they do not announce publicly. These 
practices may conflict with some health law scholars’ demand that: 
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Where government authorizes or mandates the collection of identifiable health data, both 
the data to be collected and the reason for collection should be a matter of public record. 
The public ought also be entitled to know the proposed use, how long the data will be 
stored, the circumstances under which the data will be expunged, and the extent to which 
third parties (e.g., regulators, researchers, and government officials) may obtain access 
thereto (Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini 1999: 125). 
 
Many studies have demonstrated that patients often fear disclosing sensitive information to 
medical providers because they do not know for what purposes that information will be used: 
this research includes studies of battered women (Rodriguez, Quiroga, and Bauer 1996), men 
who have sex with men (Miamaga, et al. 2007), and sex workers (Cohan, et al. 2006). Data from 
this section suggests that that sense of mistrust may be warranted in some circumstances. 
 This section has documented the formal techniques of social control reported by health 
officials.  In the next section, I describe the ways in which community members police one 
another, reaching out to health officials to report others in their communities. As I argue in this 
section, while the practice of disclosure that underlies the gossip cultures described by officials is 
not consistent with official health policy, it relies on a similar practice of documentation and 
exclusion, whereby knowing who is HIV-positive allows one to avoid sexual contact with them. 
 
Forms of Informal Social Control 
Gossip, Rumor, and Stigma: How Communities Practice Disclosure as a Form of 
Informal and Formal Social Control 
You know, the big thing we have here is people talk. And that’s how most things are 
done around here, how most complaints are filed. In fact, it all usually starts with the 
same phone call. And they’re like, [impersonating stereotypical black female voice] 
“Well… I’m calling because I know…” – and they’ll go on this whole rampage, like – 
my cousin’s baby’s daddy’s uncle who watches TV and they produce for the show – you 
know, it’s like, all these weird things! You know, like they find every string to connect 
this person to them. “And I just wanna verify if that’s true.”  [And I ask,] “Well, why do 
you wanna do that?” “Well, because I know… I can’t find it today, but I know that 
there’s a book” – oh my God, this whole county swears to God that’s there’s a book 
that’s down by some railroad tracks in [name of town] by the river. There’s a book that 
has all the HIV-positive people’s names in it (Therese, Disease Intervention Specialist, 
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Jurisdiction #5). 
 
Therese described numerous inquiries to health department staff invoking the notorious “book 
down by the river,” a near-mythical object that allegedly contains the names of everyone in the 
area who is HIV-positive. Pointing to a map on the wall in the conference room we were in, 
Therese pointed out the general area where residents claim the book can be found – emphasizing 
that it was “not a good area.” When her job requires her to visit this particular area, she makes a 
point to bring along a male co-worker whose physicality resembles his nickname, “Muscles.” 
The neighborhood in question is almost entirely African-American, plagued by widespread 
poverty and devastatingly high rates of unemployment. Like countless towns across the state, the 
manufacturing jobs that once provided the lifeline to this neighborhood are long gone. 
Even if the book does not in fact exist as a real object to be found and consulted, it is still 
useful to consider what social purposes or ends this legendary volume may serve in the 
community Therese supervises. I argue that we can think of the book as something of a social 
vector – a kind of social pipeline – through which gossip and rumor flow: 
Even people that just moved to this county… they will say the same exact thing. “Yeah, I 
just moved here and I heard that there’s a book here. And I wanna see the book of all the 
positive people” (Therese, Disease Intervention Specialist, Jurisdiction #5). 
 
Through years of gossip and rumor, “the book” has become a vehicle that enables individuals to 
trade, seek, and reveal information about others without anyone being held responsible for doing 
the original telling. As described in the beginning of this article, it is illegal in Michigan for 
anyone to disclose another person’s HIV-positive status without their express, written 
permission. The book, then, may well provide the perfect alibi for community members looking 
to trade information without being held legally liable.  
 The rumor of a list of everyone in the county who is HIV-positive was not idiosyncratic 
to this jurisdiction. I heard a similar tale from health officials in another jurisdiction, who also 
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spoke of people asking to see “the list.” As Doctor Q (Disease Intervention Specialist, 
Jurisdiction #14) laments: 
Well, and you’d be surprised too… the people that come in and want to see the list of 
HIV-positive people [laughs]… They think it’s just like the Post Office, where you’ve 
got your “Ten Most Wanted” – well, we got the HIV-positive list here! I had some 
woman here, God, it was probably six months ago, she came in with her two teenage 
daughters. She wanted to see the list. And I said, “We don’t keep a list of HIV-positive 
people.” “Oh c’mon now, I know you got a list of HIV” – and I says, “And if we did, 
why would you want to see that list?” “Cause I want my daughters to look at it, so they 
know who not to have sex with.” I wanted to reach across there and slap her. “You stupid 
bitch, is that how you teach [your daughters], “Oh here’s the list, don’t fuck any of these 
guys” (Doctor Q, Disease Intervention Specialist, Jurisdiction #14).  
 
After years of working in the same job at the health department, Doctor Q was secretly planning 
to call it quits. His frustration with his job and his clients was, to say the least, palpable.  
However, Doctor Q’s frustrations may have unintentionally revealed much about the 
contradictions of disclosure as public health imperative. As he points out, his client was seeking 
the identities of everyone in the area known to be HIV-positive so that her daughters could avoid 
having sex with them. The state actually does possess that information, even if the county does 
not keep a list available for the public to consult. So the client was not in fact as “stupid” as 
Doctor Q inferred. While her desire to gain access to such information is obviously in direct 
conflict with medical confidentiality, it is perfectly aligned with the strategy embedded in the 
logic of disclosure as a public health strategy. Disclosure as a strategy presumes that knowledge 
is prevention: if an HIV-negative person knows who is HIV-positive and who is HIV-negative, 
then he or she can make informed decisions that will mitigate the risk of contracting HIV. Within 
this logic, disclosure is conceived as the basis of informed consent.  
 As a prevention strategy, however, disclosure is flawed for several reasons. First, many 
people who are HIV-positive do not know that they are infected and believe themselves to be 
HIV-negative. Nationally, the CDC recently estimated that approximately one in five people in 
59 
 
the United States living with HIV is not aware of being infected (CDC 2008a). Moreover, given 
that the most commonly used HIV antibody tests cannot detect infection until three to six months 
after transmission, the disclosure of the results of a nonreactive HIV-antibody test from 
yesterday may not be a reliable indicator of someone’s actual HIV-status. Compounding this 
problem, those who are undiagnosed also tend to be the most infectious, because their viral loads 
remain unchecked by available antiretroviral treatment and because HIV viral load typically 
peaks soon after infection. A recent study estimated that between 54% and 70% of new sexually 
transmitted HIV infections were attributable to sexual contact with someone unaware of their 
HIV-positive status (Marks, Crepaz & Janssen 2006). Some scholars have argued that 
antiretroviral treatment may be rendering some HIV-positive individuals noninfectious in 
specific contexts (Vernazza, Hirschel, Bernasconi, & Flepp 2008). Under certain conditions, 
then, having unprotected sex with an HIV-positive person may actually be safer than having 
unprotected sex with someone who does not know their status or who thinks they are HIV-
negative.  
This evidence suggests that disclosure is a crude and dubious tool for mitigating HIV 
risk. As I show in the following section, the way that community members like Doctor Q’s client 
go about practicing and promoting “disclosure” may not quite resemble what health officials 
intend, though it follows from it. While the notion of disclosure in public health discourse 
resembles medical informed consent, health officials report a rather different form of 
“disclosure” in operation within the communities they serve, one that more readily resembles 
social control.  
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Third Party Phone Reports: How Stigma and Gossip Produce Formal Social Control 
In five jurisdictions (see Table 2.1), health officials reported receiving a large volume of what 
they term “third party phone reports.” These calls typically involve a resident phoning the health 
department to report that someone they believe to be HIV-positive is having sex without 
disclosing their HIV status.  This is what criminologists would describe as “indirect” informal 
social control, because it involves community members not taking action themselves, but 
demanding intervention from authorities (Warner 2007). Notably, these callers do not report 
actually having sex with the accused; instead, they offer a variety of explanations for how they 
know an individual is not disclosing their status (usually word-of-mouth rumor). According to 
guidelines distributed to local health departments by MDCH in 2006, officials should “determine 
if the information has merit” by: 
1. Securing the full name, address, and if available, the telephone number of the third party.  
2. Requesting that the third party submit a written statement that describes the behavior/s of the 
suspected carrier, and supports the allegations. 
3. Requesting that the third party provide the local health department with the suspected carrier’s 
name and other information such as an address or telephone number to locate the suspected 
individual (MDCH 2006: 3-4).  
 
These instructions turn out to be flexible.  The standards for determining the merit of third-party 
denunciations may be relaxed where: 1) the reported individual has previously been identified as 
an at-risk partner during contact tracing; or, 2) there have been repeated allegations concerning 
the same individual by different parties.  
Health officials were often ambivalent about relying on this kind of “rumor mill” to 
identify “health threat” cases. For example, Therese, the official quoted at the beginning of this 
section, acknowledged that most phone calls she received were “bogus claims” that were 
sometimes maliciously motivated. To illustrate this, she recounted a case in which the health 
department received a series of coordinated phone calls all reporting the same individual: 
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[People around here are] very judgmental and just angry. And they don’t like to talk 
about controversial subjects. And it’s an older population that was calling in. It wasn’t 
like I had somebody young calling in. I had somebody in their sixties calling in, and [they 
were all older]. And it turns out they all actually belong to the same church. And as you 
may know, it’s very big around here too in our black churches – in our African-American 
churches here. They do express… um… not good things about people who are gay and 
homosexual and people who have HIV and AIDS and so on and so forth… [The person 
they were calling in about] was a female who had male partners, however… that 
doesn’t… you know, it… they were black and so… in the churches around here, 
somebody told their business and everybody just kind of ganged up. A lot of people 
around here… you think you’re… living in the Salem Witch Trials, basically, and it’s 
terrible (Therese, Disease Intervention Specialist, Jurisdiction #5). 
 
After investigating these claims, she discovered that the callers were all members of the same 
church. Linking the local church’s negative views about homosexuality to its prejudices against 
HIV, Therese speculates that it was the churchgoers’ judgmental attitudes that resulted in callers 
“ganging up” on one sexually non-conforming individual – a coordinated attempt that 
exemplifies how communities police individuals they suspect of being HIV-positive people. 
Notably, race and gender played a significant role in the way that “health threat” cases 
were narrated by health officials in several jurisdictions in which “third party” phone reports 
were common. In the citation above, Therese notes the influence of black church leaders in 
stigmatizing HIV and non-normative sexuality more generally. Moreover, it is significant that 
the HIV-positive person targeted for harassment by church members was not just African-
American, but more specifically a black woman who lived in the community. Indeed, Therese’s 
reference to the “Salem Witch Trials” is a tellingly gendered reference point, suggesting that 
black women who are HIV-positive in this community may face a particularly raced and 
gendered form of stigma – a stigma that results in not just gossip and rumor, but reports to the 
health department that could result in serious consequences. 
While black men were also discussed as objects of concern, in jurisdictions where race 
was explicitly invoked by health officials, black women featured prominently in discussions of 
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“health threat” cases. For instance, in another jurisdiction across the state, I interviewed an 
HIV/AIDS Coordinator who chose the pseudonym, “Sentient.” They reported that third party 
phone reports were a common way cases were identified, but they also noted a peculiar annual 
trend: During the “holiday season,” they received numerous prank calls reporting famous 
African-American women as potential health threats: 
Author: Can you walk me through – point A to point B – in terms of how those cases 
come onto your radar screen? 
 
Sentient: Usually, they come in the form of a phone call. If they call the health 
department’s general number, they usually go to the administrative floor for HIV… and 
then they take down the person’s information and they call me and give it to me and I call 
the person back. And usually the person will say, “I know someone who’s HIV infected 
and they’re having unprotected sex.” Or, “I was infected by this particular person, and I 
wanna know how to report them or what I should do.” During the holiday season, we 
usually have unusual claims. Like, they’re a star and – like, Aretha Franklin seems to be a 
very common one. Diana Ross. And they have been infected and they’re infecting all 
these people in the area” (Sentient, HIV/AIDS Coordinator, Jurisdiction #3). 
 
Though it could well be a coincidence that both celebrities Sentient named were African-
American women, it is also plausible that this pattern is the result of community members 
perceiving black women’s sexualities as threatening.  
Although black male sexuality has been the source of considerable HIV panic, both 
within and outside of black communities in the US (Cohen 1999; Boykin 2005), limited research 
does suggest that black women’s sexualities are the subject of particular scrutiny and anxiety in 
black communities. For example, Lichtenstein (2003) found that black health workers in the 
Deep South expected their black female clients to be “lady like” and held stigmatizing views of 
“bad girls” whose sexualities did not conform to those expectations. While the findings reported 
here are not conclusive in demonstrating a gender bias in black communities’ informal social 
control of sexuality, they do suggest there may be a trend worth exploring in future research. 
In the remaining jurisdictions in which third party phone reports were common, health 
officials gave few clues about the race or gender of the individuals involved. Because of the 
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delicate confidentiality issues involved in these interviews, officials sometimes chose to talk 
neutrally about individuals – avoiding male or female pronouns or other demographic markers. 
While there were scant indications about the individual doing the calling or about whom they 
were calling to report, it was clear in one instance that a concerted effort had been made against 
an individual.  Following up about a recent case that Lucy (one of the two Disease Intervention 
Specialists in Jurisdiction #10) had described, I asked how that case came to her attention: 
It was just a community person – somebody from the community concerned about 
somebody in their neighborhood who they were thinking had HIV. And I guess they just 
felt that they needed to report it to the health department as a concern. Preliminary record 
search, nothing was found on this individual. The caller was unwilling to give their 
information – and it was a situation where there were other people in the background, 
kind of egging the person on the phone on. So in that case, after I briefed my supervisor 
about it, no further follow-up was done (Lucy, Disease Intervention Specialist 
Jurisdiction #10). 
 
The presence of “other people in the background” whom Lucy heard and suspected of “egging 
on” the caller implies a collective effort at social control. In this case, Lucy went ahead and 
attempted to verify whether the accused person was known to the state to be HIV-positive. The 
person was not, and thus the case was closed. However, the fact that Lucy took the call, recorded 
the information about the person being accused, and conducted a record search suggests that she 
nonetheless determined the anonymous group report deserved further inquiry. She did not 
speculate about what she might have done had the accused person been found to be HIV-
positive.  
However, Mitch – the HIV/AIDS Coordinator from Jurisdiction #2 – reported having 
serious doubts about the validity of information obtained from informants over the phone. But 
just as Lucy decided to run a record search in the case described above, Mitch similarly indicated 
that if the accused person was in fact determined to be HIV-positive, someone from the health 
department would “make an appearance”: 
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We get a lot of phone calls, “I know that so-and-so’s positive and I know that they’re 
sleeping around with a whole bunch of people and not telling their status.” You know, if 
that person is not willing to come in and write out a statement, then we may look for that 
name and see if there is actually a report on that name and then we may try and make 
contact and go, “Hey, how’s things going? You remember that felony law thing that we 
talked about? You doing okay with that?” [Laughs]. Kind of just make an appearance 
with them. But we don’t put a whole lotta… a whole lotta… what do I wanna say? We 
have a lot of people that call us and complain about other people and a lot of the time it 
ends up being a, you know, a he said-she-said type of thing, because so-and-so- is mad at 
so-and-so because they slept with so-and-so.” (Mitch, HIV/AIDS Coordinator, 
Jurisdiction #2).  
 
Mitch stressed that this “appearance” would be more akin to a check-in than a serious 
investigation. However, while these meetings may on paper be nothing more than a “check-in,” 
having a health official show up on your doorstep asking questions about your knowledge of the 
HIV disclosure law is likely to have a chilling effect: We’ve got eyes in the community, don’t do 
anything stupid. And that effect is presumably intended.  
 
Conclusion 
The ethical issues raised by state health surveillance are complicated. Many people may think 
that disclosing one’s HIV-positive status to one’s sexual partners before having sex with them is 
the ethical thing to do – perhaps, even a moral mandate. Many people may believe that HIV-
negative people have a “right” to know their partner’s HIV-positive status.  Others may consider 
that HIV-positive people have a “right” to decide when to reveal that status. It seems 
indisputable that every effort should be taken to reduce new HIV infections – but what are the 
best ways to do that, and what limits should be imposed?   
While this paper cannot resolve such ethical questions, it does open up new possibilities 
for inquiry by reframing public health as critical site of social control. I have argued that the 
forms of social control produced through institutions of public health differ from those forms 
produced through traditional institutions of medicine. By extending the insights of medical 
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sociologists and criminologists to the field of public health, this paper suggests new possibilities 
for theorizing and empirically analyzing social control. More specifically, while previous studies 
have demonstrated that criminal HIV disclosure laws may be counterproductive for public 
health, this study indicates for the first time how public health institutions themselves contribute 
to and facilitate the enforcement of Michigan HIV law. I do not seek to advance a complete 
theory of the social control of public health; there are other important kinds of social control 
exercised by public health that are not examined in this article, such as longstanding traditions of 
managing population health that typically include testing, treatment, and vaccination campaigns. 
Thus, more research is necessary to begin to adequately theorize collectively all the many facets 
of the social control of public health. 
Rather than an all-inclusive treatise, then, this article is intended to be a starting point for 
thinking critically about a set of institutions that have yet to be thoroughly examined by 
sociologists. While historians and anthropologists have their own rich traditions in critical public 
health, sociologists’ methodological and theoretical tools can offer unique contributions to this 
field. In particular, conceptualizing HIV testing as a form of social control allows for a critical 
analysis of what are generally regarded as taken-for-granted public health necessities. Tens of 
thousands of people never question having to reveal to the state extremely intimate details about 
their sexual histories in order to be tested for HIV. Should we provide the state with this kind of 
information, if we discover it could potentially be used to put others in legal jeopardy? This 
information is a form of power, and some may well consider resisting its exercise.  
Of course, these critical insights extend well beyond HIV testing and counseling. 
Framing public health surveillance as social control opens up possibilities for examining not just 
strategies of surveillance, but also their potentially stigmatizing outcomes within communities; 
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their impact on sexual behavior more generally; and even the potential for the emergence of 
forms of resistance that may respond to these interventions. Such a critical approach would help 
inform policy initiatives, such as the now-widespread use of so-called confidential names-based 
reporting surveillance systems. These systems were not intended for legal surveillance, yet this 
paper shows that data collected by them are susceptible to being used for criminal proceedings. 
Now that it has become clear that these data can be used for legal purposes, it is necessary for 
policymakers, advocates, and stakeholders, including HIV-positive and -negative community 
members, to consider whether or not they should be used in this manner.  
Furthermore, as I have shown in the second section of this paper, stigma and fear often 
drive community members to police HIV-positive neighbors’ disclosure practices. While these 
findings are limited to Michigan and may not be generalizable, they do suggest that the practice 
of euphemistically synonymizing informal social control with the positive concept of “collective 
efficacy” (see, for example, Sampson et al. 1997) may not always be warranted. More research is 
necessary to evaluate the generalizability of this study’s findings regarding HIV disclosure and 
local gossip cultures, as well as to determine whether health officials’ reports of gossip cultures 
accurately reflect the communities in which they work. Future research might also explore the 
potential gender bias in the informal social control of female sexuality – particularly within black 
communities.  
In terms of practice, this paper suggests that how officials interpret the law – and 
therefore their techniques for enforcing it – may vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As 
I have shown, some health officials interpreted the law to mean that HIV-positive clients must 
always use condoms even when they have disclosed their status. This interpretation was codified 
into policy in counties that employed a kind of “contract” that newly-diagnosed individuals were 
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asked to sign – agreements that could later be used in court against them (as they have already 
been). Multiple, conflicting interpretations confound the ability of state or local actors to 
communicate the law clearly to their clients and community members, potentially adding 
confusion to a situation with relatively high stakes—including incarceration. 
Finally, while critics have charged that these laws are poor behavioral deterrents and that 
they may in fact be discouraging some people from testing and not just from failing to disclose, 
there is not yet sufficient scientific evidence to evaluate such claims. We know even less about 
the impact of treatment and/or education programs legally mandated by “health threat” statutes. 
Further, while the data presented in this paper suggests that race and gender may in part be 
shaping the application of Michigan’s “health threat” law, no systematic data on prosecutions yet 
exist that would demonstrate whether or not the application of these statutes is patterned by 
discrimination. 
In its broadest dimensions, this paper raises questions about the complicated logics that 
undergird punitive approaches to problems traditionally conceptualized as medical. For instance, 
should patients who test positive for illicit substances through their doctor be investigated for 
drug use?  Should the mothers of obese children diagnosed with diabetes be investigated for 
child abuse? As medical issues come to be discursively framed in terms of morality and 
responsibility that are more readily legible to the law, both officials and community members 
may find the law a more appealing recourse for intervention and punishment. This is not just a 
theoretical possibility; examples across the globe suggest a widespread interest in using punitive 
measures to combat disease, from Canadians being prosecuted for herpes exposure (Syms 2010); 
to Australian lawmakers punishing parents who do not vaccinate their children (Betts 2010); to 
Ugandan efforts to make HIV infection a capital crime for gay men (BBC News 2009). These are 
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just a few of the many examples that we might better understand collectively if we framed them 
through the critical lens of sociology.  
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CHAPTER 3 
From Sickness to Badness: The Criminalization of HIV in Michigan 
Introduction 
Calling it a crime “akin to murder,” Kalamazoo County Circuit Court Judge Philip D. 
Schaefer ordered a Kalamazoo man to spend nine months in jail for failing to tell his 
sexual partners he was HIV-positive. “Quite frankly there isn’t a sentence long enough 
that I could give you that would be justice,” Schaefer told [the defendant]. “You have 
signed a death warrant for another human being. God forbid that you ever do it again” 
(Ricks 2004). 
 
While conceptual approaches to theorizing social control have varied over time (for a review, see 
Meier 1982), sociologists have a longstanding interest in understanding how categories of 
sickness are produced, regulated, and controlled. Indeed, medical sociologists coined one of their 
signature concepts, “medicalization,” in order to describe the process through which social 
phenomena come to be regulated by medical authorities. Yet, while sociologists have 
acknowledged that medicalization could be “bidirectional and partial” (Conrad 2005:3), most 
research has centered on what was viewed as the usual direction of change: from badness to 
sickness (Conrad & Schneider [1980]1992). Much less is known about how phenomena 
historically controlled by medical authorities come to be governed by the criminal law, or what I 
term in this paper “the criminalization of sickness.” 
In order to conceptualize this process, I draw on a variety of sociological literatures. In 
the first section, I review the literature on the social control of sickness. The bulk of this work 
has followed in the tradition of Conrad (1975; 1979; 1992), whose groundbreaking research 
highlights the processes by which medical authorities come to regulate and control ever-greater 
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domains of social life. While these insights into social control have helped to describe and 
analyze a wide range of social problems, I argue that they have tended to bracket analyses of 
how problems historically defined as medical come to be regulated by other institutions and 
forms of authority – including criminal law. I then review the literature on criminal laws 
prohibiting HIV-positive people from having sex without first disclosing their HIV-positive 
status. While reports suggest the reach of such laws is increasing (Bernard & Nyambe 2012), few 
empirical studies have examined their application.  
In the second section, I report findings from an original analysis of 58 Michigan trial 
court cases in which defendants are convicted under the felony nondisclosure statute. Drawing 
on trial court transcripts, newspaper reports concerning those proceedings, and court records 
associated with cases convicted between 1992 (the year in which the first defendant was 
convicted) and 2010, I argue that legal actors employ moralizing narratives of HIV infection that 
serve to construct HIV as a form of badness deserving of legal intervention and, thus, social 
control. Because HIV-specific criminal laws deal with a problem that is conventionally 
understood as medical (a virus), many have presumed that such laws reflect a societal interest in 
promoting the public’s health. However, I argue that Michigan’s HIV disclosure law does not 
serve to promote public health; rather, it reflects the perception of the virus as a moral infection 
requiring regulation and punishment. 
As I show, while the HIV epidemic has changed dramatically since the late 1980s when 
many HIV disclosure statutes were enacted, the way these cases are argued in Michigan courts 
has not reflected the transformations in medicine and HIV prevention. My analysis suggests that 
HIV disclosure laws continue to be used not to enhance public health but to control and punish 
populations deemed deviant.  
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The Social Control of Sickness: From “Medicalization” to “Criminalization” 
Conrad (1979, 1992) and Conrad and Schneider ([1980]1992) have explained how medicine and 
its practitioners come to govern types of non-conformity once viewed as crime or sin. Conrad’s 
theory of medical social control became encapsulated within the well-known concept, 
“medicalization,” which was informed by both Zola’s (1972) argument that medicine has come 
to supplant religion as the major institution of social control, as well as Freidson’s (1970) 
pioneering work analyzing how medical professionals came to define categories of deviance as 
illness in order to diagnose increasing numbers of individuals as sick. In his analysis of the 
development of the medical category “hyperkinesis,” Conrad (1975) coined the term 
medicalization in order to explain this very process. 
Conrad and Schneider’s ([1980] 1992) original conceptualization describes 
medicalization in either/or terms, framing it as the process through which “categories of deviant 
behavior become defined as medical rather than moral problems” (p. 17). More recently, Conrad 
& Schneider (2005) updated their approach by arguing that medicalization can be “bidirectional 
and partial” (p. 5). Anspach (2011:xxii) expands on this to suggest that “ideas about bad 
behavior… continue to exist in popular culture alongside the medical model.” Bosk (2013) 
argues that, while children with behavioral disorder diagnoses undergo partial medicalization, 
this does not protect them from criminalization. Thus, by titling this paper “from sickness to 
badness,” I am not suggesting that these states are mutually exclusive; rather, I am pointing to a 
case in which criminal justice authorities are claiming jurisdiction over a phenomenon 
conventionally understood in medical terms (e.g. a virus).  
In this paper, I build on these contributions by examining what Timmermans and Gabe 
(2002) describe as the “medico-legal borderland” – or, sites of overlapping jurisdiction between 
72 
 
medicine and the law where, at times, authorities “vie for hegemony in an attempt to redraw the 
borders to their advantage” (p. 507). Citing Abbott’s (1988) influential work on competition for 
professional jurisdiction, Timmermans and Gabe call for greater attention to the intersection of 
medicine and crime in order to better explicate the complexities of social control. In the next 
section, I turn to the literature on the use of the criminal law to control sickness in order to 
further conceptualize this particular borderland.  
 
The Criminalization of Sickness 
Sociolegal scholars have a longstanding interest in analyzing how deviance becomes labeled as 
crime and controlled by criminal justice authorities (for a review, see Jenness 2004). Describing 
this transition as a “moral passage,” Gusfield (1967:187) argues that “What is attacked as 
criminal today may be seen as sick next year and fought over as possibly legitimate by the next 
generation.” Recent studies have examined how social movements (Jenness and Grattet 2005) 
and moral panics (Jenkins 1998) can contribute to the construction of categories of crime and 
criminalization more generally.  
This paper builds on these insights by examining how criminal justice comes to control 
phenomena historically defined as medical. This is not entirely novel. For example, Schneider 
(1978) describes historical tensions in punitive and medical approaches to defining and 
controlling alcohol intoxication. A wide array of sociologists has similarly analyzed punitive 
approaches to the crimino-legal control of mental illness, which have become particularly 
problematic in an era of deinstitutionalization and mass incarceration (see, for example, Erickson 
and Erickson 2008; Pescosolido et al. 1999; Link, Andrews, and Cullen 1992). Although 
sociologists have attended to the criminalization of sickness, these efforts resemble medical 
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sociology’s focus on phenomena sometimes referred to as “existential problems” whose 
etiologies are more readily understood as socially constructed. How “organic diseases” such as 
HIV come to be regulated by the criminal law is not yet well understood.  
In organizing this paper in terms of “criminalization,” I aim to avoid confusion with the 
use of civil law procedures (such as quarantine and forced treatment) to control disease. There is 
a vast public health law literature examining the use of civil procedures for controlling disease 
(see, for example, Bayer and Dupuis 1995). For a discussion of the differences between civil and 
criminal law for controlling sickness, see Gostin (2001:224-5). While criminal laws regulating 
infectious diseases do not make infection itself a crime, they do impose restrictions on the 
freedoms of those infected that are not imposed on others. Moreover, they codify forms of 
punishment for those infected who breach normative behavioral guidelines. To the extent that the 
criminal law is applied to only those who are infected, it is appropriate to refer to this process as 
the “criminalization of sickness.”  
 
The Criminalization of HIV in the United States 
Laws in 33 states presently have HIV-specific criminal statutes on the books (Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention 2013a). Nondisclosure prosecutions have also been reported in additional 
states under statutes not specific to HIV, such as attempted murder. None of the HIV-specific 
criminal laws requires that the complainant in the case contract HIV and most prohibit even no 
or low risk sexual contact (such as oral sex or the sharing of sex toys) without disclosure (Center 
for HIV Law & Policy 2010). The majority of such laws in the US were enacted during the mid-
1980s and early 1990s in the context of high AIDS-related mortality, a general panic about its 
transmission, and before life-saving medications known as antiretrovirals (ARVs) were 
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introduced in 1996 (Burris et al. 1993; Galletly and Pinkerton 2006).  While comprehensive 
national data on the enforcement of such laws do not exist, advocacy groups report that over 
1000 HIV-positive defendants have been prosecuted under HIV-specific criminal statutes; 
Michigan is reported to have the fourth highest number of prosecutions of any country or 
territory in the world (Bernard and Nyambe 2012).  
Public debates over criminal HIV disclosure laws have focused on atypical defendants 
accused of infecting multiple partners who are understood to be particularly vulnerable, such as 
the case against Nushawn Williams, a black man accused in New York of infecting nine, mostly 
white women and girls. Shevory (2004) argues that the media spectacle surrounding Williams’ 
case reflected social anxieties not just about HIV, but also about race and crime more generally. 
Paralleling Metzl’s (2010) argument that the diagnosis of schizophrenia became a tool for 
medical control of black men, Shevory argues that Williams’ criminal case proved to be an 
occasion to shore up social values by linking anxieties about a deadly disease to deep-seated 
fears of black male sexuality and masculinity. 
While Williams was not prosecuted under an HIV-specific statute, the portrayal of his 
case in the media reveals discursive elements central to prosecutions under HIV-specific laws: 
defenseless and/or undeserving victims; reckless and/or malicious HIV-positive offenders; and a 
debilitating and fatal disease (see Weait 2007). In an analysis of Canadian HIV exposure court 
cases, Adam et al. (2008a) argue that the “onus of responsibility may be shifting back toward 
HIV-positive people” (8). In all of these contexts, the discursive construction of a polarity 
between malice and vulnerability, guilt and innocence, culpability and victimhood enables 
reframing sexual behaviors as criminal negligence on the part of the HIV-positive partner – 
facilitating legal intervention and, thus, a punitive form of social control. 
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Study Design, Sample, and Methods 
Michigan is useful as a case for two reasons. First, it was the site of the first known conviction in 
the United States under an HIV-specific law in 1992. Second, its statute is characteristic of those 
nationwide in that features a broadly construed concept of “sexual penetration” that has enabled 
prosecutors to file charges in cases involving a wide range of sexual practice. To analyze the 
enforcement of Michigan’s HIV disclosure law over time, I obtained public records of 
convictions from The Michigan State Police Information Center, which include the county, 
sentencing date, and court disposition of all convictions reported to the state. While the state did 
report 28 non-convictions, these data were limited to those cases in which the defendant had a 
prior criminal record. Because of this inherent bias, these data were excluded from the analysis. I 
attempted to identify the defendant in each case by reviewing local newspaper archives, 
searching for any mention of a case within two weeks of the sentencing date indicated in the 
police data. I successfully identified the defendant in 29 cases this way and in another 29 cases 
using county clerks’ records and internet searches. As such, I identified the defendant in 95% of 
the known 61 convictions between 1992 and 2010. 
In the 58 cases in which the defendant was identified, I ordered courtroom transcripts 
from the county circuit court. I obtained 145 court transcripts totaling 4,529 pages from 46 of the 
58 cases. In the 12 cases for which no transcripts were available, I requested copies of other 
documents in the court file that detailed the basic facts of the case and relevant legal matters. For 
the purposes of this analysis, I also draw on 125 local newspaper reports located through archival 
research, internet search engines, and electronic newspaper database queries.  This research 
design was reviewed by a University of Michigan ethics board and determined to be exempt 
from review. 
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Upon receipt, I digitized records using a scanner and a computer outfitted with ABBY 
FineReader text recognition software. Once digitized, the court transcripts were read and coded 
by the author using ATLAS.ti qualitative analysis software. For the purposes of this analysis, I 
coded for framing devices employed by legal actors to justify punishing defendants. This 
includes public health framings (e.g. “they’re a risk to public health” or “exposed another to a 
risk of contracting HIV”) and moral framings that depart from medical science (e.g. “they’re a 
reckless killer” and “they sentenced another to death”). I also coded for references to medical 
science, such as undetectable viral loads, transmission probabilities, and HIV virology. 
In addition to defendant pseudonyms, I also use pseudonyms to refer to counties in this 
paper. County pseudonyms were generated randomly using the names of counties in Wisconsin 
(counties in that state follow a naming scheme similar to Michigan’s). 
 
Findings 
 “Restrain Reckless AIDS Carriers”: The Making of A Moral Social Problem 
During the 1988 legislative debates over the felony HIV disclosure provision, the House 
Legislative Analysis division (which produces analyses of all bills originating in the house) 
prepared a telling report, “Restrain Reckless AIDS Carriers,” which detailed the arguments both 
for and against its passage. Anticipating present-day critics (Mykhalovskiy 2011; Heywood 
2008; Galletly and Pinkerton 2006), the arguments against passage are based on the view that 
criminalizing nondisclosure is bad for public health: 
Criminalization could actually foster the spread of HIV infection by driving it 
underground, impeding cooperation from infected individuals both in counseling and 
testing and in partner notification… Imposing punitive criminal penalties on recalcitrants 
may reflect the frustration and fear some people feel about the AIDS epidemic, but what 
is needed to control the spread of HIV is effective public health initiatives, not ineffective 
emotional reactions (House Legislative Analysis Section 1989:4). 
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Rather than responding to these public health arguments in the terms presented, the report’s 
authors respond instead by recasting the problem from one of public health to one of moral 
regulation and social control. Indeed, the authors even suggest that such behavior might be 
deserving of capital punishment if Michigan had not abolished it in 1846: 
Such reprehensible and morally repugnant behavior ought to be punished… A clear 
message should be sent to those people, however few in number, who recklessly and 
callously expose other people to a possible death sentence by engaging in sex without 
even informing them of the risk to which they are being exposed. Some people believe 
that capital punishment, were it available, would not be too strong a penalty… Imposition 
of felony penalties is in fact a mild punishment for such reprehensible behavior (4). 
 
These legislative debates are important because indicate the intent of the law’s framers.  While 
public health and medical narratives might have proved to be useful in framing the perceived 
problem, legislators opted instead to shift the terms of the debate to moral and punitive terms. 
 Indeed, the bill’s statutory language further evidences legislators’ reliance on discourses 
of badness.  Michigan’s criminal nondisclosure statute reads: 
A person who … knows that he or she is HIV infected, and who engages in sexual 
penetration with another person without having first informed the other person… is guilty 
of a felony… “Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal 
intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of 
any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body, but emission of 
semen is not required (Michigan Compiled Law [MCL] § 333.5210). 
 
The definition of “sexual penetration” employed by legislators did not emerge out of the ether; it 
has a history. Rather than devising a narrow, medically appropriate definition covering only 
those forms of sexual activity by which HIV can be transmitted, legislators simply copied and 
pasted from the 1974 criminal sexual conduct act that restructured Michigan’s rape law (MCL § 
750.520a). This discursive recycling suggests that legislators understood non-disclosure as 
analogous to rape – a social problem that, while not without public health concerns to be sure, is 
clearly first and foremost understood in terms of badness. As I show, cases brought under the 
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unanimously enacted disclosure law reflect legislative intent: badness is punished, often without 
regard to its implications for sickness.  
 
“A Carrier of Death”: Setting Narrative Precedent in Michigan Case Law 
A prosecutor in a small, remote county in Northern Michigan made national headlines when he 
petitioned to have the first defendant charged under Michigan’s felony HIV disclosure statute 
extradited from New York in 1991 to face charges. The prosecutor explained that he 
aggressively pursued the case against “Eric,” a white gay man, because he wanted “to see that 
[Eric] does not give any more death notices out” (Bruning 1991:2C). The case against Eric 
centered on the allegation that he had engaged in receptive and insertive oral sex without 
disclosing his HIV-status during a one-time casual sexual encounter with a 21-year-old man, 
“Sam.” Sam went to authorities months later when Eric’s ex-lover, “Tom,” revealed to him that 
Eric was, in fact, HIV-positive (Preliminary Examination:81).  
Although oral sex was generally regarded as a possible route of transmission at the time, 
some suspected that it was less risky than other sexual practices. Indeed, Eric’s defense counsel 
argued that Eric had been counseled at an HIV support group “that protection was not needed for 
oral sex” (Motion Hearing:103). In a written brief, the judge argues that engaging in lower risk 
sex “does not negate culpability”: 
[Eric] may have been of the opinion that oral sex is not as dangerous as receptive anal sex 
at the time of the alleged encounter between the complaining witness and [Eric], but that 
does not mean the statute was not violated. Such an argument, if the Defendant is found 
guilty, may bear upon the extent of culpability, but it does not negate culpability (21). 
  
In the Court’s view, engaging in low-risk sex might result in milder treatment at sentencing – but 
it does not foreclose a conviction under the law. 
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In the wake of a lengthy, widely publicized extradition process, as well as a judicial 
ruling that Eric’s medical records were unlawfully obtained and thus inadmissible, criticism of 
the case against Eric began to mount (Kellogg 1991). The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power 
(ACT UP) raised $25,000 to free Eric on bail, and the American Civil Liberties Union provided 
Eric with counsel with the intention of challenging the statute’s constitutionality. But Eric’s 
resolve to see the case to trial and through a potentially lengthy appeal process had waned. When 
the prosecutor offered Eric a deal to minimize jail time by pleading no contest, Eric acquiesced 
and was sentenced to one year in jail and five years’ probation.  
Eric’s conviction is important for several reasons. First, while there was not yet a 
consensus in 1992 as to whether oral sex was considered safe, HIV prevention campaigns by 
1995 had begun promoting it as “safer sex” (National Library of Medicine n.d.). While the CDC 
assigns precise statistical odds for vaginal and anal sex from 5 in 10,000 for insertive, 
condomless vaginal intercourse to 50 in 10,000 for receptive, condomless anal intercourse, they 
simply note that “HIV transmission through oral sex has been documented, but rare. Accurate 
estimates of risk are not available” (n.p.).  Yet, five additional defendants were convicted for 
engaging in oral sex without first disclosing in 1993, 1996, 2001, 2002, and 2004. More 
generally, Eric’s conviction paved the way for future nondisclosure prosecutions. While he was 
the sole defendant convicted in the four year period after the law’s 1989 enactment, 14 
defendants were convicted under the disclosure law during the four year period following Eric’s 
conviction. A prescient media report published the day Eric was convicted cited a number of 
investigations across the state that “have proceeded quietly in the wings as authorities carefully 
followed the progress [of Eric’s case]” (Hogan and Murphy 1992:A1). 
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The case against “Sandra,” a 32-year old white woman, was among the cases cited in the 
report. She was described as having an IQ “above the level considered developmentally 
disabled” (Walsh 1992:2A). In court, it was revealed that her IQ was 72, which was in fact 
barely above the clinical threshold for a diagnosis of disability of 70 identified in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (First, Frances, and Pincus 2004:373). After reports 
surfaced that she was having sex without disclosing her HIV-positive status, local health officials 
sought to have Sandra quarantined under the provisions of the state’s “health threat to others” 
statute that allows officials to confine an individual deemed to be a threat to public health (MCL 
§ 333.5207). The prosecutor reported to media outlets that “he also will review potential criminal 
sanctions” (Walsh 1992:2A).  
Not long after her civil confinement ended, Sandra again found herself in legal jeopardy. 
After frequent complaints to her legal guardian about the foster care home in which she resided, 
Sandra was allowed to move into what was characterized in court as a rundown motel notorious 
for sex work and drug use (Jury Trial Vol. II:203). Only two days later, Sandra called and 
begged him for permission to return to the foster care home. She reported that she had been 
having sex with another tenant, a fact that her guardian then reported to the police.  
Sandra’s case was tried by jury in 1995. The prosecutor opened his case against Sandra 
by framing her as a “carrier of death” who needed to be locked up: 
She had been told and discussed with her repeatedly that she should not have sex with another 
person unless she first told them of her HIV status. It was a condition that was made clear to 
her that… could in fact kill another individual, another human being. The facts will show… 
that she knew that she was literally a carrier of death in this situation… It is the facts of this 
case, that the disease was a fatal one, that in fact she passed it onto another person (Jury Trial 
Vol. I:74). 
 
While these statements prompted a sustained defense objection preventing the prosecutor from 
making similarly inflammatory comments again, the image of a “carrier of death” had already 
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been planted in jurors’ minds, as had the prosecutor’s false assertion that she had “passed” the 
disease onto the complainant (who did not contract HIV). 
Although the prosecutor only needed to prove that Sandra had engaged in “sexual 
penetration” without first disclosing her HIV-status, he laid out his case by framing Sandra as “a 
person acting out of self—self- fulfillment, someone that wanted to satisfy her own sexual 
desires” (Jury Trial Vol. III:392). Switching to the first person and deploying a rough 
grammatical style, the prosecutor decried that Sandra did not tell her partners she was positive 
“because that means that he won't keep comin’ back to give me more sex and to satisfy my 
sexual desires” (392). She needed to be punished not just because she had not disclosed her 
status, but because she was a selfish “carrier of death” – a menace to the community. 
 The jury found Sandra guilty. At sentencing, the judge declared that her irresponsibility 
while “carrying a deadly weapon” warranted taking her “out of circulation”: 
She is carrying a deadly weapon with her and… she could go around killing people by 
her lack of concern…. I think she has a feeble understanding of how dangerous she can 
be in a public setting such as that in which she was placed by her so-called guardian… I 
feel that, for the protection of our community, that I have to take [Sandra] out of 
circulation. (Sentencing: 6-9).  
The judge sentenced her to 32 months in prison. 
Just as Eric’s case paved the way for future prosecutions of oral sex, Sandra’s case resonates 
with seven future convictions involving defendants described in various ways as having “limited 
intelligence” in 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. More generally, the discursive 
dimensions of both Sandra and Eric’s cases echo throughout future cases. For an overview of the 
cases analyzed, see Table 3.1 (note that three cases sentenced simultaneously are combined for a 
total of 43 cases for which there were transcripts available). As the data make clear, the specter 
of the homicidal HIV-positive menace spreading death looms over the adjudication of HIV 
nondisclosure cases long after effective treatments became available. In what follows, I describe 
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a series of typical cases in greater detail. 
 
Table 3.1: Persistence of Death Narratives in 43 HIV Nondisclosure Cases with Transcripts 
Available, Sorted by Year 
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Examples of Death Narratives 
Eric Forest W M 29 M 1992 Jail – 12 mo.  
Prosecutor: "I'd like to see that [Eric] does not give any 
more death notices out." 
Adam Marinette W M 25 F 1993 Prison – 24 mo.   
Terrance Sauk B M 45 F 1993 Prison – 32 mo.   
Aaron Ozaukee W M 30 F 1995 Prison – 24 mo.  
Prosecutor: "But now we have the other case, which he 
knows that he has got a very dangerous disease. Yet he has 
chosen to have sex with another woman and not told her. 
He may have sentenced her to death, also."  
Jason Jefferson W M 34 M 1995 Prison – 24 mo.   
Maria Door L F 29 M 1995 Jail – 12 mo.  
Prosecutor: "Quite frankly, I don't know what's wrong with 
the state legislature in only making this a four-year offense. 
This conduct is life threatening to other people.” 
Sandra Portage W F 33 M 1995 Prison – 32 mo.  
Prosecutor: "The facts will show in this case however that 
despite the fact that she knew that she was literally a carrier 
of death in this situation…" 
Andrew Washburn B M 24 F 1996 Prison – 32 mo.  
Judge: "I would suggest that, given the impact of the 
potential death, that most people are kind of anxious to find 
out what the story is in connection with it...." 
Susan Grant W F 37 M 1996 Prison – 32 mo.   
John Rock B M 35 F 1999 Prison – 48 mo.  
Judge: "It seems appropriate that this offense variable 
should be scored… where there is a high probability of 
transmitting a fatal disease to an unknown victim." 
Darnell Jefferson B M 42 F 2000 Prison – 12 mo.   
Lynette Iron W F 27 M 2000 Jail – 3 mo.   
Tim Washburn W M 34 M 2000 Prison – 58 mo.  
Prosecutor: " If you -- if you know you have AIDS… and 
you don't disclose, well, what does that achieve? 'Only 
further dissemination of a lethal, incurable disease, in order 
to gratify the sexual or other physical pleasure of the 
already-infected individual.'"  
Charlie Ozaukee B M 41 F 2001 Prison – 28 mo.   
Lynette Iron W F 29 M 2001 Prison – 32 mo.   
Mark Iowa L M 44 F 2001 Jail – 9 mo.   
Sam Barron W M 39 F 2001 Prison – 24 mo.  
Judge: "You're a person who has continued to endanger life 
of others without apparently too much concern about your 
activities…” 
Thomas Pierce B M 40 F 2001 Prison – 12 mo.  
Prosecutor: "You're saying even though [she] knew you 
were HIV positive, she wanted to have sex with you and 
was willing to expose herself to the risk of catching HIV 
and possibly death?" 
Xavier Rusk W M 29 M 2001 Jail – 1.5 mo.   
Xavier Rusk W M 29 M 2001 Jail – 1.5 mo.   
Reginald Dunn B M 33 F 2002 Prison – 16 mo.   
William Price W M 45 M 2002 Prison – 32 mo.   
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Lynn Portage W F 33 M 2003 Jail – 6 mo.   
Edgar Grant W M 43 M 2004 Prison – 12 mo.   
Greg Iowa W M 33 M 2004 Jail – 3 mo.   
Maurice Rock B M 42 F 2004 Jail – 9 mo.  
Judge: " Having unprotected sex with another person while 
you've got AIDS and you're not informing them. That's 
akin to murder. You have signed a death warrant…” 
Peter Barron W M 52 M 2004 Probation  
Judge: "It never occurred to you that you might kill the 
man?" 
Roselyn Vernon B F 30 M 2004 Probation   
Kevin Jefferson W M 27 F 2005 Jail – 6 mo.   
Letsego Oconto B M 37 F 2005 Jail – 9 mo.  
Judge: "By having unconsented sexual intercourse, you 
may indeed be doing your best to infect or lead someone to 
death ultimately." 
Tyler Grant B M 38 M 2006 Prison – 12 mo.   
Derrick Grant B M 57 F 2007 Probation 
 
 
Jay Vernon B M 38 F 2007 Prison – 60 mo.  
Judge: "Even if someone can live 20 years now with that 
disease, if you’re 20 years old to die at an age 40 is an 
unseemly quick death... " 
Jermaine Ashland B M 43 M 2007 Prison – 14 mo.   
Christina Rock W F 36 M 2008 Jail – 68 days   
Alex Rock W M 25 F 2009 Jail – 2 mo.  
Judge: " It's a disease that can be passed from one person 
to another. That means it can be potentially fatal to them. " 
Benjamin Burnett L M 21 F 2009 Jail – 9 mo.  
Prosecutor: "When you talk about rape, you talk about 
murder, this ranks right up there. I can't believe that this is 
a four year offense and we've got zero to nine guidelines."   
Jackson Gr. Lake W M 32 F 2009 Prison – 30 mo.  
Prosecutor: "Because as I think they'll tell you, they're not 
out of the woods yet. They still may come down with this 
fatal disease."  
Jennifer Richland W F 23 M 2009 Jail – 5 mo.  
Prosecutor: "The disease she carried is terminal, and the 
way it's sent and that is through sexual activity, and that's 
exactly what she engaged in with unknowing patrons." 
Newt Florence W M 41 F 2009 Prison – 36 mo.  
Judge: "This is a tragedy; and, again, people's lives are at 
risk." 
Newt Lincoln W M 42 F 2009 Prison – 96 mo.   
Lilly Wood W F 54 M 2010 Prison – 17 mo.  
 
Lilly Ashland W F 54 M 2010 Jail – 11 mo.  
Prosecutor: "[A] harmful biological device... means a 
bacteria, virus or other micro-organism or toxic substance 
derived from or produced from an organism that can be 
used to cause death, injury or disease in humans, animals 
or plants. So I do think that that fits." 
 
 
 “Death to Innocent Third Parties”:  The Persistence of Death Narratives, Post-ARVs 
When combination therapy was introduced in 1996, mortality rates from HIV began to plummet. 
CDC (1999) surveillance data indicates that AIDS-related deaths peaked at 50,489 in 1995, 
dropping by over 25% in 1996; over 50% by 1997; and by nearly 65% by 1998. This rapid 
decline received considerable attention in the media. The cover of the December 2, 1996 issue of 
Newsweek asked, “The end of AIDS? Not yet – but new drugs offer hope” (Leland & Gordon 
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1996). Stories of the so-called “Lazarus effect” – a reference to the Biblical figure who was 
raised from the dead by Jesus – were widespread, even filtering down to small-town Michigan 
newspapers. A Muskegon Chronicle story in 1997, “A sign of hope,” tells the story of one local 
man who was recovering quickly after beginning treatment. “The combination of drugs doesn’t 
work for everyone. But around the country, reports of amazing things have been happening, 
leading some AIDS workers to describe the medicine as having a ‘Lazarus effect.’ Bringing 
people back to life.” (Harrison 1997). Less than a year later, a The Holland Sentinel (1998) story 
matter-of-factly stated, “Over the past few years, the three-drug AIDS ‘cocktail’ has turned 
AIDS from a death sentence to a manageable illness.” In gay communities ravaged by the 
epidemic, activists began to imagine a life “post-AIDS” (Sullivan 1996; Rofes 1998). 
News of the dramatic turn-around in the prognosis for HIV-positive people was not 
limited to print media. CNN coverage in February 1997 highlighted a report from the CDC 
detailing a “dramatic decrease” in AIDS deaths during the first half of 1996 (Woodruff 1997). 
Similar reports aired on ABC (Mora 1997) and CBS (Rather 1997). While sitting Presidents 
were not often very vocal when it came to HIV/AIDS in the early years, former President Bill 
Clinton (2002) penned an editorial for The New York Times on World AIDS Day declaring that 
“AIDS is not a death sentence.” Then-President George W. Bush echoed this claim in 2004 in a 
televised policy speech announcing his renewed commitment to the President’s Emergency Fund 
for AIDS Relief, declaring that “HIV is no longer a hopeless death sentence… New drugs and 
new treatments are dramatically extending and improving lives.” (Department of State 2004).  
In contrast to this marked shift in public discourse towards a consensus that HIV was not 
a death sentence and that treatment was extremely effective, discourse in Michigan courtrooms 
remained stuck in 1992. Tim was accused in 1999 of not telling a new roommate that he was 
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HIV-positive before they engaged in oral and anal sex. According to testimony, the complainant 
in the case did not ask Tim, a 34-year old white gay man, about his HIV-status until the 
following day. When the defendant revealed his HIV-status, the complainant “basically 
freak[ed]”, returned home, found the defendant’s HIV medication, and went to a hospital where 
he was prescribed post-exposure prophylaxis to reduce his risk of infection. Hospital attendants 
also performed a rape kit and encouraged the complainant to contact the police, suggesting that 
either the staff or the complainant interpreted his experience as a form of sexual assault (Jury 
Trial Vol. I:143). Tim was subsequently charged; he pled not guilty and exercised his right to 
trial by jury.  
With a signed confession on the record, there was little room for the defense to argue the 
facts. Instead, the defense countered the prosecution’s claim that Tim had exposed the 
complainant to “that deadly virus” (141) by arguing that Tim’s viral load (or, the amount of virus 
in his blood) was “undetectable” and thus the risk of transmission was low. While recently 
published data suggest that HIV treatments can reduce the risk of heterosexual transmission by 
96% by reducing viral load (Cohen 2011), nearly a decade would pass after Tim’s trial before 
any major scientific statement on the subject (Vernazza et al. 2008) – although many had long 
suspected this to be the case (see, for example, Smith & Van de Ven 2001:18). 
The prosecution argued that, undetectable or not, the defendant was still obliged to 
disclose: “It doesn't matter how positive — how much positive they are… It's like saying, ‘Well, 
I'm only a little bit pregnant.’ I mean, you're either pregnant or you're not pregnant.” (Jury Trial 
Vol. II:138). Quoting from a Michigan Court of Appeals decision, People v. Jensen (On 
Remand) (1998), which affirmed the HIV disclosure law’s constitutionality, the prosecutor 
argued that not disclosing one’s HIV status leads to “death to innocent third parties.” 
If you know you have AIDS or you know you have HIV and you don't disclose, well, 
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what does that achieve? "Only further dissemination of a lethal, incurable disease, in 
order to gratify the sexual or other physical pleasure of the already-infected individual." 
And I am reading off of something here because I don’t want to get the words wrong… 
"Indeed, the probable results accompanying the nondisclosure are fairly predictable: 
Death to innocent third parties” (139-140). 
 
In only four of the 58 cases did the complainant(s) allege to have contracted HIV from the 
defendant. Yet, in order to frame nondisclosure as a moral, criminal problem, prosecutors and 
judges continue to deploy analogies to murder and death sentences throughout the study period.  
Indeed, legal actors did not appear to feel constrained by medical evidence. For example, 
while Tim’s complainant testified that he did not contract HIV from Tim, Tim was treated as if 
he had at sentencing. When a felony defendant in Michigan is sentenced, the judge completes a 
spreadsheet containing an assortment of variables that assigns levels of “badness” to the crime. 
Higher scores result in higher penalties. In Tim’s case, the prosecutor argued that the offense 
variable (OV) for “physical injury to a victim” (MCL § 777.33) should be scored at 25 points, 
defined as “life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim.” Despite 
defense objections, the judge agreed. “I cannot think of anything more life-threatening” 
(Sentencing: 6). The judge sentenced Tim to 58 months to 15 years in prison, scolding him for 
his “callous disregard for life” (10). 
Of course, many HIV tests do have a “window period” of up to six months between an 
exposure and the ability for the test to detect an infection – although the CDC (2010a) reports 
that 97% of people will develop detectable antibodies within three months after exposure. Yet, 
prosecutors and judges sometimes invoked the possibility of infection in order to justify harsher 
punishment in cases where the window period had clearly lapsed. For example, none of the four 
women who accused Jackson, a 32-year old white man in Green Lake County, of not disclosing 
had tested positive when he was sentenced eight months after the last alleged encounter. Yet, the 
prosecutor argued that “they're not out of the woods yet. They still may come down with this 
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fatal disease” (Sentencing:22). The judge agreed, sentencing Jackson to 30 to 48 months in 
prison. “You have impacted, as [the prosecutor] has indicated, you know, potentially given four 
others a life sentence and that's something this Court cannot overlook” (Sentencing:24).  
In other cases, the virus itself was viewed as a weapon. Lilly, a 54-year old heterosexual 
white woman, was convicted in both Wood and Lincoln counties in 2010 for not disclosing her 
status to the same male partner. In one of those counties, the judge and prosecutor debated 
whether they should score the offense variable marked for “aggravated use of a weapon” (MCL § 
777.31) at 20 points, defined as “the victim was subjected or exposed to a harmful biological 
substance, harmful biological device” (ibid.): 
Judge: Any comment, [prosecutor], on OV two? That's like the use of a weapon…. Do 
you think it fits? 
 
Prosecutor: I looked at that and I think it does. I looked up the definition of the harmful 
biological device… Yeah, it says it means a bacteria, virus or other micro-organism or 
toxic substance derived from or produced from an organism that can be used to cause 
death, injury or disease in humans, animals or plants. So I do think that that fits 
(Sentencing:13). 
 
Echoing a controversial case that same year in which an HIV-positive Michigan man was 
charged under a law intended to combat bioterrorism for biting a neighbor (Stanglin 2010), 
judges in Lincoln County and Wood County agreed that the scoring was appropriate. The Wood 
county prosecutor argued, “If we want to talk about aggravated use, the fact that she continued to 
have sexual relations… each time, placing him in risk of loss of his life, I think it's an 
appropriate scoring” (Sentencing: 7-8). Lilly was sentenced to 11 months in jail in Lincoln 
County and 17 to 48 months in prison in Wood County. 
analogies to homicide continued well into the study period. Peter, a 52-year-old white 
gay man, was convicted in Barron County in 2004 after being accused of not disclosing his HIV 
status to a casual male sex partner before engaging in receptive anal intercourse. At sentencing, 
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Peter told the court that he was unaware that the law existed and that he thought using a condom 
was sufficient. Unsympathetic, the judge pointed to the risk of killing his partner: 
Peter: I had no idea that the law even existed, and I know that ignorance is not a 
justification of it but I did what I thought I was supposed to do. We did it safely and I 
thought that was the way it was supposed to be done 
 
Judge: It never occurred to you that you might kill the man? 
 
Peter: I was recently diagnosed. I mean we practiced safe sex which is basically the only thing 
you can do. 
 
Judge: Well, I guess if you knew what you had when you did this there's always a huge risk that 
you could infect somebody with a horrible disease. (Sentencing: 4-5). 
 
Notably, like the vast majority of these cases, Peter’s partner did not contract HIV. The case was 
unusual, however, in that Peter was extremely ill during both of his appearances in court. While 
he was sentenced to probation, he was arrested for violating its terms a year later after allegedly 
failing to attend his doctor’s appointments to receive HIV treatment – a violation that may have 
resulted in his incarceration. Peter, however, was not incarcerated; he died just days before he 
was to be sentenced for not seeing his doctor (The Gazette 2005:n.p.).  
 
“That’s Not in the Statute”: The Irrelevance of Sickness in the Face of Badness 
Charlie, a 41 year-old black man, was convicted in 2001 of not disclosing his HIV status to a 
woman with whom he had sex after they had smoked crack together one evening. The 
complainant initially told the police that she was “the victim of a carjacking, and a kidnaping by 
two unknown black men” (Sentencing:17), but she later admitted that she had gone willingly to 
the defendant’s house seeking drugs and sex. Charlie admitted to having sex without disclosing 
his status, but claimed that he believed he had abided by the law by wearing a condom.  
Given Charlie’s admission, his defense attorney attempted to mitigate his client’s 
culpability on medical grounds. Noting that Charlie had used a condom and that his viral load 
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was undetectable, the attorney pleaded with the judge to consider that his client was not “in full-
blown AIDS status and going about knowingly infecting people” (21). The prosecutor disagreed, 
arguing that the statute does not require proof of risk:  
The fact that the argument is being made that [the defendant] thought that he was 
adequately protecting the Complainant, because he was wearing a condom. Well, that’s 
not in the statute. It doesn’t say if you wear a condom it’s only a misdemeanor or–-or 
anything like that (Sentencing: 16). 
 
The judge came close to acknowledging the relevance of medical risk, but only in order to 
dismiss defense claims that Charlie’s use of a condom mitigated his culpability: even when using 
a condom, the judge ruled that the risk of transmission was “overwhelming” (25). “You don’t 
need a statute to tell you that this is behavior which is just absolutely reprehensible” (25).  
Arguing that Charlie “did manipulate and take advantage of the victim” (26), the judge sentenced 
him to 28 to 72 months in prison. 
 The scientific literature, however, suggests that the risk might have been less than 
“overwhelming.” In their review, Davis and Weller (1999) estimate condoms to be 87% effective 
at preventing heterosexual HIV transmission (Davis & Weller 1999), while Leynaert, Downs, 
and Vincenzi (1998) estimate the per-incidence risk of male-to-female vaginal transmission 
without a condom to be roughly 1 in 1000 (1998). Thus, the theoretical risk of transmission 
during condom-protected vaginal intercourse could be crudely estimated to be 1 in 7,500. While 
not available at the time, accounting for recently published figures showing that treatment 
reduces the risk of heterosexual transmission by 96% would further shrink the estimate to 
roughly 1 in 190,000 – a risk so low as to be negligible. Under such circumstances, it would 
seem difficult if not impossible to justify punishment based solely on medical grounds. 
 While there were many cases in which the level of risk was arguably small to negligible, 
some readers might contend that any level of risk would be sufficient grounds for criminal 
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intervention. Thus, to argue that the application of Michigan’s HIV disclosure law has no basis 
in medical science, the most persuasive example would be a case in which the complainant was 
exposed to no risk at all. Such is the case against Jennifer, a 23-year old white woman arrested in 
Richland County in 2009 after police raided the strip club where she was employed. The 
prosecutor justified the raid by describing the club as a “dangerous common nuisance due to 
ongoing drug activity, prostitution and repeated acts of lewd behavior” (Mumford 2009). Initially 
charging Jennifer with prostitution and drug-related offenses, the prosecutor tacked on felony 
HIV disclosure charges after it was discovered that she was HIV-positive. In order to minimize 
time spent in jail, Jennifer accepted a plea deal. During an otherwise routine plea hearing, the 
detective testified as to exactly what transpired between Jennifer and her client, a confidential 
informant, which yielded the HIV charges: 
Prosecutor: Let me focus you particularly on a situation involving a penetration with his nose or 
nasal area of his face. 
 
Detective: He would pay her twenty dollars a song for a lap dance, and on this occasion she was 
topless, she began dancing, started grinding on him, trying to arouse his penis. At one point she 
exposed her vagina area to him and placed it on the tip of his nose and began grinding on his nose 
with her vagina. 
 
Prosecutor: Did the confidential informant indicate that his nose actually went inside or 
penetrated her vaginal area? 
 
Detective: Yes, it did (Plea:12-13). 
  
There are many conceivable pathways for HIV to be transmitted during intimate contact; nasal-
vaginal penetration is not among them. Yet, at sentencing, the prosecutor alleged that Jennifer’s 
actions “clearly threatened the health and safety of specific individuals as well as the general 
public. The disease she carried is terminal” (Sentencing:3). Jennifer was sentenced to five 
months in jail and will be labeled a felon for the rest of her life. 
Cases like Charlie’s and Jennifer’s that involve no risk or extremely low risk of HIV 
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transmission confirm my argument that the disclosure law is a tool wielded to control and punish 
badness. While legislators would surely claim to be concerned with sickness and the public’s 
health more generally, the HIV disclosure law they devised is not primarily concerned with 
controlling sickness, promoting public health, or protecting the public from medical harm. In the 
words of Charlie’s prosecutor, “that’s not in the statute.”  
As the data in Table 3.1 show, the trends described in this paper are persistent over time. 
In nearly half of all cases analyzed, legal actors explicitly analogized HIV or HIV nondisclosure 
to death: HIV was described as a death sentence in 5 cases; nondisclosure was compared to 
murder in 4 cases; and nondisclosure was described as exposing the victim to a risk of death in 
11 cases. In the bulk of the remaining cases, judges and prosecutors simply proceeded through 
the hearings mechanically, without saying much more than asking the defendant if he or she is 
guilty and imposing a sentence. In fact, in only one case did a prosecutor or judge actually 
describe HIV as a manageable or chronic disease. In the case against Reginald in 2002, the judge 
told the defendant that "I want you to take the kind of medication that they are developing now 
that will take care of AIDS. They have new medications coming out that apparently are having a 
positive effect. And I hope that helps you” (Sentencing:9). Thus, it was a rare occurrence in these 
cases for judges or prosecutors to describe HIV as anything but a terminal disease. 
 
 Conclusion  
Controlling the spread of HIV is a laudable goal. However, Michigan’s HIV disclosure law does 
not primarily serve this goal. Rather than controlling HIV as a virus, I have argued that 
Michigan’s HIV disclosure law serves to control HIV as a moral infection deserving of 
interdiction and punishment. Legal actors indicate that HIV infection is a death sentence, that it 
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is a deadly weapon, and that HIV-positive people are homicidal threats. In some cases, they do 
so to justify the defendant’s conviction. In other cases, they do so to justify more severe 
punishment at sentencing. As I have shown, these powerful narratives are persistent, despite 
effective therapies that have transformed HIV from a terminal illness to a chronic disease and 
despite the fact that the vast majority of defendants are not accused of transmitting the virus. 
Indeed, defendants are convicted for not disclosing even when their alleged sexual conduct did 
not pose a significant epidemiological risk of transmission.  
Some readers may wonder whether it is reasonable to expect judges and prosecutors to 
have been aware of effective HIV treatments. As I have shown, the dramatic drop in AIDS-
related deaths was covered extensively by major media outlets. Stories appeared in national 
outlets such as Newsweek and The New York Times Magazine, as well as local outlets such as 
The Holland Sentinel and The Muskegon Chronicle. Major television news outlets ran primetime 
stories, and former President Bill Clinton penned an editorial in 2002 in The New York Times 
declaring that “AIDS is not a death sentence.” It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that 
judges and attorneys involved in cases concerning HIV arguably should have known about the 
HIV’s improved prognosis by the late 1990’s. By the early 2000’s, a description of HIV-AIDS as 
a “death sentence” was patently inaccurate.  
Despite having no basis in medical science, the moralized discourses invoked by 
prosecutors and judges indicate that Michigan’s disclosure law largely serves to impose 
retribution against defendants accused of committing a moral harm. However, it is important to 
note that retribution is not the only possible justification for these statutes. Astute readers will 
have noticed judges at times justifying the incarceration of defendants for the good of public 
safety, or what criminologists would call an “incapacitation” argument.  An example of this 
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would be when the judge told Sandra that she needed to be “taken out of circulation” for the 
good of the community. Although not described in this analysis, these arguments were observed 
in 10 cases (half the time overlapping with analogies of death; half the time existing on their 
own). Although it is beyond the scope of this article, future studies might explore such 
alternative justifications for enforcing HIV-specific criminal laws.  
Even in cases when judges relied primarily on public safety arguments, however, medical 
arguments did not generally prove persuasive to judges or juries tasked with adjudicating these 
cases. Social control theories help to explain why this is so. While medicalization explains how 
particular phenomena come to be diagnosed, treated, and controlled by medical authorities, 
criminalization explains how particular phenomena come to be legally codified, punished, and 
controlled under the law. In the case of HIV disclosure laws, social control helps explain how 
legal systems render legible social phenomena that might seem to exceed their purview; disease 
is not an immediately obvious site for criminalization. Thus, in order for the legal system to 
expand its mandate and to intervene, what was typically constructed as a medical phenomenon 
must be recast in legal terms: blame must be assigned and victimhood must be established. As I 
have shown, this is often achieved in Michigan trial courts by framing HIV as a deadly disease 
and HIV-positive defendants who fail to disclose as murderers and/or as exposing others to a risk 
of death. 
While more research is necessary to understand how this process works in other cases, 
these findings reflect the problems that emerge when particular phenomena become defined and 
governed by multiple forms of authority. In the case presented in this analysis, medical evidence 
on HIV risk did not prove influential to criminal justice authorities tasked with adjudicating 
felony HIV disclosure cases. The illegibility of medical evidence in the courtroom reflects the 
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divergent epistemic assumptions that undergird law and medicine:  whereas the law is presumed 
to assign culpability, promote justice, and impose due punishment, medicine is presumed to 
remain neutral, promote health, and offer treatment. What serves as compelling evidence on one 
side of the medico-legal borderland is not necessarily legible on the other.    
To be clear: I am not suggesting that there is some ontological “truth” underlying HIV 
that sociologists should be able to uncover, nor am I suggesting that badness and sickness are 
preordained polarities within which legislators and public health officials must situate their work. 
Rather, I argue that the institutions and their actors (re)produce these competing discursive 
frameworks through their efforts to exert control over social life. Yet, despite the fact that many 
working in the field of HIV prevention will know well that HIV has always been chased by 
badness, most arguments against the use of HIV-specific criminal laws have largely been framed 
in terms of sickness: they’re bad for public health; they decrease testing; they deter people from 
disclosing. These arguments are not persuasive in a court of law because the discursive grounds 
on which the law operates are fundamentally different. Releasing HIV from the clutches of the 
criminal law will require engaging with the law in terms that are institutionally legible.    
Of course, not all forms of sickness are equally likely to come under the control of the 
criminal law. Perhaps not surprisingly, sexually transmitted diseases have borne the brunt of 
such efforts historically (Brandt 1987). Arizona representatives, for example, recently attempted 
to criminalize exposure to a variety of STIs including gonorrhea without first disclosing infection 
(Peick 2013). That sexually transmitted diseases are particularly vulnerable to legal intervention 
– despite a myriad of other communicable diseases with undesirable clinical outcomes – suggests 
that the criminalization of sickness and sex are linked. As these findings suggest, stigma serves 
to lubricate the moral passage from sickness to badness. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Disparate risks of conviction under Michigan’s felony HIV disclosure law: An 
observational analysis of convictions and HIV diagnoses, 1992-2010 
 
Introduction 
Sociolegal scholars have a longstanding interest in explaining discrimination in the criminal 
justice system. While conceptual approaches to studying discrimination under the law vary, 
criminologists have a longstanding interest in analyzing associations between a variety of 
criminal justice outcomes and the demographic characteristics of both defendants (see, for 
example, Steffernsmeir et al., 1995; Koons-Witt, 2002) and victims (see, for example, Baldus et 
al.,1983; Holcomb et al., 2004). This paper builds on these insights by examining whether 
defendant and complainant characteristics are associated with disparate observed, population-
level risks of conviction6 under Michigan’s felony HIV disclosure law, which makes it a crime 
for HIV-positive individuals to have sex without first disclosing their HIV-status. 
Over thirty US states currently have similar HIV-specific criminal statutes (referred to 
hereafter as “HSCS”) on the books (for a review, see Lehman et al., 2014).  The majority of 
these laws were enacted in the late 1980s and early 1990s when little was known about the 
disease, and they almost invariably criminalize a wide range of behaviors irrespective of the risk 
those behaviors pose for transmitting the disease (Galletly & Pinkerton 2006). In Michigan, for 
example, a recent study documented a 2009 case in which an erotic dancer was convicted of not 
                                                          
6 Notably, this concept should be distinguished from “conviction rates,” which generally refers to the proportion of 
cases convicted versus the total number prosecuted. As I employ it here, conviction risk refers to the proportion of 
cases convicted versus the total number of individuals governed by the law. 
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disclosing her HIV-positive status to a client before his nose penetrated her vagina – a behavior 
that could not plausibly have transmitted the virus (Hoppe 2014).  
Notably, although the CDC (2013b) estimates that 15.8% of HIV-positive people do not 
yet know they are infected, an individual must have first been diagnosed as HIV-positive by a 
medical provider before he or she could be prosecuted under HSCS. The CDC has required that 
state public health departments maintain precise, names-based surveillance data regarding the 
remaining 84.2% of diagnosed HIV-positive people since at least 2008 (CDC 2013c). In many 
cases (including Michigan), state health officials began collecting names-based HIV surveillance 
data before the state’s HSCS was enacted.   
These factors create a unique legal context, in which a great deal is known about the 
narrowly delimited population of HIV-positive people who are governed by HSCS. This study 
takes advantage of this unique context in order to estimate and compare the observed, 
population-level risks of conviction for particular HIV-positive subpopulations by comparing 
two sources of data. First, I draw on an original dataset describing 95% of convictions (n=51) 
under Michigan’s HSCS between 1992 and 2010 – including the defendant’s race, gender, and 
the gender of the complainant(s) in the case. I compare these data against Michigan Department 
of Community Health data documenting new HIV-positive diagnoses7 in the state’s Lower 
Peninsula during the study period – including the individual’s race, gender, and the gender(s) of 
their reported partners. 
While scholarly interest in HIV disclosure laws and their application has increased in 
recent years, there is not yet a rich empirical literature analyzing their enforcement. For example, 
although critics have charged that these laws are homophobic and racist (Strub 2010), we do not 
                                                          
7 Because all new HIV-positive diagnoses must be to be reported to the state by law, this data describes the 
population of potential offenders and is thus useful for comparison. 
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actually know whether sexual and/or racial minorities are disproportionately convicted under the 
law. While this study’s observational methodology cannot identify the causal mechanisms 
driving the disparate impact observed, this study nonetheless contributes to our understanding of 
the impact of HIV disclosure laws and the implications such laws may have for inequality.  
 
Documenting and Explaining Disparate Outcomes in the Criminal Justice System 
There is a long tradition in criminology of documenting disparate criminal justice outcomes 
between various groups – often distinguished as either “disparate treatment” or “disparate 
impact” studies (Lucas, 2008). Disparate treatment studies on race examine racist practices that 
explicitly treat groups differently – such as racial bias in criminal sentencing (see, for example, 
Doerner and Demuth 2010; Kautt 2009; Crawford et al. 2006). Disparate impact studies, on the 
other hand, examine practices that are not explicitly related to race, gender, or some other legally 
protected identity but nonetheless result in disparate outcomes, such as the well-documented 
disparate impact of the “war on drugs” on racial minorities (for a review, see Provine 2011).  
While racial discrimination is perhaps the most widely studied form of discrimination, a 
wide range of social factors have come under the scrutiny of socio-legal scholars interested in 
discrimination. This has typically involved examining demographic characteristics of the 
defendant, such as their age (Steffernsmeier et al.1995) and gender (Koons-Witt 2002) and the 
interaction of these variables for black men in particular (Doerner and Demuth 2010; 
Steffernsmeier et al. 1998).  
While far less numerous, studies have also examined whether the characteristics of crime 
victims – rather than just defendants – are also associated with criminal justice outcomes. In 
particular, numerous studies have examined how the gender and race of violent crime victims 
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impacts the imposition of the death penalty, finding that black defendants accused of killing 
white victims receive the death penalty at higher rates than others (see, for example, Baldus et al. 
1983; Holcomb et al. 2004). Similar studies of victim characteristics in non-capital crimes and 
their adjudication are less numerous. Examining a broader set of crimes, Curry (2010) finds that 
the trend of harsher punishment for homicide cases involving white victims did not extend to 
sexual assault and robbery cases.  
Evidencing the casual mechanisms underlying these varied, disparate outcomes has been 
more problematic; sociolegal scholars have noted that interpreting such trends as racist often 
conflict with conventional notions of racial prejudice that are implicitly understood to be 
intentional (Murakawa and Beckett 2010). Myriad studies have documented various mechanisms 
that could be driving disparate outcomes. These include discriminatory attitudes and practices 
among police (Beckett, Nyrop and Pfingst 2006; Petrocelli, Piquero and Smith 2004; Bernstein 
and Kostelac 2002); prosecutors (Radelet and Pierce 1985), judges (Curran 1983), and juries 
(Mazella and Feingold 2006; Schuller and Hastings 2002). Other studies have examined “supply-
side” factors that result in fewer criminal complaints. For example, studies have shown that gays 
and lesbians are less likely to report crimes to the police than heterosexuals (Miles-Johnson 
2013) and that crime is less likely to be reported to the police when the offender is white or when 
the victim is male or white (Hart and Rennison 2003).  
The examples cited in this brief review represent but a fraction of the vast literature on 
the subject and are intended to familiarize the reader with current conceptual approaches to 
explaining discrimination in the criminal justice system. In this paper, I extend the insights of 
these scholarly efforts by evaluation whether defendant characteristics and partner gender (that 
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is, the gender of the sexual partner in cases of non-disclosure of HIV-positive status) are 
associated with disparate risk of conviction under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law.  
 
HIV Disclosure Laws in the United States, Michigan 
Criminal laws in 24 U.S. states currently impose misdemeanor or felony penalties on HIV-
positive people who have sex without first disclosing their HIV-positive status to their sexual 
partners. Including states that have sentence enhancement policies for other crimes when HIV 
risk is involved (for instance, rape or prostitution), 32 states currently have an HSCS on the 
books. While these laws vary in their specifics, none requires that the virus be transmitted and 
most do not differentiate sexual contact that poses no or low risk of transmission from contact 
that poses a significant risk (Bernard and Nyambe 2012; Center for HIV Law & Policy 2010).    
Of the 24 states that classify non-disclosure as a felony or misdemeanor, the majority 
(14) enacted their HSCS during the mid-1980s and early 1990s in the context of high HIV/AIDS 
mortality rates, relatively low levels of public knowledge about the disease and a general anxiety 
about how it was transmitted, and before life-saving medications known as antiretrovirals were 
introduced in 1995 (Burris, et al. 1993; Galletly and Pinkerton 2006). Based on their historical 
coincidence, legal scholars have suggested that the President’s Commission on the HIV 
Epidemic’s final report issued in 1988 and the Ryan White Care Act of 1990 prompted state 
legislatures to enact these statutes (Lahey 1995; McArthur 2009). Enacted before either of these 
policy efforts, Michigan’s felony HIV disclosure law was voted into law by legislators in 1988 
and specifically states: 
1) A person who … knows that he or she is HIV infected, and who engages in sexual 
penetration with another person without having first informed the other person… is guilty 
of a felony. 2) As used in this section, “sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, 
cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part 
of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's 
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body, but emission of semen is not required (Michigan Compiled Law [MCL] § 
333.5210). 
 
Thus, the statute does not require evidence of transmission and criminalizes a wide range of 
sexual practices that, according to records from a conviction as recently as 2009, involved an 
HIV-positive woman convicted in 2009 for allowing a man to “penetrate” her vagina with his 
nose without first disclosing (Hoppe 2014). Additional evidence suggests that local health 
officials in Michigan employ epidemiological surveillance technologies to assist in identifying 
HIV-positive clients who are not disclosing, and have enacted policies that can facilitate their 
prosecution under the criminal law (Hoppe 2013). 
American policy debates over criminal prosecutions for nondisclosure of HIV infection 
have tended to focus on atypical cases involving multiple partners who are understood to be 
particularly vulnerable. Perhaps the most widely cited case involved Nushawn Williams, a black 
male defendant accused in New York of infecting at least nine women (some of whom were 
underage and white). Without a criminal HIV disclosure law on the books, New York 
prosecutors instead prosecuted Williams for having sex with minors (Shevory 2004). As Shevory 
argues, the frenzied media spectacle surrounding the case reflected social anxieties not just about 
HIV, but also about race and crime more generally.  
A handful of studies have analyzed attitudes towards HIV disclosure laws and, 
specifically, whether not disclosing one’s HIV-positive status should be a crime (Galletly et al. 
2013; Galletly et al. 2012; Horvath et al. 2010). These studies have tended to draw convenience 
samples of HIV-positive residents and/or men who have sex with men, and their specific 
questions have varied, thus making it difficult to collectively interpret their findings. While these 
studies have consistently found high levels of support for criminalizing non-disclosure in at least 
some scenarios, no representative study has yet attempted to analyze whether demographic 
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characteristics are associated with attitudes towards HSCS and, more specifically, one’s 
willingness to pursue criminal charges against potential offenders.  As I suggest later in the 
paper, such variations (if they exist) might help to explain the disparate impact of Michigan’s 
disclosure law. 
While large-scale, representative studies analyzing the enforcement of HSCS do not yet 
exist, Galletly and Lazzarini (2013) examine arrests under Tennessee’s HSCS in Nashville courts 
between 2000 and 2010. Notably, Tennessee’s HSCS is broadly defined to criminalize any “HIV 
exposure,” including non-sexual exposures such as biting and spitting.  Most individuals arrested 
for HIV exposure were men (74%) and white (56%). Of the 15 cases involving adult sexual 
relationships (as opposed to spitting and biting cases), 12 (80%) involved men or women with 
opposite-gendered partners. Notably, despite the disparate law enforcement contexts, many of 
these findings echo those presented in this paper and are thus highlighted. 
   
Expectations 
This study examines a series of hypotheses to understand the impact of various social factors on 
the risk of conviction observed under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law. Based on the myriad of 
findings demonstrating the vulnerability of racial minorities to incarceration in America, the first 
hypothesis tests the independent effects of race on the observed risk of conviction: 
Hypothesis 1: The risk of conviction under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law between 1992 
and 2010 was greater for HIV-positive black people as compared to whites. 
 
A second hypothesis aims to test whether the independent effects of gender similarly follow from 
expectations that men are more likely to face criminal prosecution than women: 
Hypothesis 2: The risk of conviction under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law between 1992 
and 2010 was greater for HIV-positive men as compared to women. 
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Based on findings that black men and women in particular face a disparate impact under the law 
as compared to their white counterparts, the third hypothesis tests the joint effects of race and 
gender: 
Hypothesis 3: The risk of conviction under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law between 1992 
and 2010 was greater for HIV-positive black men as compared to other race-gender 
groupings. 
Hypothesis 3a: The risk of conviction under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law between 
1992 and 2010 was greater for HIV-positive black women as compared to other race-
gender groupings. 
 
Informed by critics of these laws who suggest they are motivated by anti-gay bias, the fourth 
hypothesis tests the effect of the partner’s gender for HIV-positive men8.  
Hypothesis 4:  The risk of conviction under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law between 
1992 and 2010 was greater for HIV-positive men with male partners as compared to 
HIV-positive men with female partners. 
 
Building on these expectations, the fifth hypothesis tests whether the partner’s gender modifies 
the effect of race on men’s risk of conviction:  
Hypothesis 5: The risk of conviction under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law between 1992 
and 2010 was greater for HIV-positive black men with male partners as compared to 
HIV-positive black men with female partners and other groupings. 
 
Study Design, Data, and Analysis 
I obtained public records of convictions from The Michigan State Police Information Center, 
which include the county, sentencing date, and court disposition of the 48 convictions reported to 
the state between 1992 and 20109. In order to analyze each case, including the social identity of 
those convicted of violating Michigan’s HIV disclosure statute, I attempted to identify the 
                                                          
8 This cannot be tested for women, since there were no women accused of not disclosing their HIV-status to other 
women, which reflects the fact that HIV prevalence among women who have sex with women is exceedingly low. 
Indeed, the data provided by the Michigan Department of Community Health does not distinguish women infected 
with HIV by their partners’ gender. 
9 While the state data did include some information on non-convictions, it was limited to only those cases in which 
the defendant had a prior criminal record. As such, they are excluded from this analysis. 
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defendant in each case by visiting county libraries in which local newspaper archives were 
housed. I searched for any mention of a case in newspaper records within a two-week period of 
the sentencing date indicated in the state police data. I successfully identified the defendant in 29 
cases this way. I identified the defendant in an additional 29 cases using county clerks’ records 
and internet sites documenting criminal records – including 13 cases not documented in the state 
police records10. In total, I identified the defendant in 58 (95%) of the 61 known convictions 
between 1992 and 2010. These 58 cases included 51 discrete defendants, as several defendants 
were convicted multiple times. I obtained court records that revealed the basic facts for each 
case, including the defendant’s demographic characteristics and the complainant’s gender. This 
research design was reviewed by the University of Michigan Health Science and Behavioral 
Sciences Institutional Review Board and determined to be exempt from review. 
In order to examine differences between the demographic characteristics of convicted 
defendants and HIV-positive residents generally, I requested data from the Michigan Department 
of Community Health detailing individuals diagnosed as HIV-positive any time between 1992 
and 2010 in all Lower Peninsula11 counties. Notably, in cases in which the health department 
data indicated “<5” HIV diagnoses instead of specifying a definite number of individuals for a 
particular risk-group, I substituted either an indirectly determined precise figure or an average 
estimator. For example, if the data indicated that 7 HIV-positive women were diagnosed between 
1992 and 2010 in a particular county and that five of those HIV-positive women were white and 
zero were “other”, then necessarily 2 were black because these categories were mutually 
exclusive. In other instances where it was not possible to deduce the precise figure, an average of 
                                                          
10 Of these 13 cases, ten were sentenced in 2008 or later. Of the 48 cases reported by the state, zero were sentenced 
after 2008. This suggests a delay in reporting to the state or in the state’s aggregation of that data. 
11 There are hardly any cases of HIV to report in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. Indeed, the state health 
department does not even regularly report such figures. There were also no reported convictions in U.P. counties. 
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the possible values was substituted. For example, if the data indicated that 8 HIV-positive 
women were diagnosed in a particular county, and that 4 of them were white, <5 were black, and 
<5 were “other”, I used the average of the minimum and maximum possible values as an 
estimator. In this example, since the sum of the possible values could not exceed four, the 
estimate substituted would be the average of 1 and 3 or 2.0. Of the 352 data points for the 22 
jurisdictions analyzed, it was necessary to substitute 25 such estimates. Because the estimators 
were necessary only in cases with very small numbers, this strategy has a negligible effect on the 
validity of the overall estimates for HIV-positive diagnoses in these jurisdictions. 
For the purposes of this analysis, population-specific risks of conviction are presented 
both with and without data from Wayne County (which includes Detroit). Wayne County is an 
exceptional case for many reasons, and presenting the data without distinguishing its effects 
muddles efforts to interpret the findings. While Wayne County represents 62.19% of all HIV-
positive diagnoses during the study period, it represents only 15.52% of convictions under the 
disclosure law.  Thus, diagnosis in Wayne County is clearly negatively associated with the 
dependent variable in this analysis (the risk of conviction). Further, 82% of the individuals 
diagnosed as HIV-positive in Wayne County between 1992 and 2010 are black, compared to 
36.4% of those diagnosed as HIV-positive in the remainder of the state. In this sense, diagnosis 
in Wayne County is also associated with the independent variable of race used in this analysis.  
Because it is associated with both an independent (e.g. race) and the dependent (e.g. risk 
of conviction) variables in this analysis, diagnosis in Wayne County can be understood as a 
spurious, “lurking” variable that confounds the associations observed in some of the analyses in 
this paper. While it is not possible to “control” for these effects using the methods employed in 
this paper, analyzing data excluding Wayne County allows for its effects to be disentangled from 
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other factors in the rest of the state. As the number of convictions in Wayne County on its own is 
so small (n=9), an analysis of its figures alone would be extremely crude and unlikely to yield 
meaningful results. As such, each analysis includes figures both including and excluding Wayne 
County. The populations for the analyses including Wayne County include 51 convicted 
defendants (representing 58 criminal cases) and 15659 HIV-positive diagnoses. The populations 
for the comparisons excluding Wayne County include 42 defendants (representing 49 convicted 
cases) and 5921 HIV-positive diagnoses.  
While the number of convicted defendants is small, both defendant data and health 
department data can be treated analytically as populations because they represent nearly 100% of 
all possible cases during the study period. The conviction data includes 58 out of 61 cases 
(95.08%) known to have been convicted in the state between 1992 and 2010. Notably, the 
number of convictions was fairly consistent over the study period: there were 13 convictions 
between 1991-1995; 10 between 1996-2000; 18 between 2001-2005; and 17 between 2006-2010. 
The demographic characteristics of these cases also did not vary substantially over time. The 
cases were geographically diverse, representing 28 of the 68 counties in Michigan’s Lower 
Peninsula. For a more detailed description of these cases, see Table 3.1. 
Regarding the health department data, the law requires that information on anyone who is 
diagnosed as HIV-positive be reported to the state. This has been the case for the entire study 
period. This includes individuals who were diagnosed first out of state and later moved to 
Michigan, as any HIV lab-work done after their arrival would fall under the same legal reporting 
requirements as a new diagnosis. While there are individuals who were HIV-positive but not 
diagnosed as such during this time, they are not relevant to this analysis because one must be 
diagnosed as HIV-positive in order to be prosecuted for failing to disclose.  
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Because both sets of data include nearly the entire population, statistical significance tests 
are unnecessary because the probability that the differences observed between the two data sets 
were the result of random error (or “chance”) due to sampling is negligible. Statistical 
significance figures for the analyses conducted in this paper would estimate the probability that 
the differences observed between groups were the result of random error due to sampling rather 
than actual differences in the population. Because these two sets of data represent entire 
populations (or, in the case of the conviction data, 95% of the entire population), statistical 
significance tests are inappropriate. 
 
Findings 
The Independent Effect of Race 
The first hypothesis predicted that a higher risk of conviction would be observed for blacks as 
compared to their white counterparts. As demonstrated by the data presented in Table 4.1, this 
hypothesis is easily rejected for the analysis excluding Wayne County. Overall, this analysis 
estimates a risk of conviction of approximately 70.95 convictions under the HIV-disclosure law 
per 10,000 HIV-positive diagnoses during the study period. The differences between racial 
groups in this analysis are negligible: 69.58 and 71.67 for black and white HIV-positive 
diagnoses, respectively. 
 As described earlier, diagnosis in Wayne County confounds this relationship. Because of 
the spurious effect of Wayne County, including its data would seem to suggest that whites – not 
blacks – faced a greater risk of conviction than other groups. Indeed, the conviction risk 
observed for whites is three times greater than that observed for blacks (60.20 convictions versus 
18.73 convictions per 10,000 HIV-positive diagnoses). However, this apparent association 
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between race and risk of conviction is spurious and explained by diagnosis in Wayne County 
where the risk of conviction among its large, mostly black population is comparatively very low.  
Table 4.1. Independent Effects of Race, 1992-2010 
 
 
Excluding Wayne County 
 
 
Convicted Defendants 
 
HIV-Positive Diagnoses 
 
Convictions Per 10,000 
HIV+ Diagnoses Race 
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
White  23 54.76%  3209 54.20%  71.67 
Black  15 35.71%  2155.5 36.40%  69.58 
Other    4   9.52%    555.5   9.38%  72.01 
N  42   5920   70.95 
 
 
Including Wayne County 
 
 
Convicted Defendants  HIV-Positive Diagnoses 
 
 
Convictions Per 10,000 
HIV+ Diagnoses Race 
 
Frequency  Percent 
 
Frequency  Percent 
 
White  27 52.94%    4485 28.64%  60.20 
Black  19 37.35%  10142.5 64.77%  18.73 
Other    5   9.80%    1030.5   6.58%  48.52 
N  51   15658   32.57 
 
The Independent Effect of Gender 
The second hypothesis predicted that a higher risk of conviction would be observed for HIV-
positive men as compared to their female counterparts. As demonstrated by the data presented in 
Table 4.2, this hypothesis is rejected for both comparisons. Excluding Wayne County, this study 
estimates a risk of conviction during the study period of 70.00 convictions per 10,000 HIV-
positive male residents, and finds a similar risk for female residents of 74.66 convictions per 
10,000 HIV-positive female residents. The estimated risk of conviction including Wayne County 
is lower overall (32.56 convictions per 10,000 HIV-positive diagnoses), but do not differ greatly 
by gender. Thus, gender does not seem to have an independent effect on the estimated risk of 
conviction for HIV-positive Michiganders. 
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Table 4.2. Independent Effects of Gender, 1992-2010 
 
 
Excluding Wayne County 
 
 
Convicted Defendants 
 
HIV-Positive Diagnoses 
 
Convictions Per 10,000 
HIV+ Diagnoses Gender 
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
Male  33 78.57%  4714.5 79.62%  70.00 
Female    9 21.43%  1205.5 20.36%  74.66 
N  42   5920   70.95 
  
Including Wayne County 
  
Convicted Defendants  HIV-Positive Defendants 
 
Convictions Per 10,000 
HIV+ Diagnoses Gender 
 
Frequency Percent 
 
Frequency Percent 
 
Male  40 78.43%  11903.5 76.02%  33.60 
Female  11 21.57%    3754.5 23.98%  29.30 
N  51   15658   32.57 
 
The Joint Effects of Race and Gender 
While no clear evidence exists that race and gender on their own are associated with a disparate 
impact under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law, the third hypothesis predicted that these factors 
would be jointly associated with disparities. In particular, I expected to observe a heightened risk 
of conviction for black men as compared to other groupings. Based on the analysis excluding 
Wayne County, there is evidence to support this hypothesis. While this analysis estimates a risk 
of conviction for white men of 57.10 convictions per 10,000 diagnoses outside of Wayne 
County, the risk for black men is more than 60% greater at 93.80.  Just as in the previous 
analysis of the independent effects of race, diagnosis in Wayne County confounds this 
relationship, resulting in estimates that would suggest a higher risk of conviction for white men 
at 46.31 convictions per 10,000 diagnoses versus 24.87 for black men.  
However, the parallel hypothesis that predicted black women would also face a higher 
risk of conviction is not just rejected but inverted whether or not Wayne County data is included. 
While this study observed a risk of conviction for black women of 15.08 convictions per 10,000  
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Table 4.3. Joint Effects of Race and Gender, 1992-2010 
 
 
Excluding Wayne County 
Race-Gender 
 
Convicted Defendants 
 
HIV-Positive Diagnoses 
 Convictions Per 
10,000 HIV+ 
Diagnoses 
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
White Men  16 38.10%  2802 47.32%    57.10 
White Women    7 16.67%    407   6.87%  171.99 
Black Men  14 33.33%  1492.5 25.21%    93.80 
Black Women    1   2.38%    663 11.20%    15.08 
Other Men    3   7.14%    420   7.09%    71.43 
Other Women    1   2.38%    135.5   2.29%    73.80 
N  42   5920     70.95 
  
Including Wayne County 
  
Convicted Defendants  HIV-Positive Diagnoses 
 Convictions Per 
10,000 HIV+ 
Diagnoses Race-Gender 
 
Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
 
White Men  18 35.29%    3887 24.82%    46.31 
White Women    9 17.65%      598   3.82%  150.50 
Black Men  18 35.39%    7237.5 24.87%    24.87 
Black Women    1   1.96%    2905   3.44%      3.44 
Other Men    4   7.84%      779   5.00%    51.35 
Other Women    1   1.96%      251.5   1.61%    39.76 
N  51   15658     32.57 
 
HIV-positive diagnoses (3.44 when including Wayne County), white women faced a risk more 
than 10 times greater at 171.99 convictions per 10,000 diagnoses (150.50 when including Wayne 
County). Despite representing 23.02% of all Wayne County HIV-diagnoses, not a single black 
woman is known to have been convicted under the HIV disclosure law in Wayne County during 
the study period. While this is consistent with the general trend towards a lower risk of 
conviction within Wayne County, it is nonetheless noteworthy (especially given that two white 
women are known to have been convicted in Wayne County and yet they represent less than 2% 
of all Wayne County HIV-positive diagnoses). In both analyses, white women were observed to 
110 
 
have faced the greatest risk of conviction of any group analyzed, suggesting that they may face a 
particular burden under the HIV disclosure law that deserves further attention. 
 
The Modifying Effect of the Partner’s Gender 
I hypothesize in this paper that the gender of the complainant in HIV disclosure cases may be 
associated with disparities conviction outcomes. Based on activist critiques charging that these 
laws are driven by anti-gay prejudice, I expected to find a heightened risk of conviction among 
men with male partners as opposed to men with female partners. As shown in Table 4.4, this 
hypothesis can be uniformly rejected. HIV-positive men with female partners face a higher risk  
 
Table 4.4: Modifying Effect of Partner’s Gender on Male Convictions, 1992-2010 
 
 
Excluding Wayne County 
 
 
Convicted Male 
Defendants 
 HIV-Positive Male 
Diagnoses 
 
Convictions Per 10,000 
HIV-Positive Diagnoses 
Partner’s 
Gender 
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
Female  23 69.70%  2084 38.37%  110.36 
Male  10 30.30%  3348 61.63%    29.87 
N  33   5432*     60.75 
  
Including Wayne County 
  Convicted Male 
Defendants  
HIV-Positive Male 
Diagnoses  
 
Convictions Per 10,000 
HIV-Positive Diagnoses 
Partner’s 
Gender 
 
Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
 
Female  26 65.00%    5900 43.18%  44.07 
Male  14 35.00%    7765 56.82%  18.03 
N  40   13665*   29.27 
* These analyses are based on risk group data from the health department. The number of total cases included in this 
data is larger than in previous analyses (e.g. a total of 5432 cases are defined as male in the data excluding Wayne 
County, whereas previous analyses indicated a total of 4714.5 male cases) because the categories defining the gender 
of the partner are not mutually exclusive: some men have both female and male partners. With this in mind, the 
figures presented here underestimate the risk of conviction for both groups. However, because the overlapping cases 
are necessarily equally distributed among both groups analyzed here, the estimated difference observed between the 
groups is not biased by the lack of interdependence.  
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Table 4.5: Modifying Effect of Male Defendant’s Partner’s Gender on Race, 1992-2010 
 
 
Excluding Wayne County 
Race-Partner 
Gender 
 
Convicted Male 
Defendants 
 HIV-Positive Male 
Diagnoses 
 
Convictions Per 
10,000 HIV+ 
Diagnoses 
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
Frequency  Percent  
 
White MSW    8 24.24%  1031 18.98%    77.59 
White MSM    8 24.24%  2214 40.76%    36.13 
Black MSW  13 39.39%    840.5 15.47%  154.67 
Black MSM    1   3.03%    880.5 16.21%    11.36 
Other MSW    2   6.06%    212.5   3.91%    94.12 
Other MSM    1   3.03%    253.5   4.67%    73.80 
N  33   5432*     60.75 
  
Including Wayne County 
Race-Partner 
Gender 
 
Convicted Male 
Defendants  
HIV-Positive Male 
Diagnoses 
 
Convictions Per 
10,000 HIV+ 
Diagnoses  
 
Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
 
White MSW    8 20.00%    1434 10.49%  55.79 
White MSM  10 25.00%    3040 22.25%  32.89 
Black MSW  15 37.50%    4059.5 29.71%  36.95 
Black MSM    3   7.50%    4270.5 31.25%    7.02 
Other MSW    3   7.50%      406.5   2.97%  73.80 
Other MSM    1   2.50%      454.5   3.33%  22.00 
N  40   13665*   29.27 
* While these analyses are based on the same denominator for HIV-positive diagnoses as the previous set, the 
overlapping cases (e.g. men who reported female and male partners at diagnosis) in these analyses are not 
necessary equally distributed across racial groups. In the first analysis excluding Wayne County, for example, 
while 24.12% of men diagnosed overall reported male and female partners, 23.38% of white men, 27.10% of 
black men, and 18.45% of other men diagnosed as HIV-positive between 1992 and 2010 reported both male 
and female partners. The proportional distribution is similar for the analysis including Wayne County (25.42% 
overall; 22.69%, 27.32%, and 21.37% for white, black, and other, respectively). Because of this, the estimated 
differences observed between the racial categories in both analyses may be biased. Specifically, the estimated 
number of convictions for black men is slightly overestimated as compared to the white and other estimates, 
while the estimate for other men is slightly underestimated as compared to the white and black estimates. 
However, the differences observed between MSM and MSW within racial groupings are unbiased by this 
distribution.  
 
 
of conviction in both analyses – nearly four times as high when excluding Wayne County 
(110.36 versus 29.87) and more than double when including it (44.07 versus 18.03). In both 
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analyses, the estimated risk of conviction for MSW is higher than the mean while the estimated 
risk for MSM is consistently lower. 
As shown in Table 4.5, this association extends to the impact of race on the risk of 
conviction. The previous analysis revealed that the partner’s gender was associated with a 
disparate impact under the HIV disclosure law. In this analysis, this difference is found to be 
consistent across all three racial categories and is consistent whether or not Wayne County is 
included in the comparison. The risk of conviction is higher for black, white, and other MSW 
than for their MSM counterparts both when including and excluding Wayne County – although 
the estimated difference is most dramatic for black men. For example, whereas 154.67 
convictions are estimated for every 10,000 HIV-positive black MSW when excluding Wayne 
County, only 11.36 convictions are estimated for every 10,000 HIV-positive black MSM. Due to 
the association between Wayne County and the risk of conviction, these differences are smaller 
when including Wayne County (36.95 versus 7.02 convictions per 10,000 HIV-positive 
diagnoses), but they are nonetheless consistent. Among men outside of Wayne County, black 
MSM faced the least risk of conviction while black MSW face the greatest risk of conviction.  
 
Discussion 
As I have shown, there were far fewer HIV nondisclosure cases involving MSM defendants in 
Michigan between 1992 and 2010 than would be expected given their vast overrepresentation 
among those diagnosed as HIV-positive during that same time. Similarly, the inverted racial 
dynamic for men and women observed suggests that black men and white women are at a 
comparatively higher risk of conviction under the law than white men and black women, 
respectively. While these observed population-level are suggestive of disparities under the law, 
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this paper does not explain how individual cases come before the court or why they are 
adjudicated in a particular fashion. Rather, the observational approach to studying risk is useful 
for determining whether there are population-level patterns that might point to underlying factors 
shaping the application of the law. Before it is possible to conclude that the findings observed in 
this analysis are actually evidence of discrimination under the law, more research is necessary. 
With these limitations in mind, this study provides little evidence to suggest that race and 
gender are independently associated with disparate risks of conviction under the state’s HIV 
disclosure law. There is some evidence to support the view that these factors are jointly 
associated with disparate risks of conviction, but these findings also do not readily conform to 
expectations. In particular, while the heightened risk of conviction observed for HIV-positive 
black men (outside of Wayne county) is in line with the vast literature documenting 
discriminatory patterns against black men in the American criminal justice system, the 
dramatically low risk of conviction observed for black women (both when including and 
excluding Wayne County), and the comparatively high risk for white women, defy expectations.  
 As I argue in this paper, accounting for complainant characteristics may help to explain 
disparate outcomes by bringing the identity of those who file charges into the analysis. While 
advocates have expressed concerns that criminal HIV disclosure laws could be used in a 
discriminatory way against gay men, this study observed a substantially lower risk of conviction 
for MSM during the study period as compared to MSW.  While more research is necessary to 
understand this finding that held consistent across racial groups, partner gender appears to be 
associated with legal outcomes for HIV-positive men in the state.  
Why might this be? Future research should examine the varied set of mechanisms that 
could be shaping this disparate impact. Perhaps MSM are simply more likely to disclose and are, 
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thus, less likely to be prosecuted. However, the literature on HIV disclosure suggests that it is 
relatively commonplace for HIV-positive MSM to engage in sexual contact without first 
disclosing their HIV-status (see, for example, Holt et al. 2009; Prestage et al. 2001; Kalichman & 
Nachimson 1999). Although no comparative study on HIV non-disclosure rates between MSM 
and MSW is known to the researcher, these findings suggest that variations in non-disclosure are 
unlikely to entirely explain these differences.  
However, while variation in behavior defined by the state as criminal may not explain 
disparate rates of conviction, normative differences in how communities define non-disclosure 
may have an effect. For example, while it may be common for MSM to engage in sexual contact 
without disclosing one’s HIV-status, MSM may be less likely to interpret that behavior as a 
criminal act deserving of punishment.  As they are often targeted for HIV prevention messages 
that encourage them to take responsibility for protecting themselves against HIV infection, they 
may be less likely to adopt the model of the victim requisite under the criminal justice system. 
Further, given the history of police persecution of same-sex sexualities, MSM may be less likely 
to report incidents of non-disclosure to law enforcement authorities. Indeed, Amnesty 
International (2005:3) concludes in a report on police brutality against LGBT Americans that “in 
the U.S., LGBT people continue to be targeted for human rights abuses by the police based on 
their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.” Empirical studies back up these 
claims, suggesting, for example, that many police officers hold antigay attitudes (Bernstein and 
Kostelac 2002); that many LGBT victims of hate crimes do not report their crimes to police 
because they fear police mistreatment (Herek, Cogan, and Gillis 2002); and that reports of police 
misconduct and inaction in cases involving LGBT crime victims are persistent over time (Wolff 
and Cokely 2007). As such, MSM potential complainants in HSCS cases may not trust the police 
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to take their case seriously. Alternatively, they may be more likely to have anonymous partners 
that they could not report to the police, even if they wished to do so.  
The mechanisms underlying these trends may extend beyond “supply-side” factors. There 
are a variety of discretionary factors that could be influencing the observed trends. In particular, 
some readers may wonder whether the biases of prosecutors, judges, and/or juries might result in 
fewer convictions in cases involving gay male complainants because they view these cases as 
less deserving of legal intervention. This would echo findings that black men convicted of 
murdering white victims are more likely to receive the death penalty than those who are 
convicted of murdering black victims. Although studies have documented discriminatory 
attitudes among law enforcement towards gays and lesbians, more research is necessary to 
understand how that would impact the handling of HIV nondisclosure cases. While many 
plausible explanations exist, the evidence is clear that Michigan’s HIV disclosure law is not 
disproportionately enforced against MSM defendants. 
The findings regarding white women are perhaps more vexing. Many of the nine white 
women convicted in these cases are especially disadvantaged (for a detailed account of one such 
case, see “Sandra” in Author, 2014). Five were described in court as having substance abuse 
problems; three suffered from mental illness; three were engaged in sex work; and one was 
homeless. Only two of the nine women are not known to fit into any of these categories (by 
comparison, the lone black woman convicted under the disclose statute in the study period was 
not described as suffering from any of these issues). The vulnerabilities facing white female 
defendants in this study may have contributed to their increased risk of conviction under the 
disclosure law. Many of the white women in this study had prior criminal records that would 
have made plea bargains to lesser crimes less likely; their highly stigmatized practices (e.g. large 
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number of sexual partners, engagement in sex work, etc.) may have made them particularly 
attractive for prosecution and/or conviction to prosecutors, judges, and/or juries; and their 
engagement in other illegal activities may have simply made interactions with the law more 
likely. This is especially true for those engaging in sex work, since all three were originally 
picked up for engaging in sex work; HIV-related charges were added after their arrest.   
Yet, while these vulnerabilities seem to in part explain the increased risk of conviction 
for the white women in the study, we would expect the same vulnerabilities to afflict HIV-
positive black women. How can the apparent protective effect for black women against 
conviction be explained? This might in part be due to the fact that their partners are most likely 
to be black men. Black men may be less likely to report their partner’s non-disclosure to 
authorities, either because they are less likely to consider the failure to disclose a crime or 
because they are distrustful of law enforcement authorities. The evidence of mistreatment of 
African-Americans in the criminal justice system demonstrates a pervasive pattern of abuse and 
discrimination that has created a hostile and adversarial relationship between law enforcement 
and black communities (see, for example, Rios 2011; Alexander 2010; Wacquant 2010). Legal 
scholars argue that these trends extend beyond police and frontline law enforcement personnel to 
prosecutors who wield considerable discretionary power in deciding who to charge and for what 
offense (for a review, see Davis 1998). This combative legal context understandably discourages 
many black men from inviting the state into their lives.    
All of these possible explanations deserve further inquiry. While this study was only able 
to evaluate the association between complainant gender and risk of conviction, future studies 
might examine whether other demographic characteristics – such as their race or socioeconomic 
status – are associated with disparate outcomes under the law.  
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Conclusion 
In the wake of the fatal shooting of Trayvon Martin in Florida and his assailant’s controversial 
acquittal under Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” statute, there has been a renewed public interest 
in the relationship between victim characteristics and criminal justice outcomes (see, for 
example, Hundley, Martin & Humburg 2012). While studies on violent crime have demonstrated 
an association between victim-defendant characteristics and criminal justice outcomes, the 
enforcement of laws regulating other non-violent forms of crime may also prove to be fruitful 
sites of inquiry.  While the relatively smaller number of studies examining victim or complainant 
characteristics (versus simply defendant characteristics) is likely due to the fact that state 
agencies generally do not collect or report such information, it is possible to collect such data 
independently and such efforts may prove fruitful for explaining trends that otherwise elude 
explanation. While HIV disclosure cases are a unique case in many ways, the methods employed 
in this analysis may be useful for understanding other statutes that are enforced largely through 
complainant reports.  
While the complexity of the causal relationships inherent to criminal justice will make 
conclusively demonstrating the mechanisms underlying these trends difficult, future studies 
might attempt to examine – at least indirectly – the plausibility of such mechanisms.  For 
example, large-sample attitudinal studies could evaluate whether there are differences between 
various demographic groups in attitudes towards HIV disclosure laws and more generally the 
criminality of failing to disclose. If such differences were found and reflected expectations from 
studies such as this one on conviction outcomes (namely, that MSM are less likely to perceive 
non-disclosure as a crime and/or report such an event to authorities), this would indirectly 
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support the argument that variations in potential complainant attitudes helps to shape the 
disparate impact of HIV disclosure laws.   
In regards to HIV disclosure laws, this study contributes to our understanding of how 
these laws are implemented on the ground. While previous cases studies have suggested that race 
and gender play a role in shaping these cases and their trajectories, until now it was not clear 
whether demographic characteristics were associated with disparate legal outcomes. As this 
study’s findings are limited to Michigan and may not be generalizable to other states with similar 
statutes, future research might examine the extent to which these patterns are consistent across 
jurisdictions and what implications such disparities might have for law and social inquiry.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the three empirical chapters of this dissertation reveal the problems connected 
with enforcing Michigan’s “health threat to others” laws. Chapter 2 reveals that health officials 
in some jurisdictions were actively employing public health surveillance technologies in order to 
identify and hold legally responsible clients they believed to be a “health threat to others.” 
Chapter 3 reveals that the enforcement of Michigan’s HIV disclosure law is not driven by 
insights from medical science; rather, it serves to control and punish HIV-positive populations 
deemed deviant. Finally, while most HIV-positive diagnoses continue to be among men who 
have sex with men, Chapter 4 reveals that it is heterosexual black men and white women who 
bear the brunt of the felony disclosure statute.  In this concluding chapter, I begin by noting the 
studies’ limitations. I then summarize the key findings and their sociological implications. I 
conclude by identifying the policy implications of this research for both public health and the 
legal regulation of sickness. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
More research is necessary to evaluate the impact of HIV disclosure laws nationwide. Although 
it is representative of similar statutes nationwide, Michigan’s law, which has provided the 
exclusive focus of this study, should not be viewed in isolation. While the case law in other 
states has not yet been systematically analyzed, media reports and small studies in other 
jurisdictions strongly suggest that the pattern of punishing HIV-positive people who do not 
120 
 
actually pose a risk to others is consistent nationwide in at least in some respects. In Nashville, 
Tennessee, for example, a recent study found that nearly half of all criminal charges filed under 
the HIV exposure statute were against defendants accused of nonsexual behaviors that do not 
pose a risk of transmitting the virus, such as spitting and biting. Future research is necessary to 
understand the case law in the 33 states in which HIV exposure and/or nondisclosure is explicitly 
made criminal.  
 This study is also limited by the fact that it could not evaluate cases in which a conviction 
was not secured against a defendant and court records were therefore expunged. The lack of 
conviction could be due to a variety of reasons, such as the dropping of charges or a jury’s 
verdict of not guilty. This problem is pervasive in the criminology literature, since information 
on non-convictions is often purged to protect the privacy of defendants who are not found guilty. 
I did locate a small number of news reports about cases in which the charges against a defendant 
were dropped, invariably because the complainant failed to appear at a hearing to testify against 
the defendant. Since HIV disclosure cases generally garner media attention, the fact that no other 
cause of non-conviction was ever identified is noteworthy. Nonetheless, these reports cannot be 
said to be representative of the larger number of non-convictions. While it was not feasible to 
evaluate non-convictions under Michigan’s HIV disclosure law systematically, it is possible that 
other state agencies may keep records that would permit an analysis of all prosecutions under the 
law, not just all convictions.  
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Key Findings and Their Sociological Implications 
From Sickness to Badness 
While the findings of this dissertation are not without limitations, they clearly suggest that the 
sociological study of social control should extend beyond the study of medicalization. The 
reformulation of deviance “from badness to sickness” has proven an extremely fruitful line of 
inquiry for understanding how medical authorities have expanded and deepened their authority 
over numerous domains of social life. Medicalization has been a potent historical force, as 
categories such as ADHD, mental illness, and alcoholism have come under medical authority.  
As consumer groups and pharmaceutical corporations become the new “engines” of 
medicalization (Conrad 2005), new forms of “sickness,” such as PMDD and fetal alcohol 
syndrome have been manufactured. However, as this dissertation suggests, it is misleading to 
read the trajectory of history as moving in a single direction:  institutions beyond medicine can 
jockey for control over phenomena conventionally understood as medical problems, and legal 
institutions can control a jurisdiction that once came under medical authority. This dissertation 
has examined the intersection of medical and legal forms of social control by considering the 
social control of disease under the law—what I term the criminalization of sickness. 
In partner services programs, public health workers occupy a liminal space between 
public health and legal forms of authority. Public health workers were engaged not simply in 
testing and or referring to treatment, but also in identifying lawbreakers and facilitating their 
prosecution. They did so by employing HIV surveillance technologies not intended for legal 
surveillance and by the use of “client acknowledgment forms” created solely for the purpose of 
demonstrating criminal liability at a later date. Workers do not merely engage in counseling on 
how to avoid exposing others to HIV—rather, their “advice” is backed up by the threat of 
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involuntary detention. The isolation of the “recalcitrant” sick, while technically falling under the 
civil law, melds the logic of preventing future dangerous behavior with retribution for past 
behavior found in the criminal law (Sullivan & Field 1988; Gostin 1989).  For the person newly 
diagnosed with HIV, the encounter with public health workers may be the first station in the 
moral passage from sickness to badness: the sick person is “potentially bad.” 
The criminalization of sickness helps illuminate how legal institutions exert control and 
authority over a phenomenon that would be conventionally thought of as a medical problem. By 
reframing HIV as a moral problem deserving of interdiction and punishment, legal actors carve 
out a space in which their intervention becomes legible and legitimate. For those accused of 
violating Michigan’s criminal exposure law, courtroom proceedings are a rite of passage in 
which sickness is transformed into badness—a passage completed by a guilty verdict and a 
sentence. Absent from the court is the rhetoric of the medical model in which patients are treated 
rather than punished. Even when faced with a defendant showing the clinical signs of AIDS, 
judges and prosecutors did not invoke illness to explain or excuse the defendant’s behavior. 
Instead, when he violated parole, this defendant received a jail sentence he would not live long 
enough to begin. Medical arguments carry little weight in a setting in which the language of 
criminal culpability prevails.   
 The criminalization of sickness is not confined to HIV criminal exposure laws. As I noted 
in Chapter 3, in the U.S. and internationally, governments and communities are using the 
criminal law to combat disease.  For this reason, it is imperative that we, as actors and as 
sociologists, recognize the importance of this trend and consider the complicated moral trade-
offs that come with making such a move. 
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Public Health as a Site of Social Control: Toward a Critical Sociology of Public Health 
This dissertation has examined how public health serves as an institution of social control by 
revealing how Michigan’s health threat statutes are enforced in two settings:  Michigan’s Partner 
Services and courtrooms where persons living with HIV are tried for allegedly having violated 
Michigan’s criminal exposure laws. Both settings have been the subject of critical commentary 
from HIV advocates and scholars. Advocates have criticized surveillance programs such as those 
in Michigan for recording the names of those diagnosed with HIV in a central registry, thereby 
exposing them to serious discrimination should the names become public (see Bayer 2003, 
2007). Contact tracing has been particularly controversial because of its deep intrusion into the 
private lives of persons with HIV/AIDS, and because it exposes persons with HIV to violence 
from partners who learn they may have been exposed to HIV (Gostin 2004). 
Critics have noted that HIV exposure statutes sometimes impose stiff sentences and 
criminalize behaviors that pose little risk or are widespread:  having consensual sex without 
disclosing one’s HIV-positive status, whether or not one uses protection, is so widespread that it 
would be impossible to identify and prosecute all the “offenders.” This opens the door to 
selective, discriminatory enforcement against disfavored, unpopular and vulnerable groups (for a 
discussion, see Gostin 2004). 
To evaluate the claims of critics, we must examine how public health professionals and 
court officers “make” the law and policy by enforcing Michigan’s health threats statutes (Lipsky 
2010 [1980]; Wolf and Vezina 2002). We must also go beyond the “law on the books” to 
examine the “law in action.” A critical sociology of public health must rest on a solid empirical 
foundation. When the enforcement of Michigan’s health threat statutes is examined empirically, 
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this study confirms some of critics’ most dire predictions. It also finds, however, that the law is 
enforced in ways critics did not anticipate. 
Public health professionals’ exercise of social control goes well beyond CDC directives 
or even Michigan’s criminal HIV nondisclosure statute. A key finding is that workers in 
Michigan’s Partner Services program occasionally use contract tracing to identify and investigate 
people believed to represent health threats, thereby transforming an epidemiological surveillance 
tool into a technique of forensic surveillance. Once contact tracing is yoked to the enforcement 
of health threats statutes, “confidential” registries containing the names of people with positive 
diagnoses of HIV or STIs can be put to service as tools in the investigation of potential health 
threats. 
Michigan’s health threat statutes and criminal exposure laws introduce an adversarial 
element into workers’ relationships with their clientele. Once workers are charged with enforcing 
health threats statutes, HIV-positive persons are transformed from “clients” in need of “services” 
into potential lawbreakers to be controlled and investigated. This can be seen in the practice of 
requiring HIV-positive persons to sign contracts in which they agree to disclose their 
seropositive status and refrain from unprotected sex—documents designed to provide 
incriminating evidence in the courtroom. Public health workers do not merely engage in 
counseling on how to avoid exposing others—rather, their “advice” is backed up by warnings 
and the threat of involuntary isolation.  
Public health workers in different jurisdictions differ dramatically in their definitions of 
“health threats.” Workers in some jurisdictions, following Michigan’s criminal HIV 
nondisclosure laws, view a “health threat” as failure to disclose one’s HIV-positive status to 
sexual partners. In other jurisdictions, having sex without using a condom is sufficient to qualify 
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as a health threat—a definition that goes beyond Michigan’s criminal exposure law, which 
criminalizes only sex without disclosure. Although “cultural competency” has become a mantra 
in today’s healthcare settings, public health officials are unaware of or fail to consider “safer 
sex” practices in HIV-positive communities, such as serosorting, to be an acceptable means of 
preventing the spread of HIV. 
Partner services workers exercise wide discretion as to whom they investigate.   
Judgments about whether to take third-party complaints seriously suggest gendered and 
racialized views about whose complaints are considered credible. Whether a person with 
HIV/AIDS comes to be investigated as a potential health threat depends on a variety of 
contingencies:  how much contact the person has with public health workers; the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS in an area; the definition of “health threat” that prevails in a particular jurisdiction; 
and the identity of the complainant. It is these contingencies, more than their risk behaviors, 
which distinguish the HIV-positive persons who are targeted as health threats from others in the 
community. 
Stigma follows defendants with HIV into the courtroom. Several cases confirm critics’ 
predictions that the law will be enforced selectively against members of the most powerless 
groups. Many who come before the court represent vulnerable groups in society: women 
described as having low intelligence, some living in group homes, whose understanding of the 
law was arguably limited. In the discourse of badness that prevails in the courtroom, neither their 
sickness nor their poverty nor their limited understanding is invoked to explain defendants’ 
behaviors. Instead judges and prosecutors characterize them as recalcitrant repeat offenders who 
continue to expose others to HIV and deserve long sentences to protect the public.                                                                                                                                                                         
 When cases are examined as aggregate data, the analysis reveals that the enforcement of 
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Michigan’s HIV disclosure law is not even across demographic categories. In line with their 
increased risk of legal entanglements more generally, heterosexual black men were found to be 
disproportionately convicted under the statute. Surprisingly, white women were found to face a 
similarly disproportionate risk of conviction under the disclosure law. No evidence was found 
during the course of this study that would suggest officials are more likely to select cases 
involving heterosexual black men or white women—or heterosexuals more generally. Future 
studies might evaluate such a claim, or they might examine whether some potential complainants 
are simply more likely to seek legal intervention than others. Yet, while the underlying 
mechanisms driving these disparities are not known, such a disparate impact highlights the 
political dimensions of enforcing the HIV disclosure statute . 
In numerous other cases, defendants were charged with criminal exposure even though 
their behaviors had a low or negligible risk of transmission. Defendants were charged with 
failing to disclose their HIV status to their partners before engaging in oral sex. Others were 
prosecuted despite having a viral load that had been suppressed by antiretroviral drugs, or despite 
wearing a condom. It is exceedingly unlikely that an HIV-negative person would contract HIV 
from an HIV-positive person when the latter has a treatment-suppressed viral load and/or when a 
condom is used. Defense attorneys’ medical arguments that their clients posed little risk carried 
little weight in the courtroom. Although they had made conscientious efforts to protect their 
partners from exposure to HIV, these defendants nevertheless received prison sentences and now 
bore the stigmatizing mark of a criminal record and an already discrediting disease. Prosecutors 
and judges compared them to “murderers” who “sentenced partners to death” by exposing them 
to a “deadly virus.” These defendants were the casualties of a statute that criminalized low-risk 
behaviors and failed to consider condom use as a defense; the logic of criminal law that is 
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focused on blame and culpability; and court officers who seemed uninformed about the risks of 
transmitting HIV. 
Indeed, it was not always clear how well informed judges and prosecutors were about the 
dynamics of HIV transmission. While it would be unreasonable to expect judges and prosecutors 
to be familiar with the latest scientific findings regarding HIV, to continue to refer to HIV as a 
death sentence in the 21st century, when HIV is widely viewed as a chronic, rather than a fatal, 
illness, is irresponsible at best. One could attribute the statements of prosecutors to strategies 
designed to win cases through hyperbole that play to jurors’ fears. It is, however, impossible to 
explain away the apparent ignorance of judges.        
   The harmful repercussions of such antiquated thinking extend beyond the courtroom, 
where defendants are treated as homicidal threats to the public. As these cases garner 
considerable media attention—often featuring prominent quotations from the judge or lead 
prosecutor on the case—outdated notions about HIV transmission and risk are then disseminated 
to a public that is not often knowledgeable enough about the disease to view them critically. For 
example, in sending HIV-positive people to prison for engaging in safer sex practices, judges 
may be unintentionally communicating to the public the mistaken notion that HIV is highly 
contagious and can be transmitted even when sexual partners are using protection.  Readers of 
much of the news coverage of these cases could not be blamed for concluding, erroneously, that 
defendants had intentionally tried and succeeded in infecting (and thus killing) as many innocent 
partners as they could. 
The more complicated social context in which HIV disclosure takes place is rarely 
acknowledged, either in the courtroom or the media. For example, did the defendant fear that 
disclosing their status would put them at risk of violence? These fears are understandable since 
128 
 
the dangers of such disclosure are very real. (Decker et al. 2011; Maman et al. 2000; Gielen et al. 
1997).  Did the complainant ever think to ask the defendant if they were HIV-positive?  A 
Canadian study recently found that 36% of both HIV-positive and HIV-negative men who have 
sex with men did not ask their partners about their HIV-status (Moore et al. 2012). Many people 
instead make assumptions about their partner’s serostatus based on a variety of unreliable 
factors, such as the person’s appearance or their desire to engage in sex with or without condoms 
(Wilton & Rogers 2014; Eaton et al. 2009; Adam et al. 2008b). While health campaigns 
encourage HIV-negative people to take responsibility for their own health by engaging in safer 
sex practices, it is HIV-positive individuals who shoulder the responsibility under the law. 
In documenting the role of public health officials, prosecutors, and judges in blaming, 
punishing, and stigmatizing persons with HIV/AIDS, this study lends support to the work of 
historians who have shown how public health stigmatizes the very communities it intends to 
serve. For example, Gussow (1989) analyzes historical efforts to control leprosy by public health 
officials in the early 20th century, arguing that their policies were largely informed by racist 
attitudes towards Chinese immigrants rather than by medical evidence.  Along similar lines, 
Markel (1999) argues that public health efforts to quarantine Jewish immigrants in the late 1800s 
were largely the product of racist and class-based prejudice—not epidemiological science. In 
short, there is a long tradition in public health of using paternalistic, stigmatizing, and coercive 
measures against minority communities. HIV is not unusual in that respect. What may be new 
about the control of HIV, however, is the emergence of a criminal justice response to punish and 
incarcerate those the state seeks to control. Although the criminal law is its own institution 
separate from public health, my dissertation reveals that these two institutions are deeply 
imbricated. 
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These findings underscore the need for an empirically-grounded critical sociology of 
public health.  Critical analysis of the “law on the books” is a necessary, but ultimately 
insufficient, first step toward understanding Michigan’s health threat statutes. When we examine 
how public health officials and court officers interpret and enforce the law, we find they do so in 
ways that the law on the books does not predict: epidemiological surveillance is used as a tool of 
forensic surveillance; definitions of “health threat” vary among jurisdictions; public health 
officials exercise considerable discretion in investigating health threats; and attorneys and judges 
continue to voice an antiquated view of HIV/AIDS as a “death sentence.” Whether health threat 
statutes actually undermine public health objectives and deter people from testing or treatment 
should also be considered an open question that merits empirical investigation. 
 
Policy Implications 
Implications for Public Health 
In the last two decades, social control (though the term is not used) has been at the center of 
debates in public health as the CDC has gradually moved away from its focus on strict 
confidentiality and voluntarism toward surveillance measures that are less protective of civil 
rights. Despite dramatic advancements in the treatment of HIV/AIDS, one in five HIV-positive 
people is unaware they are infected with the virus. In the view of CDC officials, this situation 
demands more extensive systems of surveillance. To this end, the CDC recommended nation-
wide reporting of HIV and, despite the objections of AIDS activists, recommended name-based 
reporting (CDC 1999). This was followed by a recommendation that states develop partner 
services (CDC 2008a). Recently, in what is perhaps its boldest move, the CDC (2006) called for 
universal screening for HIV in most healthcare settings unless patients “opt out” or explicitly 
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object to being tested. This recommendation replaces the system of pre- and post-test counseling 
and voluntary informed consent. Given what is viewed as the success of some programs in 
controlling the spread of tuberculosis and the popularity of “treatment as prevention,” it is only a 
matter of time before the CDC takes the next step and calls for compulsory treatment with 
HAART to stop the spread of the epidemic (for harbingers, see Maryland Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene 2011). Moreover, HAART is a complicated regimen with significant side 
effects and consequently a high rate of non-compliance. Given that, as has been the case with 
tuberculosis, nonadherence contributes to the proliferation of resistant strains of HIV, the 
predictable next step would be a CDC recommendation that state public health departments 
institute DOT (directly observed treatment) programs to ensure that persons with HIV/AIDS 
comply with mandatory treatment regimens. In fact, the CDC (2013d) recently announced its 
new “serostatus approach” to combatting HIV, which specifically includes DOT as a measure for 
increasing adherence to treatment regiments. These developments suggest that public health, as a 
practice, administrative regime, and profession is at a crossroads. Increasingly, public health 
officials will face hard choices about whether and to what extent they can embrace compulsory 
measures of social control.  It is therefore important to ask about the policy implications of this 
research for partner services and the enforcement of “health threat” statutes and its more general 
policy implications for social control in public health. 
The study of Partner Services reveals wide variation in how “health threats” are 
defined—that is, whether it is failure to disclose seropositivity or failure to use a condom that is 
needed to be considered a health threat. Public health workers who used the latter definition 
seemed unaware that it contradicted the definitions used in Michigan’s criminal exposure law, 
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which criminalizes HIV exposure. This suggests, at minimum, a need for improved coordination 
between public health officials and law enforcement. 
Second, public health department officials (and legislators) should reconsider whether 
contact tracing programs—particularly when coupled with health threats investigation—are a 
wise investment of their resources. Partner services programs are quite costly, but there is little 
empirical evidence of their effectiveness in reducing the spread of HIV (Gostin 2004). In 
addition, this research suggests myriad other problems: wide variation in the definition of health 
threats and targeting as health threats some people who employ measures of risk reduction. 
While invasion of the privacy of newly diagnosed persons is said to be ethically justifiable 
because of their partners’ right to know they have been exposed to HIV, contact tracing 
programs fail to respect partners’ right not to be informed of their risk of exposure.  
 Although officials promise not to reveal the identity of the “index case” to partners, in 
fact, particularly in ostensibly monogamous relationships, partners can easily identify the person 
who spoke with officials. By insisting on disclosure, partner services programs may expose some 
newly diagnosed persons to unacceptable risks of intimate partner violence. While some readers 
may view such a claim skeptically, an HIV-positive woman was in fact murdered last year in 
Texas after she disclosed her status to her boyfriend (Emily 2013). Despite the fact that he did 
not contract the disease, the defendant reportedly said that his actions were justified because “she 
killed me, so I killed her.” While disturbing, the defendant’s view that his victim had “killed” 
him by having sex with him without disclosing her HIV-positive status closely resembles the 
language used by judges and prosecutors in Michigan HIV nondisclosure cases. While this case 
is clearly exceptional, studies have shown that HIV-positive people—particularly women—
experience a variety of negative outcomes when they disclose, including rejection, abandonment, 
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verbal abuse, and physical assault (Decker et al. 2011; Maman et al. 2000; Gielen et al. 1997). 
 While partner services are ostensibly voluntary and based on informed consent, 
participants are not informed of one of the most serious risks of these programs, particularly 
when used to investigate “health threats”: the “risk of exposure” to surveillance and regulation of 
their intimate lives. Neither “index cases” nor their partners are informed that “confidential” 
information about their serostatus or infection with STI’s (should they test positive) may come to 
be used to investigate their sexual behavior, possibly leading to involuntary confinement or 
arrest. Nor are they informed that the contracts they sign may be used against them in criminal 
proceedings. This research demonstrates that the fears of AIDS activists that names-based 
reporting may one day be used to discriminate against people living with HIV/AIDS are not, in 
the last analysis, unfounded. 
Moreover, while one would expect compassionate attitudes from public health workers 
toward those who have been diagnosed with a life-altering disease, in fact public health officials 
display moralistic and even punitive attitudes toward those deemed “health threats.”  As my 
research shows, many of the strategies reported by local health officials for enforcing Michigan’s 
“health threat” law reproduce the very same stigmatizing perspectives that plague the criminal 
law. Asking individuals newly diagnosed as HIV-positive to sign a contract stating that they will 
not break the law sets up provider-patient relationship that resembles that of a parent and a 
badly-behaving child. In his posthumously published book, the late gay men’s health activist and 
scholar Eric Rofes (2007) argued that this is precisely the kind of approach public health 
agencies adopted in their efforts to control the sexual behaviors of gay men, post-AIDS:  
In the minds of many, AIDS proved that gay liberationists had been wrong. Gay men 
were, in fact, not capable of caring for themselves and others. Not only did homosexuals 
bring this epidemic onto themselves, but they were responsible for HIV becoming 
endemic by repeatedly and knowingly infecting one another. All of a sudden gay men 
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became damaged goods—damaged by homophobia, damaged by AIDS, damaged by out-
of-control sexuality, damaged by addiction. Damaged goods demanded a paradigm of 
health promotion focused on surveillance, control, discipline, and punishment—a 
paradigm that treats adults like children, a model focused on the colonizer and the 
colonized (47). 
 
For these reasons, I would suggest that the resources spent on partner services programs coupled 
with health threats investigation could be better spent on programs less likely to violate privacy, 
dignity, and potentially the liberty of both partners—programs that have been demonstrated to be 
effective in preventing the spread of disease, including: education, peer counseling, needle-
sharing programs and programs that make treatment more widely available. 
Third, public health officials should resist the lure of the more coercive measures of 
mandatory antiretrovival treatment and DOT.  Such programs may extend lives, but this benefit 
comes with the heavy price of intrusion on individuals’ “bodily integrity.”  DOT, which involves 
taking pills in the presence of a supervisor, is a highly demeaning, paternalistic practice, and 
people are understandably unwilling to participate in such programs unless threatened with 
involuntary confinement. There are also problems adapting a program used to control 
tuberculosis, a highly contagious but curable disease, to a less contagious but incurable disease 
such as HIV. Treatment of curable diseases typically ends when the person is cured or no longer 
contagious, but compulsory treatment for HIV/AIDS, a disease that is not yet curable, could 
potentially last for the duration of the treated person’s life. Supervising thousands of people for 
lengthy periods poses possibly insurmountable logistic and financial problems. On the one hand, 
having a tiered system allows officials to offer less restrictive alternatives before moving to more 
coercive ones. On the other hand, the move toward coercion is part of a larger pattern: the 
enchainment of social control measures, in which each disease control technology demands a 
more coercive measure in the background to compel people to comply (e.g., mandatory treatment 
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leads to noncompliance and DOT, which is backed up by the threat of involuntary confinement).  
Compulsory interventions diffuse rapidly, and measures shown to be effective in controlling the 
spread of one disease may be less effective in controlling another.  The specter of using these 
measures to police noncompliance in medical settings suggests that this chain should be broken.                                                                                                                                  
  Fourth, in addition to considering the human rights burdens of coercive control measures, 
public health policy makers should also consider the costs of coercive social control to public 
health professionals themselves and to the moral foundations of their profession.  Social control 
can take a toll on workers’ job satisfaction. Research on psychiatric emergency teams (Emerson 
and Pollner 1976) has shown that idealistic young professionals who enter the helping 
professions with service ideals may become disillusioned when they find that their work consists 
largely of social control. Indeed, this research suggests that several partner services workers 
exhibited signs of burnout. 
 Social control also entails risks for workers’ personal safety. Public health professionals 
may encounter violence when they venture into the field to deliver unwelcome news. The 
murders of child protective services workers are a sobering reminder of the dangers that 
accompany the exercise of the state’s police power (Kresnak 1998).  In its 2008 guide for partner 
services professionals, the CDC (2008b:33) recognized these risks when it advised workers to 
become “skilled at problem solving and dealing with situations that might be encountered in the 
field (e.g., personal safety, intimate partner violence, violence to others).”  Having warned 
professionals of the dangers, the CDC continues to recommend that professionals deliver the 
news to partners in person and stops short of what would seem to be the inescapable conclusion: 
that there are occasions when the exercise of the state’s police powers had best be left to the 
police. 
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These considerations suggest that coercive social control should be relegated to the 
periphery, rather than the core, of public health’s mandate. The state has given public health 
officials enormous powers, not the least of which is the power to deprive individuals of their 
freedom in the name of public health. But with that power comes the potential for its abuse. This 
research demonstrates the corrosive consequences that can ensue when partner services workers 
are charged with enforcing Michigan’s health threat statutes: adversarial relationships with 
clients, punitive attitudes toward them, and burnout. The casualties of this development are 
informed consent and the privacy and dignity of persons living with HIV/AIDS. The marriage of 
public health and law enforcement is not an equal partnership, and the discourse and practice of 
the latter soon comes to prevail. As Colgrove and Bayer (2005: 573) note of substance abuse 
programs, by policing and controlling sex, public health runs the risk of becoming “little more 
than the handmaiden of criminal law.” 
  
Socio-legal Implications: HIV/AIDS and the Criminal Law 
A disturbing finding of this study is that prosecutors and judges seemed poorly informed about 
the transmission of HIV and the risks associated with various modes of transmission. As a first, 
small step toward reform, I propose that all attorneys, prosecutors, and judges involved in cases 
concerning HIV be required to complete a survey course or an online certification program on 
the epidemiological and social aspects of HIV to fulfill their continuing education requirement. 
The course would include such topics as the transmission of HIV and progress in its treatment; 
the experience of living with HIV; and the stigma of HIV.   
This simple intervention may influence how prosecutors handle cases in which 
defendants make good-faith efforts to avoid transmitting HIV to their partners or are accused of 
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behavior that poses minimal risk. At best, the proposed intervention could sensitize court officers 
to their own role in perpetuating the stigma of HIV and to the role of the court as an active 
shaper, rather than simply a mirror, of society’s values. At the very least, it can do little harm. I 
am not suggesting that education and information in themselves have the potential to cure 
society’s ills—a belief common among public health professionals. Rather, I am suggesting that, 
in the absence of alternatives, education should be given a try. 
 The findings of Chapter 3 point to a need for broader changes in the law. Many of the 
cases involved sexual behavior that carried a very low risk of transmission. HIV-positive 
defendants often used condoms or believed that their undetectable viral load protected their 
partner against infection. Indeed, fewer than ten percent of complainants alleged that they 
contracted HIV from the defendant. While prosecutors and judges may be justly criticized for 
making inflammatory, stigmatizing statements about HIV and for meting out excessively harsh 
sentences in some cases, the decisions fell within the boundaries of Michigan’s criminal HIV 
exposure statute.  To avoid the outcomes I have just mentioned, it is therefore necessary to revise 
or repeal Michigan’s statute. Moreover, these flaws are not unique to Michigan’s law, but rather, 
as critics note, are commonly found in many other HIV-specific statutes and have led critics to 
call for reform (for a review, see Lehman et al. 2014). 
 Recently, federal officials and policy makers have begun to pay attention to critics. In 
March, 2014, CDC and Department of Justice researchers issued a joint report. After surveying 
U.S. HIV-specific criminal laws, they concluded that: 
Many of these laws criminalize behaviors that pose low or negligible risk for HIV 
transmission. The majority of laws were passed before studies showed that antiretroviral therapy  
(ART) reduces HIV transmission risk and most laws do not account for HIV prevention measures 
that reduce transmission risk, such as condom use, ART, or pre-exposure prophylaxis. States with 
HIV-specific criminal laws are encouraged to use the findings of this paper to re-examine those 
laws, assess the laws’ alignment with current evidence regarding HIV transmission risk, and  
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TABLE 5.1 PROPOSED, ACCEPTED, AND REJECTED VERSIONS OF IOWA’S 
CONTAGIOUS OR INFECTIOUS DISEASE TRANSMISSION ACT 
A. Original Proposed Bill, Proposed and Rejected by House in 2013 
Class*       Intent Transmission     Crime  Penalty                                   
1. Yes Yes Class C Felony ≤10 yrs. + $1,000—$10,000  
2. Yes No Class D Felony ≤5 yrs. + $750--$7,500  
3. Reckless Disregard Yes Aggravated Misdemeanor ≤2 yrs.    +    $625--$6250  
4.** No No No None 
*Classes 1, 2, and 3 do not apply if the infected person takes practical means to prevent transmission or informs 
uninfected person of that s/he has a contagious disease and the offer to take practical means to prevent infection is 
rejected. Proving the uninfected person knew about the infected person’s condition is an affirmative defense. 
Persons found guilty are no longer placed on list of sex offenders, and previous offenders’ names are removed. 
**Class 4 is decriminalized in original proposed bill.  
 
B. Senate File 2297. Contagious or Infectious Disease Transmission Act, Approved by Senate 
February, 2014, Approved by House May, 2014 
Class*       Intent Transmission    Crime  Penalty                                   
1. Yes  Yes Class B Felony ≤25 yrs.    
2. Yes  No Class D Felony ≤5 yrs. + $750--$7,500  
3. Reckless Disregard Yes Class D Felony ≤5 yrs.    +  $750--$7,500  
4. Reckless Disregard No Serious Misdemeanor ≤2 yrs.  + $625--$6250 
*Classes 1, 2, 3 and 4 do not apply if the infected person takes practical means to prevent transmission or informs 
uninfected person of that s/he has a contagious disease and the offer to take practical means to prevent infection is 
rejected. Proving the uninfected person knew about the infected person’s condition is an affirmative defense. 
Persons found guilty are no longer placed on list of sex offenders, and previous offenders’ names are removed. 
 
C. House Amendment to Senate File 2297. Contagious or Infectious Disease Transmission Act, 
Proposed by House Judiciary Chair Chip Baltimore and Rejected by House 
Class*       Intent Transmission    Crime  Penalty                                   
1. Yes Yes Class B Felony ≤25 yrs.    
2. Reckless Disregard Yes Class C Felony ≤10 yrs. +  $1,000--$10,000 
3. Yes No Class D Felony ≤5 yrs. +   $750--$7,500   
*Classes 1 and 2 do not apply if the infected person has been informed by a healthcare provider that he or she poses 
no measurable risk of transmitting the disease. Proving the uninfected person knew about the infected person’s 
condition is an affirmative defense.  The names of persons found guilty of classes 1, 2, and 3 are placed on the list of 
registered sex offenders.  
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consider whether the laws are the best vehicle to achieve their intended purposes (Lehman et al. 
2014). 
 
Should state legislators take the CDC-DOJ report’s recommendation seriously—as activists will 
surely urge them to do—the report may one day be seen as a defining moment in the history of 
the HIV epidemic. Commentators have proposed two approaches to reform: 1) revising and 
redrafting existing HIV-specific laws and 2) repealing HIV-specific laws and using general 
criminal laws to prosecute those who intentionally transmit HIV. Some states are also redrafting 
HIV-specific statutes so they can be applied to other infectious diseases. 
 Wolf and Vezina (2004) recommend redrafting existing HIV-specific statutes in order to 
target those with the highest level of culpability. The authors recommend: using enhancement 
statutes to impose additional penalties on serious sex crimes only; requiring an intent to harm 
and a serious risk of transmission as conditions for prosecution; excluding those who use risk 
reduction methods (e.g., condoms); focusing on those who expose multiple partners after failing 
less restrictive public health measures; and decreasing the penalties, particularly for first-time 
offenders (Wolf and Vezina 2004). An example of an HIV-specific law that fulfills many of 
these conditions is California’s law, which criminalizes sexual exposure to HIV only if the 
defendant clearly intended to harm another person by transmitting HIV and did so through high-
risk sexual practices (Galletly & Pinkerton 2004). 
 Iowa is the first, and so far the only, state to attempt a significant reform of its HIV-
specific statute. Iowa’s law, one of the toughest in the nation, carried a severe 25-year maximum 
sentence for failing to disclose one’s HIV status before exposing another person to HIV and 
required those convicted to register as sex offenders (Hernandez 2013). One catalyst for the 
introducing the new bill was the public outcry over the case of Nick Rhoades, who was given the 
maximum sentence of 25 years for having sex without disclosing that he was HIV-positive even 
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though he used a condom, had an undetectable viral load, and did not transmit the virus 
(Hernandez 2013) The law, which was years in the making, underwent revision and survived 
challenges (for a review of the bill’s progression, see Table 5.1), before it was finally adopted by 
both the Senate and the House in 2014. For lawmakers in other states contemplating changing  
state HIV laws, Iowa’s experience demonstrates that the road to statutory reform can be long,  
winding, and fraught with political negotiation and compromise (for reports on Iowa’s bill, see 
Pena 2013; Hernandez 2013; One Iowa 2014; Red Wing 2014). 
Iowa’s new law (Table 5.1B) creates a tiered approach to punishing offenders that would 
reserve the most severe sentence (up to 25 years) for those intentionally transmitting the disease.  
People who intend to transmit but only expose another person to a disease without transmitting it 
and those who transmit the disease through “reckless disregard” (e.g., through condomless sex) 
are subject to a sentence of up to five years in prison and a fine. Finally, merely exposing another 
person to a disease through “reckless disregard”—decriminalized in the first iteration of the 
law—is a serious misdemeanor, punishable by up to two years in jail and a fine. Under the new 
law, defendants cannot be found guilty when they take measures to prevent transmission, or if 
the defense is able to prove the complainant consented to risky behavior. The law no longer 
requires people found guilty to register as sex offenders, and the names of those who were 
previously found guilty are removed from the list.  
By including only behavior that carries a serious risk of transmission, excluding cases 
where the person took reasonable measures to prevent transmission, and making penalties 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offense, Iowa’s law follows many of the recommendations 
for statutory reform that call for more carefully and narrowly tailored laws. (e.g., Lehman et al. 
2014). There is, however, an additional feature of the new law that may be drafted too broadly: 
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Presumably as a response to the criticism that HIV-specific laws unfairly single out persons with 
HIV for prosecution, Iowa’s law, now called the “Contagious or Infectious Disease Transmission 
Act,” applies not only to HIV but also to all forms of hepatitis, tuberculosis, and meningococcal 
disease.  These diseases differ in how serious they are; whether a vaccine exists; the degree to 
which they are contagious; and how they are transmitted. Such differences raise the question of 
whether a single law can be applied to a heterogeneous collection of infectious diseases. 
Meningococcal disease, for example, is spread through direct contact with the nasal or throat 
secretions of an infected person, who sneezes or coughs on another person, or through kissing, 
and is encountered in environments where people stay in close proximity. Suppose a teenager 
attending summer camp develops meningitis but neglects to tell her boyfriend to see his doctor 
for preventive antibiotic treatment and he becomes sick. Should the young woman be tried under 
the new statute? Should she be tried as an adult? Or should her parents be tried for failing to have 
her vaccinated, leaving a sick patient without a parent to care for them? My point is that 
criminalizing the transmission of very different diseases can have unanticipated and untoward 
consequences when applied to actual cases—consequences that may not become apparent for 
years. 
 Iowa is not unique in extending its law to other diseases: since 2007 legislators in 
Tennessee and two other states have expanded HIV exposure laws to include hepatitis B and C 
(Hernandez 2013). Despite some differences in mode of transmission these diseases are most 
common among the same marginalized groups at greatest risk of HIV: injection drug users, 
MSM (especially African Americans and Latinos), and African American women (Hernandez 
2013). These laws, then, are subject to the same criticisms applied to HIV-specific laws: that 
they selectively target disadvantaged and disfavored groups. Moreover, while it is less harmful to 
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extend a carefully drafted law, such as Iowa’s statute, to other diseases, most HIV-specific laws 
are, as has been argued, quite flawed. In fact, some states have simply extended existing HIV-
specific laws to other diseases without redrafting existing statutes. If it is unfair to apply a “bad” 
law to those with HIV, is fairness served when the same “bad” law is extended to other diseases?  
A more equitable solution would be to decriminalize the transmission of HIV rather than 
criminalizing the transmission of other diseases. Extending HIV-specific laws, regardless of how 
well drafted they may be, to other diseases has a clearly foreseeable consequence: it broadens the 
legal precedent for punishing sickness and reinforces the idea that the criminal law is a legitimate 
model for controlling disease.  
Revising existing HIV-specific laws has potential pitfalls as well as promises. On the one 
hand, having carefully tailored disease-specific laws has the potential to restrict the kinds of 
cases in which individuals could be found criminally liable and to reserve the most severe 
punishments for those who are most blameworthy.  On the other hand, enacting or even 
reforming disease-specific statutes would further entrench the idea that punishing someone for 
exposing someone else to a disease agent is a valid use of the criminal law. As many have 
argued, this approach tends towards reproducing stigmatizing attitudes and does little to actually 
curtail the spread of the disease in question. As a policy solution, many would argue it does more 
to harm public health than to protect it. While enacting more precise and narrowly tailored laws 
that reserve punishment for individuals who actually put others at risk of contracting a disease 
may be a sensible step, the question remains of whether the criminal law is an appropriate 
recourse for controlling sickness. It is difficult to argue that someone intentionally infecting 
another person with a disease should not be viewed with contempt. But do we need laws specific 
to disease to allow for their punishment under the law? Existing case law indicates that 
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individuals who expose others to disease agents have been prosecuted under a variety of general 
criminal statutes that have nothing to do with sickness (see Center for HIV Law & Policy 2010).   
Several human rights organizations have recommended the second approach:  using 
existing criminal laws to punish the most serious offenders. For example, the United Nations’ 
(2006) International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights recommended that legislators 
not enact specific laws against the deliberate transmission of HIV but should instead apply the 
general criminal law to these cases. This would “ensure that the elements of foreseeability, 
intent, causality and consent are clearly and legally established to support a guilty verdict and/or 
harsher penalties (Guideline 4, para 29(a)).”  Moreover, UNAIDS urged governments to repeal 
existing HIV-specific laws and “apply general criminal laws only to the intentional transmission 
of HIV,” such as “where a person knows his or her HIV positive status, acts with the intention to 
transmit HIV, and does in fact transmit it” (UNAIDS 2008: 1, 6). Lowering the threshold of 
criminal liability beyond intentional transmission to reckless conduct—an ambiguous concept—
would have the same effect as excessively broad HIV specific statutes: subjecting large numbers 
of people to criminal prosecution and selective enforcement against marginalized groups 
(UNAIDS 2008). Cases of intentional transmission are quite rare. Two clear examples are the 
cases of a man who injected his son with HIV to avoid making child support payments (Strait 
1998) and a physician who sought revenge on his ex-lover by injecting her with HIV and 
hepatitis B viruses (Schultz 1998; for a description of these cases, see Gostin 2004). Most would 
agree that these defendants should have been punished. 
 General criminal laws, however, have not been applied narrowly to the intentional 
transmission of HIV. Quite the contrary, criminal laws have been used to prosecute individuals 
whose behavior poses no risk of transmitting HIV.  For example, a Kentucky inmate was 
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recently charged with attempted murder after he threw urine at one of the corrections officers 
(WAVE 3 News 2013). Although assaulting a corrections officer is clearly not a behavior that 
should be legally condoned, it is difficult to justify attempted murder charges on medical 
grounds. Not only can urine thrown on someone not transmit HIV, but even if it could, to 
describe such an act as murderous would seem to belittle the crime of homicide. Nor is this case 
unique. In courts throughout the country, people living with HIV have been charged with 
aggravated assault or even attempted murder for biting, spitting, or throwing bodily fluids, 
usually on police or corrections officers, and their teeth, saliva, or blood have been described as 
“deadly weapons.” In such cases, the risk of actually transmitting the virus is negligible (see 
Gostin 2004; Center for HIV Law & Policy 2011). 
 These cases occur because existing criminal laws are open to multiple interpretations. 
Rarely are the laws on the books written so narrowly as to apply exclusively to those who 
intentionally attempt to infect others. Instead, “the laws create an ambiguous zone of 
condemnation that can potentially encompass everyone from deliberate exposers to ‘average’ 
negligent non-disclosers” (Burris et al. 2007: 490). It is prosecutorial discretion and judicial 
interpretations that determine how traditional criminal offenses are applied to particular cases 
(UNAIDS 2002).  If we are to follow UNAIDS’ guidelines and limit prosecutions to the 
intentional transmission of HIV, the question then becomes how to limit prosecutorial discretion 
without enacting yet another HIV-specific statute. UNAIDS (2002, 2006) proposes that states 
issue guidelines that limit prosecutorial discretion in applying criminal laws by providing narrow 
and clear definitions of “intentional transmission” and specifying conditions that militate against 
prosecution. For example, persons who disclose their HIV status to partners or who use 
reasonable measures to prevent the transmission of HIV should not be prosecuted because they 
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did not intend to transmit the virus (UNAIDS 2006). As is also relevant to this dissertation, the 
guidelines should advise prosecutors to “avoid publicity that may prejudice a trial…and 
[contribute] to widespread misconceptions about how HIV may be transmitted” (UNAIDS 2002: 
40). There is no guarantee that guidelines will always be followed, and like laws, they are subject 
to interpretation. In the end, it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate the interpretive 
processes through which laws are linked to actual cases. These interpretive processes become 
problematic when they include cultural schemas that stigmatize persons with HIV. The 
enforcement of the law—whether criminal laws or HIV statutes—depends on the cultural 
context, and it is this context that must change.  
The purpose of this dissertation is not to devise the correct approach to controlling 
sickness. If there is a “perfect” policy solution, it is not known to this author. That said, there are 
clearly costs associated with the continued enforcement of Michigan’s HIV disclosure law. If the 
HIV-disclosure statute makes it possible in 2009 to convict an HIV-positive dancer of a felony 
for (allegedly) allowing her client’s nose to penetrate her vagina, then there is clearly a need for 
policy reform. It amounts to punishing an HIV-positive person for no other reason than that she 
was HIV-positive. This violates basic human rights guarantees and a constitutional right to equal 
protection under the law. While this case is exceptional in some ways, many of the cases 
involved sexual behavior that was not actually blameworthy. Moreover, no evidence was 
presented in any of the cases reviewed that would have suggested that the defendant maliciously 
intended to infect their partners. While defenders of HIV-specific criminal statutes often invoke 
stories of malicious offenders who wreak havoc by attempting to infect as many innocent, 
unwitting partners as possible, this narrative does not accurately reflect any of the cases analyzed 
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in this dissertation. The HIV-positive monster in many people’s minds is a product of stigma and 
has no basis in reality. 
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